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Graduate School of Business possible. Also, a special thanks to my co-supervisor, Battista Severgnini,
who contributed with valuable suggestions, ideas, and encouragement whenever needed.
In 2013, I got the opportunity to visit the Stanford Graduate School of Business. The months
there were filled with academic discussions and seminars, which provided me with so much valuable
experience and so many new ideas. I am grateful to Professor Edward Lazear for inviting me and
creating this opportunity. Without the funding from several funds, including the Otto Mønsted Fond,
Knud Højgaards Fond, Fabrikejer, ingeniør Valdemar Selmer Trane og hustru, Elisa Tranes Fond, and
the Augustinus Fonden, this trip would not have been possible.
I am sincerely grateful for the careful reading of my papers and the detailed comments and feedback
that I received from my pre-defense committee, consisting of Professor Lisbeth la Cour and Professor
H.C. Kongsted, chairman of my Ph.D. committee. Also, thanks to my colleagues from the Department
of Economics at Copenhagen Business School for providing an inspiring research environment. A
special thanks to Fane Groos for helpful comments and mental support, to Moira Daly for always being
ready to help me understand all of the econometrics, and to Anette Boom for being a supportive and
helpful Ph.D. coordinator. The entire secretariat at the Department of Economics, the CBS Graduate
Administration, and the Administrative Planning Unit for the Business Economics undergraduate
program at CBS were also very helpful when I had questions related to the structure of the programs
at CBS.
Also, I want to thank Christian Møller Dahl for our collaboration on my second chapter and for
many helpful comments on other parts of my work. I also owe Benedikte Bjerg, with whom I have
written my fourth chapter, a large thank you. Thanks for your cooperation and for all of the encour-
agement. Finally, I have spent my years as a Ph.D. student with the best Ph.D. colleagues possible.
Thanks for innumerable discussions about endogeneity, for being the best office-mates possible, and
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I also need to thank all of my friends and my family for all the encouragement and for always being
there when I needed a reason to smiley. Specially, I want to thank my father for talking sense into
me, my mother for being a steady rock, and my grandmother for always reminding me that there is
so much more to life than a Ph.D. I also need to thank my brothers for, among other things, creating
the soundtrack of my Ph.D. Last, but not least, I need to thank my boyfriend Simon, without whom I
would not have managed to finish. Thanks for so much loving support, endless patience and for always
being there for me even when I was not able to be there for myself.
As my time as a Ph.D. student comes to an end, I have come to realize how little I knew when I
started. In many aspects, I now feel ready to write my papers properly since I now know what I should
have done and particularly what I would like to do in further research. I guess that is the nature of
finishing a Ph.D., how ironic it might be.
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Summary (English)
This thesis focuses on individuals’ educational achievements and labor market outcomes in a Dan-
ish context. Particularly, the thesis aims at determining the returns to specific tertiary educational
decisions and understanding the mechanisms underlying such decisions. These related objectives are
addressed using econometric methods applied on Danish micro data. All four chapters are empirical
studies and combine data from different sources. The main source of data is an administrative data
set obtained from Copenhagen Business School (CBS) that contains detailed educational information
on students enrolled at CBS. I combine this data with register data obtained from Statistics Denmark.
The educational data is the core of Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4 and defines the sample in
these chapters. Chapter 1 relies exclusively on data from Statistics Denmark.
Chapter 1 (a joint work with Anders Sørensen from Copenhagen Business School) estimates the
wage premium of those with a master’s degree in business economics and management when compared
to the wages of those with master’s degrees in other fields in the social sciences. By means of an
Instrumental Variable (IV) approach, we identify the returns to a business education by addressing
the endogenous selection of master’s programs. Using season of birth as an exogenous determinant of
master’s degree choice, we find that a master’s degree in business economics and management results
in a wage premium of around 12% compared to other master’s degrees in the social sciences. Moreover,
we find that the probability of private sector employment is significantly larger for individuals with a
master’s degree in business economics and management. Finally, in contrast to the literature that finds
significant reductions in the gender wage gap when controlling for educational fields, controlling for a
master’s degree in business economics and management does not affect the large and robust gender
wage gap prevalent in our sample.
Chapter 2 (a joint work with Anders Sørensen from Copenhagen Business School and Christian
Møller Dahl from University of Southern Denmark) documents how variation in choice of electives and
educational diversification within a master’s program corresponds to variation in labor market outcomes
across individuals. Chapter 2 uses information on individuals who enrolled in the same master’s
programs at CBS but took different elective courses in order to estimate the association between
detailed educational decisions and both wage outcomes and the probability of obtaining leadership
positions. The findings in Chapter 2 indicate, among other things, that elective management courses
and educational diversification within classical business school topics are associated with a higher
probability of obtaining leadership positions. By contrast, we find that educational diversification
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outside classical business school courses is insignificant in our model. The latter provides more insight
into the widespread idea that top managers have broad knowledge and benefit from general abilities
by contrast to firm specific skills.
Both Chapter 3 (single authored) and Chapter 4 (a joint work with Benedikte Bjerg from University
of Copenhagen) use data on students enrolled in the largest undergraduate program at CBS. Relying
on information about randomly assigned peer groups, Chapters 3 estimates the impact from peers on
the probability of dropping out during the first year of study and Chapter 4 estimates the impact from
peers on the choice of master’s degree program. Both chapters address the econometric problems of
self-selection into peer groups by using randomly assigned groups as a measure of peer groups.
Chapter 3 addresses the two-way causality that arises from the interdependence of individual and
peer group behavior by using pre-determined measures of abilities to create measures of peer group
quality and finds that women’s probability of dropping out increases with the ability level of their
peers. By contrast, men’s probability of dropping out is unaffected by peers’ abilities. Chapter 3
also shows how women’s peer group rank is a stronger determinant of the drop out probability than
women’s high school GPA. One interpretation of my findings is that women compare themselves with
their peers and create wrong ideas about their own ability level, which could potentially distort the
expectations of cost and benefits of education and make women under-invest in their own education.
Concerning peer effect in master’s degree choice, Chapter 4 uses the nontraditional method of
dyadic regression to document how pairs of students that were assigned to the same peer group when
enrolled in the bachelor’s program are more likely to choose the same master’s program after bachelor’s
graduation. In the context of our model, this can be thought of as positive assortative matching on
peers. Importantly, we find that positive assortative matching among peers is stronger for individuals
with similar abilities measured by first year GPA. Finally, we see no strong adverse effect of following
peers on educational performance.
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Resume (Danish)
Denne afhandling fokuserer på individers uddannelsesmæssige og arbejdsmarkedsrelaterede resultater
i en dansk kontekst. Konkret har afhandlingen til formål at bestemme individers økonomiske afkastet
knyttet til forskellige aspekter af videregående uddannelser samt at forstå mekanismerne bag forskellige
beslutninger relateret til en videregående uddannelse. Disse emner behandles ved hjælp af økonometriske
metoder, der anvendes på det danske mikro data. Alle fire kapitler er empiriske undersøgelser og kom-
binere data fra forskellige kilder. Den vigtigste datakilde er et administrativ datasæt fra Copenhagen
Business School (CBS), der indeholder detaljeret uddannelsesinformation på studerende på CBS. Jeg
kombinerer disse data med det danske registerdata fra Danmarks Statistik. Uddannelsesdataet fra
CBS er kernen i kapitel 2, kapitel 3, og kapitel 4 og definerer stikprøven i disse kapitler. Analyserne i
Kapitel 1 beror udelukkende på data fra Danmark Statistik.
Kapitel 1 (udarbejdet med Anders Sørensen fra Copenhagen Business School) benytter det danske
registerdata til at estimere en lønpræmie for dem med en kandidatgrad i erhvervsøkonomi og ledelse
set i forhold til dem med kandidatgrader indenfor andre områder af samfundsvidenskab. Vi identifi-
cerer afkastet til en uddannelse i erhvervsøkonomi ved hjælp af Instrument Variable (IV) teknikker.
Helt konkret forklarer vi valg af uddannelsesretning med graden af uddannelsesmæssig modenhed,
et karakteristika vi antager er eksogent i forhold til arbejdsmarkedsrelaterede resultater og vi måler
denne uddannelsesmæssige modenhed med fødselstidspunktet på året. Ved hjælp af denne metode
finder vi, at en kandidatgrad i erhvervsøkonomi og ledelse resulterer i en lønpræmie på omkring 12
% set i forhold til andre kandidatuddannelser indenfor samfundsvidenskab. Derudover finder vi, at
sandsynligheden for at blive ansat i den private sektor er signifikant større for personer med en kandi-
datgrad i erhvervsøkonomi og ledelse. Endelig, i modsætning til flere studier i litteraturen der finder
at lønforskellen mellem kønnene reduceres betydeligt når der kontrolleres for uddannelsesvalg, finder
vi ingen reduktion i lønforskellen mellem kønnene selv efter vi har kontrolleret for en kandidatgrad i
erhvervsøkonomi og ledelse.
Kapitel 2 (udarbejdet med Anders Sørensen fra Copenhagen Business School og Christian Møller
Dahl fra University of Southern Danmark) dokumenterer hvordan variation i valg af valgfag og ud-
dannelsesmæssige diversificering bliver reflekteret i resultater på arbejdsmarked. I Kapitel 2 benytter
vi data på studerende, der alle har studeret den samme kandidatgrad på CBS, men som har valgt
forskellige valgfag. Ved hjælp af dette data estimerer vi sammenhængen mellem detaljerede uddan-
nelsesmæssige beslutninger og både løn og sandsynligheden for at opnå lederstillinger. Resultaterne
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præsenteret i kapitel 2 viser, blandt andet, at kurser i ledelse og uddannelsesmæssig diversificering
indenfor klassiske business school kurser er associeret med en højere sandsynlighed for at opnå led-
erstillinger. I modsætning til dette finder vi også, at uddannelsesmæssig diversificering udenfor de
klassiske business school kurser er insignifikante i vores model. Sidstnævnte resultat giver mere ind-
sigt i den udbredte idé om, at topchefer har bred viden og drager fordel af generelle færdigheder i
modsætning til at have virksomhedsspecifikke færdigheder.
Både kapitel 3 og kapitel 4 (sidstnævnte udarbejdet med Benedikte Bjerg fra Københavns Uni-
versitet) bruger data på studerende der har været indskrevet på den største bacheloruddannelse på
CBS. Dette data indeholder information om tilfældigt inddelte grupper som de studerende inddeles
i ved uddannelsesstart, hvilket er en essentiel information for begge kapitler fordi de begge løser det
økonometriske problem med selektion af peers ved at bruge de tilfældigt inddelte grupper som et mål
for peer-grupper. Kapitel 3 estimerer effekten fra peers på sandsynligheden for at droppe ud i løbet af
det første studieår, mens kapitel 4 estimerer effekten fra peers på valg af kandidatretning.
Et kendt problem når man estimerer peer-effekter er den tovejs kausaliteten der opstår, fordi
individets og peer-gruppens adfærd er indbyrdes afhængig. I Kapitel 3 benytter jeg de studerendes
gymnasiegennemsnit som et mål for deres evner og niveau til at udregne et mål for “peer-kvalitet”,
der er forudbestemt i modellen og derfor ikke endogent. Resultater i Kapitel 3 viser, at kvinders
sandsynlighed for at droppe ud stiger med niveauet i deres peer-gruppe. I modsætning til det viser det
sig, at mænds sandsynlighed for at droppe ud er upåvirket af niveauet i deres peer-grupper. Kapitel
3 viser også, at kvinders rang indenfor deres peer-gruppe har en stærkere indflydelse på kvinders
sandsynlighed for at droppe ud end kvindernes eget gymnasiegennemsnit. Jeg tolker disse resultater
som, at kvinder sammenligner sig med deres peers og skabe forvredne forestillinger om deres eget
niveau, hvilket kan medføre at de dropper ud. Sådanne forkerte ideer om eget niveau kan ligeledes
resultere i forkerte forventninger til omkostningerne og fordelene ved at tage en uddannelse, hvilket
kan gøre, at kvinder underinvestere i deres egen uddannelse.
Kapitel 4 estimerer peer-effekter i valg af kandidatretning ved at bruge dyadic regression. Dyadic
regression er i uddannelseslitteraturen en utraditionel økonometrisk metode, men den er oplagt at
bruge til at estimere hvorvidt par af studerende, der ved uddannelsesstart tilfældigt blev sat i samme
gruppen, er mere tilbøjelige til at vælge den samme kandidatuddannelse efter bachelor-eksamen. I
rammerne af vores model kan dette tolkes som positiv assortative matching på peers. Vores resultater
viser, at studerendes valg af kandidatgrad er påvirket af deres peers og at denne positive assortative
matching på peers er stærkere for personer med samme karaktergennemsnit fra første år. Endelig
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observerer vi ingen effekt af at følge peers i valg af kandidatretning på hverken uddannelsesmæssige
resultater eller resultater på arbejdsmarkedet.
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Introduction
This thesis consists of an introduction followed by four numbered chapters and ends with a short
conclusion. All chapters are based on empirical research papers, are self-contained, and can be read
independently. However, all four chapters fall under the heading of Economics of Education and Labor
and are concerned with aspects of the associations between tertiary educational decisions and labor
market outcomes and mechanisms underlying these educational decisions.1 My Ph.D. was funded by
Copenhagen Business School (CBS) and was initiated because of the need to better understand how
students, firms, and society in general can benefit from a business school as CBS. Thus, many questions
were raised in advance of the research. Chapters 1 and 2 initiate from and expand on these questions,
whereas the ideas for Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 were formed during the Ph.D. Chapter 1 estimates
the return to a master’s degree in business economics and management and Chapter 2 estimates the
association between labor market outcomes and students’ choice of elective master’s courses. Chapters
3 and 4 focus on peer effects on educational decisions related to a tertiary education. Particularly,
Chapter 3 investigates the impact of peers’ abilities on individuals’ probability of dropping out of
university and Chapter 4 estimates peer effects in master’s program choice. While each chapter has
its own topic, the chapters are linked through the use of Danish micro data, the empirical focus and
econometric techniques, and an overlap in background literature.
The topics of this thesis are motivated by both the micro and macro literature. It is broadly
recognized that educational investment decisions are related to welfare and growth both at the country
and individual levels. Existing empirical research at the micro level provides evidence of field-of-study
choices being strong predictors and causal determinants of labor market outcomes, with the literature
on this topic growing in recent years (e.g., Arcidiacono, 2004; Altonji et al., 2012; Kirkebøen et al.,
2014; Joensen and Nielsen, 2015; Altonji et al., 2015). Moreover, at the macro level, findings suggest
that growth and cognitive skills (in contrast to years of education) are positively associated (e.g.,
Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2012). These findings suggest that students
1In Appendix A, page 258, I describe the Danish education system in more detail. For people unfamiliar with the
Danish education system it might be beneficial to consult Appendix A before reading the papers in this thesis.
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should be guided in their educational choices in order to improve both individual-level outcomes and
the economic growth. However, the causal influence from the field of education is still debated, and
knowledge about the impact of detailed educational choices is limited. For policymakers to be able
to design policies aimed at improving micro-and macro-level outcomes through changed educational
behavior, gaining a better understanding of how educational choices are reflected in the labor market
is crucial. Moreover, to design policies that are adequate in changing educational behavior, knowledge
concerning the drivers of these choices is essential. The former justify the research focus in Chapters 1
and 2— the returns to specific educational decisions—while the latter motivate the focus of Chapters 3
and 4 on the determinants of educational decisions. Importantly, my findings also feed into the ongoing
debate in Denmark focusing on productivity differences across educational fields and how to construct
a more efficient education system.
Almost all empirical work on the returns to and choice of education relies on the theoretical and
empirical work of Becker (1964), Mincer (1958, 1974), and earlier studies. Among other things, Becker
contributed to the economic literature by expanding on the ideas that individuals could decide on
their education and that such decisions could be considered investments in human capital, which
would contribute to productivity. In the framework of human capital theory, individuals choose their
education based on the cost and benefits associated with such decisions.2 Mincer (1974) introduced the
Mincer log wage equation where he related earnings to not only years of schooling but also experience or
on-the-job training. The Mincer log wage equation has since been used as the foundation for countless
studies on the return to education. Following these studies, the empirical literature investigated the
causal impact of years of education on earnings by means of Instrumental Variable (IV) approaches
(e.g., Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Card, 1999).
More recently, the empirical literature has been concerned with the differences in labor market
outcomes caused by differences in field-of-study choices (e.g., James et al., 1989; Blundell et al., 2000;
Arcidiacono, 2004; Altonji et al., 2012; Kirkebøen et al., 2014; Altonji et al., 2015). This thesis is
inspired by such studies, but suggests alternative ways of addressing the selection into education and
also considers the impact of self-selected curricular differences within a specific field of study. Building
on the literature that has established a significant connection between educational decisions and labor
market outcomes, researchers have realized the importance of understanding the mechanism underlying
such educational decisions (e.g., Berger, 1988; Montmarquette et al., 2002; Arcidiacono, 2004; De Giorgi
2Moreover, Becker was the first to distinguish between general and firm specific skills. This distinction can be related
to Chapter 2, which investigates the importance of managerial skills. Managerial skills are often though of as being the
opposite to firm specific skills.
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et al., 2010; Zafar, 2013). Following this literature, this thesis provides empirical studies of students’
decisions of dropping out of university as well as their choice of master’s program.
In the process of writing my Ph.D. thesis, the results obtained from one chapter inspired me to
initiate and continue working on the other chapters, which again inspired me to take up the previous
chapters for revision. However, the order of the chapters still reflects an important learning process
in two ways. First, Chapter 1 was simply the first chapter that I wrote while Chapter 4 was the last
chapter I initiated. Second, the order of the chapters reflects a learning process at a more substantial
level. Chapter 1 estimates the return to a master’s in business economics and management and Chapter
2 investigates the labor market consequences of detailed educational choices, such as type of elective
master’s courses and the extent of educational diversification within a specific master’s program. Both
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 establish a significant association between educational choices and labor
market outcomes and emphasize the need to understand what drives individuals to make these edu-
cational choices. Motivated by these results, Chapters 3 and 4 focus on determinants of educational
decisions related to a tertiary education. In particular, Chapters 3 and 4 focus on understanding peer
effects in the decision to drop out of university and in choice of master’s program. Chapter 4 is the
least traditional of the chapters, as it applies an estimation method that is not very familiar within
the economics of education literature.
The four chapters share a key feature, namely the use of Danish micro-level data. All chapters
use the Danish register data that covers the entire Danish population and is maintained by Statistics
Denmark. Besides the Danish register data, a key data source is a unique data set obtained from the
administration at CBS. This data contains detailed educational information on individuals that were
enrolled at CBS between the 1980s and 2011. I use this data in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. The large amount
of information in this data enabled me to shed light on questions that the literature often only answers
using survey data. This data also contains information on randomly assigned peer groups, which I
exploit in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 to overcome the standard self-selection problem when estimating
peer effects (Manski, 1993). Finally, Chapter 2 also uses data from the Danish Business Authority
about individuals on the executive boards of all joint stock companies that already existed or were
established during the 2000–2010 period.
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Chapter Overview
A large body of research investigates the labor market returns to education, and studies have analyzed
both the return to an extra year of education (the quantity of education) and the return to specific fields
of education (the quality of education) (e.g., Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Card, 1999; James et al., 1989;
Blundell et al., 2000; Arcidiacono, 2004; Altonji et al., 2012; Kirkebøen et al., 2014). Particularly, the
causal impact from education continues to be a topic of interest for policymakers and is therefore still
debated (for reviews and discussions about this see Altonji et al., 2012, 2015). Using Danish register
data, Chapter 1, The Returns to a Business Education - Evidence from Danish Administrative Register
Data (a joint work with Anders Sørensen from Copenhagen Business School), builds on the traditions
of this literature and establishes a causal relationship between a master’s degree in business economics
and management and labor market outcomes, measured both as hourly wage and the probability of
employment in the private sector.3 Chapter 1 compares the labor market outcomes of students who
graduated with a master’s degree in business economics and management to those of students who
graduated with a master’s degree in other social science fields.
By contrast to other studies that measure wages at one point in time, the Danish register data
allows us to measure hourly wages every year after graduation up and until the 10th year. Estimating a
potential business education wage premium every year after graduation helps us to understand how this
business education wage premium works together with enhanced labor market experience. To estimate
a causal relationship, we apply an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach. Determinants of educational
choices that are exogenous to labor market outcomes is scarce (Altonji et al., 2015). We complement the
literature by suggesting educational maturity as an instrument for master’s degree choice. We define
educational maturity as a student’s certainty about field-of-study and career choices. The intuition
behind this idea is that the more educationally mature students are, the more certain they are about
their field-of-study choice. Because a master’s program at a business school is much broader than a
master’s program in other fields of the social sciences, we hypothesize that students with a low level of
educational maturity are more likely to choose a master’s degree in Business Economics. We measure
educational maturity by quarter of birth and argue that, because we consider the case of Denmark,
quarter of birth is exogenous to labor market performance.
Using our suggested instrument, we find a causal and positive impact of a master’s degree in busi-
ness on a set of measures of labor market outcomes. Specially, we show that a master’s degree in
3The term “a master’s degree in business economics and management” is composed of master’s degrees obtained from
different Danish business schools.
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business economics and management is associated with a wage premium of 12-17%. Moreover, the es-
timated business wage premium increases in years after graduation, suggesting that the acquired skills
become more valuable when integrated with labor market experience. Estimating the wage regression
for each year after graduation, we also find an increasing gender wage gap. The wage gap increase
from 7% to 23% in the period from the first year to the 10th year after graduation. By contrast to
the literature that finds significant reductions in the gender wage gap when controlling for educational
fields, controlling for a master’s degree in business economics and management does not narrow the
gender wage gap prevalent in our sample. Finally, we find that a master’s degree in Business Economics
increases the probability of private sector employment significantly.
Chapter 2, Choice of Electives and Future Leadership - Evidence from Business School Students (a
joint work with Anders Sørensen from Copenhagen Business School, and Christian Møller Dahl from
University of Southern Denmark), uses data from CBS, the Danish register, and the Danish Business
Authority to examine how the extent of educational diversification, i.e., the number of different types
of elective courses a student took during the master’s program, and the choice of certain elective
master’s courses are reflected in both the hourly wages and the probability of getting a position in the
executive board of a firm (a C-level position). Building on existing findings in the literature, we expect
that individuals who are educated in management would have a higher probability of getting a C-level
position. Moreover, we expect individuals with diversified knowledge from their education to be more
likely to obtain a C-level position.
A growing body of literature is concerned with determining what specific skills are required for
leaders. Within this literature, both theoretical and empirical studies have been concerned with the
influence of managerial abilities and diversified knowledge on CEO appointments and payments (e.g.,
Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004; Lazear, 2012; Custódio et al., 2013; Falato et al., 2015). Specifically,
empirical studies have shown that being educationally diversified and having diversified labor market
experiences are positively reflected both in the probability of becoming a leader and in the wages of
CEOs (e.g., Lazear, 2012; Custódio et al., 2013; Falato et al., 2015). Alongside this literature, a body of
research investigates the influence of specific educational decisions and skills on labor market outcomes,
holding the level and field of education constant. Within this literature, studies have found that skills
related to mathematics and finance particularly improve wage outcomes (e.g., Joensen and Nielsen,
2009; Bertrand et al., 2010; Lazear, 2012; Joensen and Nielsen, 2015). Finally, findings in a slightly
different branch of the literature suggest that management practices and choice of CEO can explain
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part of the differences in performance across otherwise equal firms (e.g., Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007;
Bennedsen et al., 2006; Bloom et al., 2013; Falato et al., 2015). Considering these parts of the literature
together helped us to form our expectations.
Chapter 2 contributes to the literature by asking how detailed curriculum characteristics of an
individual’s master’s program predict both leadership and wage outcomes. The empirical analysis is
meant to provide a detailed description of the people in leadership positions and the variables asso-
ciated with their characteristics. The results should therefore not be interpreted causally. However,
as the literature on the association between detailed educational choices and leadership is limited, a
study of correlations can still be valuable because it can uncover patterns and lay ground for further
research. We find that management courses and educational diversification within classical business
topics are strong predictors of leadership, whereas broader diversification is insignificant in determining
leadership. Moreover, we find that courses in finance and accounting are positively associated with
wage outcomes. Such findings confirmed our expectations and are in line with previous research (e.g.,
Bertrand et al., 2010; Lazear, 2012; Bloom et al., 2013; Joensen and Nielsen, 2009).
Chapter 3, Dropping Out of University: Estimating Peer Effects Using Randomly Assigned Groups,
also uses the detailed educational data obtained from CBS together with the Danish register data
and investigates peers’ impact on both students’ probability of dropping out during the first year of
an undergraduate program at CBS and on their first-year GPAs. While the literature on peer effects
in education is extensive, most studies are concerned with peer effects in educational performance,
and fewer papers investigate peer effects in tertiary education (e.g., Sacerdote, 2001; Carrell et al.,
2009; Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009; Lavy et al., 2012; Carrell et al., 2013; Murphy and Weinhardt,
2014; Elsner and Isphording, 2015). Likewise, only few studies investigate the impact from peers on
the probability of dropping out (Johnes and McNabb, 2004; Booij et al., 2015). I contribute to this
literature by an investigation of peer effects on students’ dropout decisions in tertiary education.
Because education is a significant determinant of labor market outcomes (as also seen in Chapters
1 and 2), it is important to understand the mechanism behind educational performance and decisions,
which explains why peer effects in educational outcomes continue to be debated in the literature.
Besides the importance for labor market outcomes, university dropouts are associated with inefficient
use of time and resources for students, universities, and the broader society. For instance, when students
do not complete their studies, they have spent time gaining human capital that they are likely not
to use. Also, either they delayed their labor market entrance by postponing a potential graduation
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or they enter the labor market with a lower level of education, which is likely to be reflected in their
lifetime earnings. Finally, they have taken up a space at the university that could have been used by
another student. Thus, obtaining a better understanding of peer influence on the decision to drop out
is important.
The main contribution of Chapter 3 is an analysis of how the ability level of a peer group is
associated with individuals’ probability of dropping out of university. Moreover, inspired by recent
literature that investigates the influence of ability ranking on educational performance (Murphy and
Weinhardt, 2014; Elsner and Isphording, 2015), Chapter 3 is also concerned with how and if ability
ranking in peer groups in tertiary education affects the decision to drop out. To the best of my
knowledge, no other papers have investigated this relationship. The detailed educational data from
CBS provided me with information on randomly assigned peer groups and knowledge about individuals’
pre-university abilities, which enabled me to overcome the econometric problems of reflection (two-way
causality) and endogenous selection of peers, as described by Manski (1993).
Chapter 3 finds that women’s probability of dropping out increase with peers’ abilities , whereas
men’s are unaffected by their peers. This is especially true for women in the lower end of the abil-
ity distribution. A potential explanation for this result is the so-called “big fish, little pond” effect
(BFLPE) found in the psychology literature (e.g., Marsh and Parker, 1984; Marsh and Hau, 2003).
The BFLPE appears when students form their own concepts of self by comparing their academic abil-
ities to those of their peers. Having high-ability peers could potentially make students underestimate
their own abilities, which might make them feel like they are falling behind. The finding that it is
women who are adversely impacted by the ability level of their peers might be explained by a ten-
dency among women to underestimate themselves and to shy away from competition (e.g., Gneezy
et al., 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, 2010). My results also show that women who rank high in
their peer groups are less likely to drop out, whereas their own ability level (measured by high school
GPA) becomes insignificant in determining the probability of dropping out when the peer group rank
measure is included. The latter indicates that peer group rank is a stronger determinant of dropout
than own ability level, which could distort the expectations of the trade-off between cost and benefit
associated with education and might make women under-invest in their own education. Overall, my
results suggest that, for women, the influence from peers is significant in determining the important
educational decision of dropping out, suggesting that educational institutions should take that into
considerations when designing education programs.
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Finally, Chapter 4, Do Peers Matter? - Impacts of Peers on Master’s Choice and Labor Market
Outcomes (a joint work with Benedikte Bjerg from University of Copenhagen), complements Chapter
3 and investigates peer impacts on master’s degree choice using the same data. Because individuals’
choice of master’s program is reflected in both labor market outcomes and the skill composition of the
labor force—and thereby in growth and productivity—it is essential to understand the mechanisms
driving it. This has already been recognized in the literature (e.g., Berger, 1988; Montmarquette
et al., 2002; Arcidiacono, 2004; De Giorgi et al., 2010; Zafar, 2013). However, likely because of the
econometric problems related to estimating peer effects (see Manski, 1993), only a few studies have
been concerned with peer effects in post-undergraduate decisions (Lyle, 2007; De Giorgi et al., 2010;
Ost, 2010; Poldin et al., 2015).
Chapter 4 contributes to the literature by estimating an association between individuals’ choice
of master’s program and peers’ choice of master’s program using the application of an econometric
methodology normally applied in the study of social network formation in development economics; it
is referred to as dyadic regression (e.g. Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007). The method of dyadic regression
can be compared to the Gravity model from the international trade literature, which is commonly used
to model bilateral aggregate trade flows between pairs of countries (dyads) (e.g., Bergstrand and
Egger, 2011; Mayer, 2014). By means of dyadic regression together with data on randomly assigned
peer groups, we overcome both the reflection and peer-selection problems (Manski, 1993). Particularly
we investigate the presence of positive and negative assortative matching along multiple dimensions
using dyadic regressions, including matching on peers. In the context of our study, positive assortative
matching means that two students who are more similar are more likely to enroll in the same master’s
program and vice versa for negative assortative matching.
Among other findings, our results show indications of positive assortative matching on peers: Stu-
dents randomly assigned to the same group the first year of undergraduate studies are more likely to
enroll in the same master’s program three years later. Our results vary across years and the effect is,
however, only significant at the 10 percent level for our main year of interest. Importantly, the results
from Chapter 4 also show that positive assortative matching among peers is stronger for individuals
with similar abilities. Inspired by De Giorgi et al. (2010), Chapter 4 also investigates how educational
performance and labor market outcomes are associated with being impacted by peers when choosing
master’s programs. We find no effect of following peers on educational performance and a 10 percent
significant negative effect on labor market outcomes. The lack of an effect on educational performance
is explained by our previous finding: namely, that positive assortative matching is much stronger
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among students who are similar in terms of abilities. We interpret this as the fact that following peers
with a similar level of abilities might actually result in positive effects from, for instance, improved
collaboration, which would cancel out the negative effects that stem from following peers while ignoring
one’s own abilities.
Collectively, the four chapters focus on the determinants and consequences of educational decisions at
the tertiary level. I find, among other things, that educational decisions such as choice of master’s
program and choice of elective master’s courses are influential in terms of labor market outcomes.
Moreover, I find that peer effects are present in educational decisions, such as the decision to drop
out during the first year of undergraduate studies and the choice of master’s program. From a policy
perspective, my findings can help inform policymakers about which educational fields that provide the
highest return and how young people are influenced in their educational decisions.
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Abstract
Using Danish administrative register data, we estimate the labor market returns to master's
degrees in business economics and management by comparing students from business economics
with students from other ﬁelds in the social sciences. We address selection into ﬁelds of study
using an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach, through which we introduce a novel application of
an existing instrument. We hypothesize that educational maturity is important for educational
decisions and use season of birth as an exogenous predictor of master's degree choice. Our results
show that individuals with a master's degree in business economics and management, on average,
have a wage premium of approximately 12-17% and a signiﬁcantly higher probability of private
sector employment. Comparing IV and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates shows that our
OLS estimates are downward biased, which indicates negative selection into a business education.
Finally, our results show that controlling for a master's degree in business economics does not re-
duce the observed gender wage gap in our data.
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1 Introduction
The idea that education is fundamental for individual productivity is well established in the literature
and most economists now agree that education is increasingly important for labor market success.
The labor market continues to reward highly educated employees perhaps because of the increasingly
globalized economy and the corresponding high competition. Because the labor force continues to
be more educated and the returns to many fields is now equivalent to the college wage premium
(Kirkebøen et al., 2014), educational decisions are no longer only about the amount of education; they
are actually more about the type and field of study. However, which type of skills that results in higher
returns is still not completely clear, even though the literature on the returns to education continues
to grow. This paper complements the literature by estimating a causal relationship between a master’s
degree in business economics and management and labor market outcomes, which are measured by
hourly wages and the probability of private sector employment.1 Using Danish administrative register
data, we compare the labor market outcomes of individuals who obtain a master’s degree in business
economics and management to those of individuals who receive master’s degrees in other fields in the
social sciences.
Ample research examines the returns to education and covers both the returns to quantity (years)
and quality (field) of education, including pioneering studies that have evaluated the impact of ad-
ditional years of schooling (e.g., Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994; Card,
1999). By contrast, this paper is concerned with the returns to a specific field of study (e.g., James
et al., 1989; Blundell et al., 2000; Arcidiacono, 2004; Hamermesh and Donald, 2008; Buonanno and
Pozzoli, 2009; Dalgaard et al., 2009; Altonji et al., 2012; Hastings et al., 2013; Kirkebøen et al., 2014).
Much attention has already been directed towards understanding the relationship between wages and
education, and the literature on the returns to various fields of education has been growing rapidly
in recent years. To complement the existing literature, we establish a causal business education wage
premium and subsequently re-estimate this wage premium every year for 10 years after graduation.
We do the latter to better understand how the business education wage premium works. Moreover,
we estimate the causal relationship between a business education and the probability of private sector
employment. To identify the effect of a business education, we suggest a novel application of an existing
instrument, which enables us to address self-selection into a master’s program in business economics
and management. By contrast to other studies, we limit our sample to consists of individuals that have
1The term “a master’s degree in business economics and management” is composed of master’s degrees obtained from
different Danish business schools.
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graduated with either a master’s degree in business economics and management or a master’s degree
in other fields in the social sciences. This means that our estimated business wage premium is relative
to having a master’s degree in other fields of the social sciences.
Policymakers continue to ponder whether the association between educational choices and labor
market success is only caused by self-selection or if certain types of education provide students with
more productive human capital. At the micro level, research has shown that educational choices are a
strong predictor of labor market outcomes (e.g., Blundell et al., 2000; Arcidiacono, 2004; Hamermesh
and Donald, 2008; Lazear, 2012; Altonji et al., 2012; Joensen and Nielsen, 2015); at the macro level,
cognitive skills (unlike years of education) have been shown to be an important determinant of economic
growth (e.g., Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2012). Policymakers should thus
consider these factors when designing educational policies. However, to make informed and useful
policy recommendations, one needs to fully understand how educational choices are reflected in labor
market performance. In particular, we need to understand whether students should be encouraged
to pursue certain fields of study or if a positive association only exists for students with specific pre-
determined abilities and preferences.
Educational choices are widely recognized as endogenous, which means that a causal interpretation
of the estimated effect of education is difficult. Despite the vast literature on the returns to education,
the question of how to determine causality is still debated, and structural estimation, selection on
observables as a guide for selection on unobservables, and the exogenous variation of an instrument or
in admission criteria have been among the proposed solutions (e.g., Berger, 1988; Arcidiacono, 2004;
Dalgaard et al., 2009; Webber, 2014; Kirkebøen et al., 2014; Altonji et al., 2015). Acknowledging the
non-random self-selection into fields of study, we address endogeneity using an Instrumental Variable
(IV) approach, whereby we hypothesize that educational maturity is an important determinant of
educational choices and is exogenous to labor market outcomes. Measuring educational maturity by
season of birth, we use quarter-of-birth dummies as our exogenous instrument.
The problem of endogenous selection emerges if, for instance, an individual chooses a field of study
that corresponds to his or her unobserved abilities. If these unobserved abilities also have an impact
on future labor market outcomes, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates are biased. If someone
performs better in, for instance, the natural sciences, then he or she may be more likely to choose
an education in which he or she can benefit more from these skills. Such abilities are also likely to
influence a person’s wage outcome and employment opportunities, which causes the OLS estimates
to be upward biased. Endogenous selection can also introduce biased estimates if individuals observe
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wage differences across types of master’s degrees and account for these differences in their educational
choices. Likewise, if less-able students compensate for their shortcomings by choosing fields of study
that offer higher wages or more productive human capital, such action will bias the OLS estimates
downward. To address the issues that arise from self-selection into fields of study, we need an instrument
that is both relevant and exogenous.
To identify the impact of business education on labor market outcomes, we start by studying the
mechanisms behind these educational choices. That is, we try to understand tertiary education choices.
We posit that educational maturity is an important factor in field-of-study choice in tertiary education.
We follow Naylor and Sanford (1980) and define educational maturity based on the student’s certainty
about his or her university field and career choices. Based on this definition, we hypothesize that, if
educational maturity is low, a prospective student will tend to choose a field of study with more general
characteristics than a prospective student with high educational maturity. We argue that a master’s
degree in business economics and management at a business school is broader and has more general
characteristics than similar master’s programs within the social sciences at the university. Thus, we
expect that students with low educational maturity will be more likely to choose a master’s program in
a business school. Based on this expectation, we model field-of-study choice as a function of a student’s
background characteristics, high school performance, and educational maturity. We expect high school
performance and other background characteristics to have an impact on labor market outcomes, but
educational maturity should be exogenous to future labor market outcomes, making it a potential
instrument.
We assume that educational maturity is related to age. In other words, we assume that, within
the same birth year, individuals who are born later in the year display, on average, less educational
maturity than individuals who are born earlier in the year. Students in Denmark choose tertiary
education at the same time each year, which means that students born in the same year differ in age
and educational maturity when they choose their fields of study. We measure educational maturity
by season of birth, and our instrument is quarter-of-birth dummies. In our estimations, we find that
the later a person is born in the year, the more likely he or she is to enroll in a master’s degree in
business economics and management. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to address
the endogeneity of master’s program choice using season of birth as an instrument.
We need to discuss why season of birth is exogenous to labor market outcomes. Several studies
have attempted to document the negative implications of starting school relatively young in terms
of both long-term and short-term outcomes (e.g., Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; McEwan and Shapiro,
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2008). However, more recent studies have concluded that school starting age has no long-term effect
on labor market performance and level of education (e.g., Dobkin and Ferreira, 2010; Black et al.,
2011; Fredriksson and Öckert, 2013; Rockwool-Foundation, 2015).2 In contrast with their findings for
almost all other countries, Bedard and Dhuey (2006) show that season of birth does not have an impact
on Danish pupils’ educational performance, perhaps because Danish pupils are not tracked based on
abilities until they have finished lower secondary school at 15 or 16 years of age. Additionally, a
November newsletter from the Danish Rockwool Foundation Research Unit concluded that, for Danish
students, starting school young does not influence the final years of their obtained education (Rockwool-
Foundation, 2015). These findings are especially important for this study, as they substantiate our
assumption that season of birth is exogenous to labor market outcomes in a Danish context.
Our baseline OLS results show that a master’s degree in business is, on average, associated with a
wage premium of approximately 6% when compared with other master’s degrees in the social sciences.
Applying our IV strategy, we observe an average business wage premium of approximately 12-17%,
which suggests that the OLS estimates are downward biased. Additionally, our IV results show that the
business wage premium increases with the years after graduation. The literature in general finds that
having an education in the natural sciences, engineering, or business yields a higher return compared
with other tertiary fields of study (e.g., James et al., 1989; Blundell et al., 2000; Arcidiacono, 2004;
Altonji et al., 2012; Webber, 2014; Kirkebøen et al., 2014), which is in line with our results. In a
slightly different branch of the literature, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and Bloom et al. (2013) show
that differences in management practices correspond with differences in firms’ performances. Because
business schools often teach management to their students, one might expect that individuals with
master’s degrees in business economics and management have managerial skills that might help them
contribute to improved management practices and, in turn, improved firm performance. If individuals
contribute positively to firm performance, we expect to see their contributions reflected in higher wages,
which may partly explain the observed business wage premium.
Continuing to our employment sector model, our OLS estimates show a 34 percentage-point increase
in the probability of private sector employment if an individual holds a master’s degree in business
economics and management. Compared with our IV strategy, we see a slight increase in the estimated
impact of business education (36-38%) on the probability of private sector employment. Because
business universities generally teach skills that are primarily in demand in the private sector, this
2This question has recently been discussed in a Danish context (Dee and Sievertsen, 2015; Landersø et al., Forth-
coming; Rockwool-Foundation, 2015), including recent reports in both Danish and international newspapers (e.g., Dee,
2015; Landersø and Sievertsen, 2015). We return to these studies later.
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result is in line with our expectations.
We also observe a gender wage gap of approximately 20% in our sample. Our results show that the
gender wage gap increases in the years following graduation, particularly when estimating for a sample
of individuals with at least one child. In our estimations for the entire sample, we observe a gender
wage gap of approximately 7% and 23% 1 and 10 years after graduation, respectively. Comparing
men and women without children, the gender wage gap is less pronounced and is nearly constant
across the years after graduation. Thus, our results suggest that the main explanation for the observed
gender wage gap is having at least one child. Finally, in contrast to the literature that finds significant
reductions in the gender wage gap when controlling for educational fields, we do not find that having
a master’s degree in business economics and management narrows the gender wage gap.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces selected parts of the existing
literature with more detailed descriptions of the findings of a few chosen papers. Section 3 presents
the empirical framework and the identification strategy and Section 4 describes the data. Section 5
explains the rationale behind our instrument. Sections 6 and 7 report and discuss our results, and
Section 8 presents robustness checks. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
The first papers on the returns to education initially estimated the returns to additional years of
schooling. The findings in the literature suggest that an extra year of schooling increases the wage
outcomes by approximately 10% (e.g., Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994;
Card, 1999; Leigh and Ryan, 2008). More recently, returns to the quality/field of study has received
the most attention, and the literature continues to increase (e.g., James et al., 1989; Blundell et al.,
2000; Arcidiacono, 2004; Hamermesh and Donald, 2008; Buonanno and Pozzoli, 2009; Walker and
Zhu, 2011; Altonji et al., 2012; Hastings et al., 2013; Webber, 2014; Kirkebøen et al., 2014). Overall,
significant differences are found across degrees, and the findings most commonly show that degrees
in engineering, business, law and natural sciences are the strongest determinants of higher wages.
However, some of this literature focuses on individuals who graduated 20-30 years ago, and some of
these studies fail to address the endogeneity of educational choices.3
Some studies concerned with the returns to specific skills use data from the US (e.g., James et al.,
1989; Arcidiacono, 2004; Hamermesh and Donald, 2008). For instance, using data on male college
3For great reviews of the literature and discussions about causality and determinants of educational choices see
Altonji et al. (2012, 2015).
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graduates in the US, James et al. (1989) show that wage outcomes differ significantly across college
majors but that institutional differences are not strong determinants of the variation in wages. Because
of this finding, James et al. (1989) are often cited for concluding that majoring in engineering at a
local college is a better private investment than enrolling in Harvard.
Hamermesh and Donald (2008) use survey data on students at the University of Texas to model
the impact of college degrees on earnings; they account for non-response bias and selection into em-
ployment. They show that, compared with a major in education, majors in hard and soft business are
associated with wage premiums of 48.7% and 37.8%, respectively, while a major in social sciences re-
sults in a wage premium of 27.9%. These results show a 20% log point difference between the earnings
of a (hard) business major and the earnings a social science major.
Moreover, several papers use data from the United Kingdom, all of which document earnings
differences across fields of study (e.g., Blundell et al., 2000; Bratti and Mancini, 2003; Walker and Zhu,
2011; Chevalier, 2011). For instance, Blundell et al. (2000) estimate the returns to higher education
and to field of study. They find that having a higher degree or an undergraduate degree is generally
associated with a significant wage premium compared to not going into higher education.4 With regard
to the wage differences across fields of study, they find the strongest effect for women, where degrees in
education, economics, accounting and law, or “other social sciences” are associated with higher wages.
Altonji et al. (2012, 2015) conduct extensive reviews of the empirical literature on the returns
to fields of study, the determinants of educational choices, and the potential ways of handling self-
selection. Comparing results in the literature, they conclude that engineering consistently yields a
high wage premium, usually followed by business and science, while humanities, social sciences, and
education are further behind. Altonji et al. (2015) also highlight the endogenous selection into field
of study and discuss selection on observables as a guide for selection on unobservables (e.g., Webber,
2014), structural estimation (e.g., Arcidiacono, 2004), and variation in access to fields (e.g., Hastings
et al., 2013; Kirkebøen et al., 2014) as ways of handling this selection. Finally, when discussing the
control function approach, they also note the difficulty in finding a variable that can function as an
instrument (i.e., influence major choices but not wages).
Arcidiacono (2004) addresses selection differently than this paper does and estimates a dynamic
choice model that accounts for college choices and major choices. He finds that students who major
in math generally perform better in the labor market and that the wage premium—relative to that
4Similar to our study, Blundell et al. (2000) restrict their sample to individuals who obtained at least one A-level
qualification. Thus. their reference group is individuals that had at least one A-level qualification, and thus the prospect
of going into higher education, but who did not continue into higher education.
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of those without a college education—is highest in the natural sciences and engineering, followed by
business. Moreover, Arcidiacono (2004) documents a college selection process based on individual
preferences for specific workplaces and majors.
More recently, studies have used a regression discontinuity approach to address the selection issue
and have also documented large earnings effects across fields of study (Hastings et al., 2013; Kirkebøen
et al., 2014). Using data from countries with centralized admission requirements for all university
programs and with certain master’s programs only accepting students with a high school GPA above
a specific threshold, a regression discontinuity approach can be used to estimate the causal impact of
field of study.
Using data on Norwegian students and central admission data, Kirkebøen et al. (2014) estimate the
payoff of a chosen field of study compared with that of a specific next-best alternative. In particular,
Kirkebøen et al. (2014) formulate a regression model with multiple treatments (multiple fields), and
knowledge about students’ rankings of alternative fields allows them to relax some of the strong as-
sumptions normally required when performing IV estimation. Kirkebøen et al. (2014) find significant
differences in payoffs across fields of study, with business education producing higher payoffs when
compared with all other fields, except engineering and law.
Finally, at a more detailed level, a part of the literature has considered the influences of curriculum
and course choices, holding degrees or educational level constant. This body of research has shown
that, in particular, skills related to mathematics are positively associated with wage outcomes and that
the lack of such skills might explain the gender wage gap (e.g., James et al., 1989; Hamermesh and
Donald, 2008; Joensen and Nielsen, 2009; Bertrand et al., 2010; Lazear, 2012; Joensen and Nielsen,
2015).
As documented above, the literature suggests that educational choices are important contributors to
the differences in labor market outcomes across individuals. Because schooling choices are significantly
associated with earnings, numerous studies have aimed to explain field-of-study choice. These studies
generally find that the important determinants of field-of-study choice is gender, ability, expected
future earnings, peers, and individual preferences (e.g., Berger, 1988; Montmarquette et al., 2002;
Arcidiacono, 2004; Ost, 2010; De Giorgi et al., 2010; Arcidiacono et al., 2012; Zafar, 2013). These
findings show that field-of-study choice is non-random, which indicates that master’s program choice
may also be driven by unobservables. The latter underlines the need to address the corresponding
endogeneity in educational choices when estimating the returns to fields of study.
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3 Empirical Framework and Identification Strategy
3.1 Econometric Model
In this paper, we aim to identify the labor market return to a master’s degree in business economics
and management, 𝜌, relative to a master’s degree in other fields in the social sciences. We start by
specifying a wage estimation equation that includes the individual choice of field of study, which is
measured by a “business dummy”, 𝐷𝐵𝐸𝑖 . Unlike in other studies, we do not simultaneously estimate the
returns to several fields (multiple treatments/fields). Our empirical specification is shown in Equation
(1):
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜌𝐷
𝐵𝐸
𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + 𝜃𝑏 + 𝜀𝑖 (1)
𝑖 represents individuals and 𝑦𝑖 is either the logarithm of the hourly wage of individual 𝑖 or is a
dummy variable that is equal to one if individual 𝑖 was employed in the private sector in 2008. 𝑋𝑖
includes individual specific characteristics that are expected to impact wage outcomes such as gender,
labor market experience, parental characteristics, age when finished high school, high school GPA etc.
𝜑𝑡 is graduation year fixed effects and are included to control for macroeconomic characteristics that
might impact starting wages and, potentially, also earnings in a longer perspective. 𝛼𝑙 are location
fixed effects and are included to control for differences in job possibilities across regions in Denmark
and 𝜃𝑏 is birth year fixed effects.5 Finally, 𝐷𝐵𝐸𝑖 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if individual 𝑖
graduated with a master’s degree in business economics and management and is the primary variable
of interest.
As discussed, if master’s program choices are endogenous, including 𝐷𝐵𝐸𝑖 in the model introduces
endogeneity and our OLS estimates will be biased. However, we start by estimating Equation (1) using
standard OLS, and we present the estimates as our baseline results. We will ultimately treat 𝐷𝐵𝐸𝑖
as endogenous, and apply an IV procedure to identify the returns to a master’s degree in business
economics and management. Because our endogenous variable is a dummy, we apply an extended
version of a standard IV approach and use the following two-step IV procedure, which is described in
detail on page 939 of Chapter 21 in Wooldridge (2010) and is used by, for instance, Doerr et al. (2013).
This two-step procedure is primarily used because it produces more efficient estimates than a standard
5Due to multicollinearity between birth year, age when finished high school and age in 2008, we do not include age in
2008 in the regressions. In standard wage regressions age and age2 are considered proxies for labor experience. Because
we also include a measure of labor market experience obtained from Statistic Denmark, it is not crucial to also control
for age.
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two-stage least square (2SLS) approach. To test robustness, we also report results from standard 2SLS
estimation in Appendix B.4.6
The first step in this involves estimating the probability of enrolling in a master’s program in a
business school in Denmark. We generate these estimates using a binary choice model provided by
Equation (2) and Equation (3):
𝑃 (𝐷𝐵𝐸𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖) = 𝐺(𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖; 𝛾, 𝜑, 𝛼, 𝜃) (2)
𝐷𝐵𝐸𝑖 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 if 𝛾0 + 𝛾𝑥𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑧𝑍𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + 𝜃𝑏 + 𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0
0 Otherwise
(3)
𝐷𝐵𝐸𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖, 𝜑𝑡, 𝛼𝑙, 𝜃𝑏 are defined as in Equation (1) and 𝑍𝑖 is a vector of our suggested instrument(s).
We assume that 𝑢𝑖 are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) standard normal, meaning that
we use a probit model to model the probability of selecting into a master’s degree in business.7 After
estimating Equation (2), we predict the fitted probabilities, which we denote 𝐺𝑖. The second step
involves using these fitted values as our instrument in the standard 2SLS framework described in
Equations (4) and (5).
1. stage: 𝐷𝐵𝐸𝑖 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆𝑋𝑖 + 𝜈𝐺𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + 𝜃𝑏 + 𝜖𝑖 (4)
2. stage: 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖𝑣?^?
𝐵𝐸
𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + 𝜃𝑏 + 𝜀𝑖 (5)
As in standard IV estimations, we need our instrument to meet two required conditions. First, the
instrument should be significantly correlated with the endogenous variable it seeks to explain—i.e.,
the instrument should be relevant. Second, the instrument should not be related to our measures of
labor market performance given the set of observable determinants that are already included—i.e., the
instrument should be exogenous.8 Because we are interested in the returns to a business education, we
suggest an instrument that is a significant and exogenous determinant of the selection into a master’s
program in business economics and management. Relevance is testable, whereas exogeneity is a matter
6As is normal when performing standard IV estimations, though in contrast with the literature on heterogeneous
treatment effects/local average treatment effects (LATE), we will assume that the returns to a master’s degree in business
economics and management is constant across all individuals in our sample. Because we have a sample of individuals
who are similar in terms of educational choices (they all graduated with a master’s degree in the social sciences), we
believe that this assumption is plausible.
7Even if 𝑢𝑖 are not i.i.d. standard normal, the estimates obtained from Equation (5) are still consistent. For more
on the assumptions, see assumption ateiv.1’ on page 939 of Wooldridge (2010).
8If one is willing to rely on the non-linearity of 𝐺(·) it is possible to identify 𝜌 even without an exogenous instrument.
However, this is not recommended, as discussed on page 940 of Wooldridge (2010). Moreover, in order to compare the
results from the 2-step procedure to the results from standard 2SLS estimations, we need a reliable instrument.
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of beliefs and intuition. In Section 5, we discuss the instrument in greater detail.
4 Data
This paper uses Danish register data. These data are maintained and administered by Statistics
Denmark and cover the entire Danish population. They convey very detailed individual information,
such as detailed labor market information, and information on individuals’ educational backgrounds,
parents, and other socioeconomic characteristics.
4.1 Sampling of Data
We restrict our sample so it is very homogeneous in terms of individuals’ educational attainment.
In particular, we restrict our data to include individuals with either a master’s degree in business
economics and management from a Danish business school or a master’s degree in political science,
law, sociology, anthropology, administration or economics from a Danish university. These master’s
programs fall under the umbrella of the social sciences.9 By restricting our sample to individuals
who have chosen similar fields of study, we have generated a sample of individuals who have similar
occupational opportunities in the labor market.10
Furthermore, we restrict our sample to individuals who have graduated from a general high school
in Denmark. When students leave primary school in Denmark, the institutional setting allows them to
choose between a vocational education, a business high school, a technical vocational high school, or a
more general high school (or nothing).11 However, to be admitted to tertiary education in Denmark,
students need to graduate from one of the high schools. Thus, only students who have graduated
from high school are included in the sample. However, only students from the general high school
are registered with high school GPAs in our data.12 Therefore, to control for high school GPA in
the regressions, we only keep these students in our sample. The exclusion of individuals with a
business/technical high school education and other individuals with missing high school GPA forces us
to disregard a relatively large share of the sample. However, observing high school GPAs across fields
of study not only allows us to include high school GPA in the regressions but also indicates whether we
9Even though Statistic Denmark’s official definition of social sciences also includes psychology and musical sciences,
we have excluded these fields of study, as they seem less comparable with business economics.
10This method of sampling can be compared with the sampling done by Blundell et al. (2000) and share similarities
with the methods of matching.
11Students can also choose a 2-year high school program that is mainly for students that are a little older and has
taken the optional 10. grade. This type of high school is also considered a general high school. For an introduction to
the Danish education system see the Main Appendix A of this thesis
12GPA from other types of high school are not registered in the data before 2000.
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see positive or negative selection into business education. Finally, as one of our dependent variables is
the hourly wage rate in November 2008, we only include individuals who have graduated from tertiary
education before 2007. We also limited our sample to individuals that graduated before 1984.
Because one of our dependent variables is the hourly wage measured in November 2008, the indi-
viduals in our sample were wage-employed in 2008, which means that we exclude the self-employed
and individuals who are outside the labor force. Additionally, we exclude individuals who had an-
nual earnings below 200,000 Danish kroner (DKK) in 2008.13 The exclusions ensure that we do not
have individuals in our sample who were wage-employed in November 2008 but were outside the labor
force the rest of the year. Robustness tests where these individuals are included back in the sample
reveals, in fact, no qualitative changes to the results.14 Finally, to limit measurement errors, we follow
recommendations from Statistic Denmark and disregard observations where the hourly wage rate is
unobserved or is measured imprecisely. This leaves us with a sample of 30,418 individuals who have
obtained either a master’s degree from a Danish business school or one of the aforementioned master’s
degrees in the social sciences from a Danish university and was wage employed in November 2008.
4.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the relevant variables for this study. In 2008, the average
hourly wage was DKK 383 for individuals with a business education and DKK 343 for individuals
with a degree in the social sciences from the university. As expected, we see a major difference in
the earnings of men and women in 2008, with men earning, on average, an hourly wage of DKK 407
and women earning, on average, an hourly wage of DKK 300. The individuals in our sample have, on
average, 12 years of labor market experience, and 86% of the individuals with a business education
were hired in the private sector in 2008. By contrast, only 50% of the individuals with a master’s
degree in the social sciences were hired in the private sector in 2008. In our sample, 45% of the women
and 28% of the men were hired in the public sector in 2008.
Forty percent of our sample graduated with a master’s degree in business economics and manage-
ment. Forty-four percent of the men and 34% of the women obtained a business education. Individuals
were, on average, 19 years old when they finished high school. Twenty-nine percent of the men and
23% of the women took an additional non-compulsory year in the 10th grade of lower secondary school
(in Denmark, only the first 9 grades of schooling are mandatory—more about this requirement later).
13Annual earnings covers the total wages in current year as well as tax-free wages. 1 US dollar is equal to approximately
6.53 DKK.
14In a robustness test we include these observations in the sample again, see Tables B.3 and Table B.4. The OLS
results are the same and the IV results are slightly weaker in terms of significance, but offer the same conclusions.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
All Private
Sector
Public
Sector
Business
educated
University
educated
Men Women
Personal characteristics:
Dane (=1) 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
High school GPA 8.83 8.77 8.95 8.52 9.04 8.75 8.93
(0.83) (0.82) (0.82) (0.79) (0.78) (0.86) (0.78)
Standardized high school GPA 0.00 -0.08 0.14 -0.38 0.25 -0.10 0.12
(1.00) (0.99) (1.00) (0.96) (0.95) (1.04) (0.94)
Age when finished high school 19.25 19.22 19.30 19.23 19.26 19.32 19.16
(0.88) (0.78) (1.03) (0.76) (0.95) (0.89) (0.85)
Continued into 10. grade 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.23
(0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.42)
Gender (Male=1) 0.55 0.61 0.43 0.61 0.51
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
2008: Children<18 in the fam-
ily (=1)
0.65 0.63 0.68 0.63 0.66 0.63 0.66
(0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47)
Business educated 0.40 0.53 0.15 0.44 0.34
(0.49) (0.50) (0.36) (0.50) (0.47)
Law 0.24 0.21 0.30 0.40 0.18 0.31
(0.43) (0.41) (0.46) (0.49) (0.38) (0.46)
Political Science 0.10 0.05 0.19 0.17 0.10 0.10
(0.30) (0.22) (0.39) (0.38) (0.30) (0.30)
Economics 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.23 0.18 0.09
(0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.42) (0.38) (0.29)
Social science unknown 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02
(0.11) (0.08) (0.15) (0.14) (0.07) (0.15)
Administration 0.08 0.04 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.09
(0.27) (0.21) (0.34) (0.33) (0.25) (0.28)
Anthropology 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03
(0.12) (0.10) (0.16) (0.16) (0.08) (0.16)
Labor market characteristics:
2008: Experience 12.03 12.12 11.86 12.33 11.83 12.59 11.35
(5.95) (5.99) (5.86) (5.95) (5.93) (6.08) (5.71)
Age per 1. January 2009 38.84 38.54 39.37 38.68 38.94 39.26 38.32
(5.90) (5.88) (5.89) (5.78) (5.97) (5.92) (5.83)
Hourly wage in 2008 358.48 395.87 291.01 382.58 342.74 406.93 299.66
(268.07) (319.95) (98.70) (306.83) (238.08) (336.33) (124.34)
Hired in private sector 0.64 0.86 0.50 0.72 0.55
(0.48) (0.34) (0.50) (0.45) (0.50)
Location:
Copenhagen 0.39 0.41 0.34 0.42 0.36 0.38 0.39
(0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49)
Zealand 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.15
(0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.33) (0.36)
South Denmark 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.16
(0.37) (0.36) (0.38) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.36)
Central Jutland 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.18
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.40) (0.40) (0.38)
North Jutland 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12
(0.33) (0.31) (0.36) (0.32) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33)
Parents’ characteristics:
Father’s year of edu. 13.82 13.84 13.79 13.61 13.98 13.91 13.71
(3.02) (2.96) (3.15) (2.93) (3.08) (2.96) (3.09)
Mother’s year of edu. 13.06 13.06 13.06 12.80 13.26 13.07 13.04
(2.96) (2.90) (3.08) (2.90) (2.99) (2.96) (2.97)
N 30418 19571 10847 12019 18399 16681 13737
Note: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are reported. 26.485 and 27.456 have information on father’s and mother’s
years of education, respectively. In the regressions, I control for this using dummies.
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Figure 1: Histograms of High School GPA Across Type of Educational Fields*
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*In order to comply with the discretion rules of Statistic Denmark, we have excluded observations with high school GPA below 6
and above 11.
Until 2007, Denmark used the “13” grading scale when assigning grades to students.15 Thus, the
reported high school GPA is also computed based on this scale. On this scale, the lowest passing grade
is 6, and the highest grade is 13. However, the scale does not make use of the value 12, skipping
from 11 to 13, and students are almost never awarded 13. To ease the interpretation of the estimated
coefficients in the regression models, we use a standardized measure of high school GPA. Particularly,
we include a measure of high school GPA that has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in the
full sample (this measure is also reported in Table 1). Table 1 shows that the average high school GPA
is significantly lower for individuals with a master’s degree in business economics and management
compared with individuals with another university degree in the social sciences. In addition to the
average, the distributions of high school GPA across fields of study differ, as seen in Figure 1. The
averages reported in Table 1 and the distribution presented in Figure 1 indicate some sort of negative
selection into business studies.
5 The Instrumental Variable
As discussed above, if master’s program choice is endogenous, our OLS estimates will be biased.
Different sources of bias have an impact on the naïve OLS estimates. For instance, if individuals select
a master’s program that corresponds with their unobserved abilities, then the OLS estimate of the
15See the Main Appendix A of this thesis for a translation of the Danish grading scale.
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effect of a specific master’s degree is upward biased. Likewise, if students that want to earn higher
wages choose a master’s program with expected higher earnings, then the OLS estimate is also biased
upwards. We think of this type of selection as positive selection. By contrast, if less able individuals
compensate by completing master’s programs that are associated with higher wages and very productive
human capital, the OLS estimates are biased downward. We think of this type of selection as negative
selection. Thus, a priori, predicting the direction of the bias is difficult. To address the problem of
self-selection, we treat 𝐷𝐵𝐸𝑖 as endogenous and employ the IV approach described above, which is why
we need a valid instrument.
We use educational maturity as our instrument for master’s program choice and follow Naylor and
Sanford (1980) in defining educational maturity based on students’ certainty about field-of-study and
career choices. Our IV strategy is based on the idea that (1) individuals’ educational maturity is an
important determinant of field of study; (2) students with low levels of educational maturity are more
prone to enroll at a business university; and (3) educational maturity is uncorrelated with unobserved
factors that also influence labor market outcomes (educational maturity is uncorrelated with 𝜀𝑖 in
Equation (1)). We assume that educational maturity can be measured by season of birth, and we
create our instruments as quarter-of-birth dummy variables.
Season of birth has been used as an instrument in several other papers, though for slightly different
purposes (e.g., Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Lee and Orazem, 2010). Most important is the influential
paper by Angrist and Krueger (1991), who use season of birth as an instrument for years of schooling,
as students in the US are eligible to drop out of school at age 16. However, the exogeneity of season of
birth to labor market outcomes has since been questioned (e.g., Bound and Jaeger, 2000; Plug, 2001;
Buckles and Hungerman, 2013). Thus, further discussion is needed to understand why we believe that
season of birth is a plausible instrument in a Danish context. In the following section, we explain
why a low level of educational maturity is associated with selection into a business university and why
season of birth can be used as an exogenous measure of educational maturity to further elaborate this
issue.
5.1 The Relevance of the Instrument
We hypothesize that, because a prospective student with a high level of educational maturity is more
likely to know the type of career that he or she wants to pursue after completing a master’s programs,
such a student is also more likely to choose a more specialized education. By contrast, if prospective
students have low levels of educational maturity and are very insecure about their career paths, they
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will generally choose an educational type with more general characteristics, as this general type of
education offers more broad employment opportunities.
We argue that a master’s degree in business economics and management is more general compared
with those of other fields in the social sciences, which we argue are more specialized—or are at least
perceived as such. For example, at Copenhagen Business School (CBS)—the largest business school
in Denmark—most students are enrolled in a very broad bachelor’s program that then gives them
access to various master’s programs. After completing a bachelor degree at CBS, students can choose
a master’s program in economics, finance and accounting, organization and innovation, marketing, and
global business. In each field, students can specialize in an additional 3-4 tracks, which allows them
to choose among 13 diverse tracks at CBS.16 Thus, the choice of a bachelor’s program at CBS does
not naturally lead into a specific and specialized master’s program. By contrast, choosing a bachelor’s
degree in the social sciences will naturally lead into the one corresponding master’s program. Given
these different structures, enrolling in a business school is likely more attractive to individuals who are
educationally immature. Because most students enrolled in a bachelor’s program in business economics
proceed to a master’s program in business economics, we can also model master’s program choice as
dependent on educational maturity.17
We assume that educational maturity is positively related to age, and we argue that, conditional
on birth year, individuals born later in the year will be less educationally mature than individuals
born earlier in the year. Comparing individuals with the same birth year, the difference in age can
be almost an entire year, which we expect to manifest itself in different levels of educational maturity.
The university application system in Denmark is centralized, which means that Danish prospective
students, irrespective of when they are born, choose their tertiary education at the same time of the
year. In Denmark, children start school in August of the year in which they turn 7, and they are
likely to continue through the educational system at the same speed.18 As such, students born in the
same year are likely to differ in age and educational maturity when they choose their fields of study
for tertiary education.
To measure educational maturity, we create our instrument as three binary variables that indicate
quarter of birth. Because we control for birth year in our regressions, we only compare the educational
maturity of individuals who were born in the same year. Table 2 shows the distribution of individuals
16The number of tracks depends on the year of enrollment.
17In Bjerge and Skibsted (2016), Chapter 4 of this thesis, we observe that more than 90% of the students who finish
a bachelor’s program at CBS will select into a master’s program there.
18In 2009, the rule change to having mandatory school start at age 6. This means that from 2009, students begin
school in grade 0 the year they turn 6.
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into business schools and universities across seasons of birth. The share of individuals born in November
and December who enrolled in a master’s program at a business school is significantly higher compared
with the rest of the sample.
Table 2: Business Educated Across Quarter of Birth
Quarter of Birth
1 2 3 4 Total
Business educated (in %)
No 61.25 60.01 60.85 59.80 60.49
Yes 38.75 39.99 39.15 40.20 39.51
Month of Birth
January-
February
March-
April
May-
June
July-
August
September-
October
November-
December
Total
Business educated (in %)
No 60.66 60.96 60.18 60.80 61.48 58.58 60.49
Yes 39.34 39.04 39.82 39.20 38.52 41.42 39.51
Even if they are born in the same year, some Danish students do not follow the same time path
as their peers for a couple of reasons. First, in Denmark, some students might stay an additional year
in the primary/lower secondary school system. This extra year is non-compulsory and is intended to
benefit students who are not ready to proceed to high school. If students born late in the year are
more likely to spend an extra year in the lower secondary school system, they will also be more likely
to be a year older when they choose their tertiary education, which may weaken our instrument. To
handle this potential snag, we include a dummy for students who spend an extra year in secondary
school (10th grade).
Second, the school cut-off rules are not strictly followed in Denmark. Some parents tend to delay
their children’s school entries if they think that their children are not ready for school. If students
born later in the year are more likely to postpone entry into primary school, they will be a year older
when they choose their tertiary education, which may weaken our instrument. Unfortunately, we do
not have information in our data to control for delayed school entry. As a second-best alternative, we
control for students’ ages when they complete high school.
Finally, students may choose not to continue directly from high school into tertiary education.
Again, if students born later in the year are less likely to directly enroll in tertiary education, our
instrument will be weakened. The latter issue is unlikely to be of great concern, whereas the postponed
school entry could present a problem. However, despite these issues, our instrument is still a strong
predictor of master’s program choice, as we will see in the following section.
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5.2 Season of Birth as a Predictor of Master’s Program Choice
To more stringently and analytically assess the relevance of season of birth as a determinant of edu-
cational choices, we present the results from our estimations of the probability of selecting a master’s
degree in business, i.e., the results from the estimations of the probit model captured in Equations (2)
and (3):
𝑃 (𝐷𝐵𝐸𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖) = 𝐺(𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖; 𝛾, 𝜑, 𝛼, 𝜃) (2)
𝐷𝐵𝐸𝑖 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 if 𝛾𝑥𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑧𝑍𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + 𝜃𝑏 + 𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0
0 Otherwise
(3)
Table 3 shows the results and the 𝜒2 test statistics from testing 𝐻0, where 𝐻0 : 𝛾𝑧𝑄2 = 0, 𝛾
𝑧
𝑄3 =
0, 𝛾𝑧𝑄4 = 0. In this paper, +, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Across all the specifications, the three quarter-of-birth dummies are jointly significant at the 1% level.
Moreover, one by one, the instrument dummies are also significant at the 1% or 5% level. Thus,
educational maturity measured by quarter of birth is significant in determining the field of tertiary
education. As an alternative instrument, we use a variable that counts the days between January 1
and the student’s birthday. Thus, this variable ranges in value from zero and 365. When estimating
Equation (2) with 𝑍𝑖 =Days Between January 1 and Birthday (divided by 100), the instrument is an
equally strong predictor of master’s program choice, as can be seen in Table 3.
The sign of the estimated coefficients also confirms our hypothesis that individuals born later in the
year are more likely to choose a master’s degree in business compared with individuals born in the first
three months of the year.19 In addition to the significance level and the sign of 𝛾𝑧, we notice that men
are more likely than women to enroll in a business school; parents’ years of education negatively affect
the enrollment in a business program; and high school GPA and enrollment in a business program are
negatively correlated. That high school GPA enters with a negative sign indicates negative selection
into a business program.
Finally, the inclusion of post-treatment characteristics in columns (2)-(5) seemingly does not have
an impact our instruments’ prediction power, and the estimated coefficients for the quarter-of-birth
dummies remain practically unchanged across the 5 specifications. In other words, the inclusion of
post-treatment controls does not change the magnitude of the estimated coefficients for the three
19The reported coefficients are not marginal effects, but the sign of the marginal effects is the same as the sign of the
estimated coefficient in the probit model.
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quarter-of-birth dummies. This lack of change suggests that quarter of birth is uncorrelated with the
variables that we expect to predict wage outcomes, which supports the assumption of exogeneity.
Table 3: The Selection into a Business Education
Probit Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Born 2. quarter 0.069** 0.068** 0.071** 0.071**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Born 3. quarter 0.058** 0.057* 0.062** 0.062**
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Born 4. quarter 0.094** 0.091** 0.098** 0.098**
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Days Between 1. January and
Birthday (divided by 100)
0.032** 0.031** 0.034** 0.034**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Age when finished High School 0.016 0.025* 0.033** 0.033** 0.018 0.027* 0.035** 0.035**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Continued into 10. grade 0.039+ 0.052* 0.056** 0.055* 0.036+ 0.050* 0.054* 0.052*
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Standardized High School
GPA
-0.533** -0.542** -0.542** -0.542** -0.533** -0.542** -0.542** -0.542**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Dane (=1) -0.324** -0.233* -0.239* -0.240* -0.323** -0.232* -0.237* -0.239*
(0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098)
Gender (Male=1) 0.186** 0.151** 0.182** 0.147** 0.185** 0.151** 0.182** 0.147**
(0.016) (0.027) (0.016) (0.027) (0.016) (0.027) (0.016) (0.027)
2008: Children<18 in the fam-
ily (=1)
-0.103** -0.107** -0.102** -0.107**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Gender (Male=1) * Children
(=1)
0.059+ 0.047 0.059+ 0.047
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
2008: Experience 0.020** 0.021** 0.020** 0.021**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Father’s year of edu. -0.009** -0.013** -0.012** -0.012** -0.009** -0.013** -0.012** -0.011**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Mother’s year of edu. -0.021** -0.024** -0.024** -0.024** -0.021** -0.024** -0.024** -0.024**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Location Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Graduation Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
𝜒2 17.907 16.971 19.366 19.236 16.329 15.503 18.084 17.887
𝑝 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. of obs 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if an individual enrolled in a master’s in business economics and
management. 𝜒2 and 𝑝 comes from testing the (joint) significance of the instruments. Robust standard errors are computed
and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1. The sample is restricted to individuals with annual earnings
above DKK 200,000 in 2008.
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Table 4 shows the results from estimating the selection equation with a Linear Probability Model
(LPM) and reports the F-statistics from testing the joint significance of the instruments.20 These
results and F-statistics help us assess the strength of our instruments in a more traditional way by
comparing the F-statistic of the joint test to the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10. Testing 𝐻0 : 𝛾𝑧𝑄2 =
0, 𝛾𝑧𝑄3 = 0, 𝛾
𝑧
𝑄4 = 0 reveals an F-statistic of approximately 5.5, which we would prefer to be at least 10.
However, using the instrument 𝑍𝑖 =Days Between January 1 and Birthday (divided by 100) reveals
F-statistics above 10 and indicates that season of birth measured by 𝑍𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 is a stronger instrument.
Because the different definitions of our instrument provide us with the same main results—when
applying the described two-step method (see Tables B.7 and B.8) and when performing standard
2SLS estimations (see Tables B.9 and B.11)—we feel confident about the strength of our instrument.
Moreover, when we use ?^?𝑖 as our direct instrument, we observe F-statistics that are well above 10 for
both measures of educational maturity.
Table 4: The Selection into a Business Education
Linear Probability Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Born 2. quarter 0.021** 0.020** 0.021** 0.021**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Born 3. quarter 0.017* 0.016* 0.018* 0.018*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Born 4. quarter 0.029** 0.027** 0.030** 0.029**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Days Between 1. January and
Birthday (divided by 100)
0.010** 0.009** 0.010** 0.010**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Location Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Graduation Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
𝐹 5.498 5.066 5.817 5.790 15.258 14.139 16.474 16.430
𝑝 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. of obs 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if an individual enrolled in a master’s in business economics and
management. 𝐹 and 𝑝 comes from testing the (joint) significance of the instruments. Controls as in Table 3 are included.
Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1. The sample is restricted
to individuals with annual earnings above DKK 200,000 in 2008.
20Table A.2 in addition also reports the results on all the controls included.
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5.3 The Exogeneity of the Instrument
The assumption that season of birth is uncorrelated with the error term in the main equation can be
challenged. That is, if season of birth is correlated with unobserved abilities that are also important
for labor market outcomes, the exogeneity assumption fails. We cannot test whether our instrument
is appropriately exogenous; thus, we need to be sufficiently convinced of its exogeneity. First, the
assumption is supported because our data allows us to control for a rich set of specific characteristics
that determine labor market outcomes, including high school GPA and parents’ years of education.
In what follows, we argue that, because season of birth is uncorrelated with observed outcomes (e.g.,
school performance, final educational level, and later labor market outcomes) in a Danish context, one
can reasonably assume that season of birth is also uncorrelated with unobservables that explain labor
market outcomes.
Some findings suggest that individuals born later in the year perform, on average, worse in primary
school and that they are more likely to commit crimes and have mental health problems, which does
not support our exogeneity assumption (e.g., Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; McEwan and Shapiro, 2008;
Black et al., 2011; Elder, 2010; Dee and Sievertsen, 2015; Landersø et al., Forthcoming).21 However,
the results regarding the implications of school starting ages for individuals’ educational performances,
labor market outcomes, and mental health continues to be discussed in the literature (e.g., Bedard and
Dhuey, 2006; Black et al., 2011; Fredriksson and Öckert, 2013; Dee and Sievertsen, 2015). In contrast
with studies that show that starting school relatively older leads to substantially better performance
on school tests, more recent studies have shown that the measured benefits from relatively older school
starting ages only emerge because students’ ages at the time of the test differ and are not caused by
benefits directly related to an older school starting age (e.g., Black et al., 2011; Rockwool-Foundation,
2015). In fact, using Norwegian data, Black et al. (2011) find a small significant negative effect of
school starting age on an IQ test taken at age 18 but a strong positive effect of age at test date.
In an analysis of fourth and eighth graders across OECD countries, Bedard and Dhuey (2006) show
that the youngest students score substantially lower than their oldest counterparts in both the fourth
and the eighth grade. However, Bedard and Dhuey (2006) find no evidence of relative age effects on
test scores in eighth grade in Denmark and Finland. They argue that relative age has no effect on
21The potential reasons that starting age influences in-school performance, including the advantages of being relatively
and absolutely mature, are discussed in the literature. The advantages of students’ relative maturity is the potential
benefits of simply being older, as such students are more developed than their younger classmates. The advantages of
absolute maturity refer to students who benefit from being older because the educational system is better suited for older
children (Dee and Sievertsen, 2015). If skill accumulation at an early age is positively associated with learning later in
life, a student’s relative age at the beginning of his or her educational career might have long lasting effects on his or her
performance.
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performance in Denmark because students in Denmark are not differentiated based on abilities and
grades until they have finished lower secondary school at 15 or 16 years of age. Fredriksson and Öckert
(2013) use Swedish administrative data to estimate the effect of school starting age on educational
attainment and long-run labor market outcomes. Along the same lines of Bedard and Dhuey (2006),
Fredriksson and Öckert (2013) find only a small effect of a child’s school starting age on educational
attainment when tracking is delayed until age 16.
Moreover, in November 2015, the monthly newsletter from the Danish Rockwool Foundation Re-
search Unit reported that starting primary school at a young age does not influence Danes’ final years
of education (Rockwool-Foundation, 2015). The findings of Bedard and Dhuey (2006), Fredriksson
and Öckert (2013), and Rockwool-Foundation (2015) suggest that season of birth is uncorrelated with
observable individual-level educational outcomes in a Danish context, which supports the assumption
that season of birth does not explain labor market outcomes through unobserved abilities that are
acquired through pre-university education.
The potential associations between school starting age and both mental health and the propensity
to commit crime could pose a problem for our exogeneity assumption.22 Dee and Sievertsen (2015)
find that a one-year delay in school entry significantly reduces the probability of observing inatten-
tion/hyperactivity in 7- and 11-year-old children. However, they do not find strong evidence of its
effect on any other measures of mental health. Additionally, Black et al. (2011) find that boys who
start school later are less likely to have poor mental health at age 18, but the magnitude of this effect
is very small.23 By contrast, using Danish data, Dalsgaard et al. (2012) find no support for the claim
that children who are relatively old for their grade are less likely to be diagnosed with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).24 Because we only consider students that successfully graduated from
both high school and university, instances of poor mental health and criminal behavior are likely to
be limited in our data. Moreover, studies have shown that the adverse consequences of relatively early
school entry, if they exist, do not persist into later labor market outcomes (e.g., Dobkin and Ferreira,
2010; Black et al., 2011; Fredriksson and Öckert, 2013).
Dobkin and Ferreira (2010) find no effect of early school entry on adult outcomes, such as employ-
22Also the assosiation between school starting age and criminal behavior could be an issue for our identification
strategy. For instance, using Danish data, Landersø et al. (Forthcoming) show that school starting age has an effect on
criminal behavior in the late teens and early 20s. They suggest that primary school helps girls avoid criminal behavior
and that high school keeps boys from committing crime. Thus, the effect of school starting age is seemingly caused by
incapacitation rather than a developmental effect, which, despite the significant results, favors our exogeneity assumption.
23Black et al. (2011) measure mental health by a psychologist’s assessment of a patients’ suitability for military service
at the age 18.
24The results of Dalsgaard et al. (2012) indicate that when diagnosing in some countries is performed by non-specialists,
they are more prone to make relative diagnoses by comparing children in the same classes rather than by making objective
diagnoses, which explains the documented relationship between ADHD diagnoses and early school entry.
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ment rates, wages, and home ownership. In fact, Black et al. (2011) find that starting school at an
older age has a negative short-run effect on earnings, which is consistent with the claim that starting
school later reduces labor market experience. However, Black et al. (2011) find that this negative effect
of later school entry only persists until age 30. Fredriksson and Öckert (2013) define the prime age as
falling between 25 and 54 and show that, on average, prime age earnings are unaffected over the life
cycle, except for those whose parents have lower levels of education and, to some extent, for women.
Finally, season of birth has also been suggested to possibly be correlated with unobserved charac-
teristics in the mother (or father) that may also have an impact on labor market outcomes. Buckles
and Hungerman (2013) find that women who give birth during the winter differ from other women
because they are younger, less educated, and less likely to be married. If unobserved characteristics in
the mother (or the father) determine season of pregnancy/birth and also play an important role in the
child’s labor market outcomes, season of birth is not exogenous. However, as Buckles and Hungerman
(2013) conduct their study using data from the US—a country that is very different from Denmark in
terms of inequality and socioeconomic context—the same pattern will likely not emerge in Denmark.
Additionally, Table 5 shows the differences in parents’ years of education across the child’s quarter of
birth. The t-test results show no statistically significant difference-in-means across the quarter-of-birth
groups. Finally, as our data allow us to control for parents’ years of education, the potential problem
suggested by Buckles and Hungerman (2013) should be mitigated.
Table 5: Summary Statistics Across Quarter of Birth
Difference between: Q1 and rest Q2 and rest Q3 and rest Q4 and rest
Diff1 𝑝 Diff2 𝑝 Diff3 𝑝 Diff4 𝑝
High School GPA -0.004 0.696 -0.002 0.873 -0.010 0.343 0.018 0.118
Hourly wage in 2008 2.287 0.518 4.056 0.239 1.044 0.768 -8.252 0.025
Father’s year of edu. 0.042 0.479 -0.048 0.411 -0.122 0.041 0.140 0.024
Mother’s year of edu. 0.013 0.786 0.106 0.024 -0.121 0.012 -0.005 0.913
Note: Diff𝑖=𝜇𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 − 𝜇𝑄𝑖 where 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4. 𝑝 is the 𝑝-value from testing the hypothesis of no mean-difference. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, + p<0.1.
In addition to the evidence in the literature, our data offer additional support for the exogeneity
assumption. Table 5 reveals no significant difference across quarters of birth in the average hourly
wage in 2008 or in high school GPA. Figure 2 shows histograms of high school GPA across the sample
of students born in the first, second, third and fourth quarters. No noticeable difference is observed in
the distributions. Performing a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions test between
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the first quarter and the remaining quarters, the second quarter and the remaining quarters, the third
quarter and the remaining quarters, and the fourth quarter and the remaining quarters, the test fails
to reject the hypothesis that the two distributions are equal. Finally, controlling for birth year and
year of high school graduation, we find no evidence of a significant impact of season of birth on high
school GPA, as seen in Table A.3 in the Appendix.
Figure 2: Histograms of High School GPA Across Quarter of Birth
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*In order to comply with the discretion rules of Statistic Denmark, we have excluded observations with high school GPA below 6
and above 11.
Thus, both the presented results and the findings in our data suggest that Danish students’ season
of birth does not significantly correlate with their parents’ years of education, hourly wages, and
educational performance; therefore, we feel confident in assuming that our instrument does not correlate
with labor market outcomes through unobservables.
6 Results: The Business Education Wage Premium
Table 6 shows results from estimating Equation (1) with the OLS (columns (1)-(4)) and Equation (5)
with the IV (columns (5)-(8)) approaches. Each column includes different control variables that we
expect to have an impact on wage outcomes. The OLS estimates of Equation (1) show that a master’s
degree in business economics and management is, on average, associated with a wage premium of
approximately 6% compared with the wages associated with a master’s degree in other areas in the
social sciences. As discussed, the OLS estimates are biased, and the IV estimates presented in column
(5)-(8) of Table 6 try to address that. However, despite the endogeneity, the OLS results are interesting
for comparative purposes and offer an opportunity to assess the direction of potential selection bias.
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Table 6: The Return to a Business Education - Wage Estimations
OLS estimation 2-step IV estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Business educated 0.066** 0.062** 0.055** 0.055** 0.154** 0.172** 0.147** 0.155**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Age when finished High School -0.019** -0.018** -0.012** -0.013** -0.019** -0.019** -0.013** -0.014**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Continued into 10. grade -0.043** -0.041** -0.039** -0.039** -0.044** -0.043** -0.040** -0.040**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Standardized High School
GPA
0.041** 0.040** 0.039** 0.040** 0.056** 0.059** 0.055** 0.057**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Dane (=1) -0.014 -0.008 -0.010 -0.014 -0.005 -0.000 -0.004 -0.007
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Gender (Male=1) 0.207** 0.105** 0.200** 0.103** 0.202** 0.099** 0.194** 0.098**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
2008: Children<18 in the fam-
ily (=1)
-0.053** -0.056** -0.049** -0.053**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Gender (Male=1) * Children
(=1)
0.163** 0.153** 0.161** 0.152**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
2008: Experience 0.017** 0.016** 0.016** 0.015**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father’s year of edu. 0.002* 0.001+ 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002* 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother’s year of edu. 0.002** 0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Location Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Graduation Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
𝜒2 17.907 16.971 19.366 19.236
𝑝 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
No. of obs 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the hourly wage measured in November of 2008. The instruments are quarter-
of-birth dummies, and the reference group includes individuals born in the first quarter. 𝜒2 and 𝑝 come from testing 𝐻0, where
𝐻0 : 𝛾𝑄2 = 0, 𝛾𝑄3 = 0, 𝛾𝑄4 = 0. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
+ p<0.1. The sample is restricted to individuals with annual earnings above DKK 200,000 in 2008.
The IV estimates show that a master’s degree in business economics and management leads to an
hourly wage premium of approximately 12-17% when compared with wage outcomes of graduates in
the social sciences. The estimated business education effect is significant at the 1% level using both
the OLS and IV estimation techniques. Most papers that examine the returns to majors use different
reference groups, different methodological approaches, and different classifications; therefore, an exact
comparison of the results is impossible (as also noted by Hamermesh and Donald (2008) and Altonji
et al. (2012)). However, to validate our results, we do make a few comparisons.
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When comparing education majors with hard business majors, soft business majors and social
science majors, Hamermesh and Donald (2008) find wage premiums of 48.7%, 37.8%, and 27.9%,
respectively. Thus, the results of Hamermesh and Donald (2008) find a 20% log-point difference between
the earnings of (hard) business majors and a social science majors. Comparing these results to the
results in Table 6, a wage difference of approximately 15% does not appear overly large. Hamermesh
and Donald (2008) do not account for the endogeneity of major choice and expect positive selection
into majors, which means that their estimates are likely upward biased. The lack of a control for the
self-selection into majors and the anticipated positive selection might explain why Hamermesh and
Donald (2008) find a larger wage gap between social science and business majors than we do.
Using data from the American Community Survey Altonji et al. (2012) present simple OLS esti-
mates of the returns to various majors. Controlling for occupation type, Altonji et al. (2012) find that
men with a business education receive, on average, 14% higher wages when compared with men with a
general education. Without the occupation controls, the business wage premium is as large as 33.9%.
An accounting major presents an even higher wage premium. In general, Altonji et al. (2012) find that
the same majors offer lower wage premiums for women than for men.
As discussed in Section 5, determining the direction of the bias a priori is difficult, as the OLS
estimates may be upward biased because of positive selection and downward biased because of negative
selection. A stringent comparison of coefficients across un-nested models is impossible, which makes
comparing the IV and OLS estimates a complicated task. Therefore, comparing confidence intervals and
coefficient estimates is our best option when assessing the direction of the bias. Figure 3 graphically
presents the estimated business wage premiums, along with the corresponding confidence intervals,
across models and estimation methods. The OLS estimates underestimate the impact of a business
education on wage outcomes, as seen in Figure 3. This finding indicates negative selection into business
schools, where less able individuals may compensate by selecting into business master’s programs, which
will cause the OLS to underestimate the wage premium.
Figure 1, Table 1, and Table 3 also indicate negative selection into business education. Table 1
shows that, on average, individuals who enroll in a master’s program in business have lower high school
GPAs compared with those who enroll in other master’s programs in the social sciences. Table 3 shows
a negative and significant correlation between high school GPA and selection into business school.
Finally, Figure 1 shows the distribution of high school GPA across business and social science students
and offers the same conclusion.
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Figure 3: Estimated Business Wage Premium Across Model Specifications
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Our results also show a gender wage gap of 20%, which decreases to 10% when controlling for
children younger than 18 in the household. Moreover, we observe a positive and significant wage
premium effect for men with children in the household. Similar results have also been documented in
the literature. Finally, increasing high school GPA by one percentage point is associated with a 4%
increase in the hourly wage, whereas students who spend an extra year in lower secondary education
(10th grade) receive significantly lower wages than their counterparts. As expected, our measure of
experience enters the model with a significant and positive coefficient.
6.1 Wage Premium and Years After Graduation
In this section, we estimate the business education wage premium across years after graduation to
better understand how the wage premium works. In particular, we measure an individual’s hourly
wages from 1 to 10 years after graduation. In doing so, we allow all individuals to have been available
on the labor market for the same amount of time, thereby indirectly controlling for any post-treatment
variables that are related to the labor market without including them directly in the equation.25
25To make wages comparable across years, we inflation-adjust all wages with 2000 as the baseline year. Figure A.3
shows the average hourly wage across years after graduation.
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Table 7: The Return to a Business Education - Wage Estimations
OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Wages measured year after graduation 1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5 year 6 year 7 year 8 year 9 year 10 year
Business educated 0.073** 0.084** 0.081** 0.080** 0.082** 0.079** 0.086** 0.083** 0.081** 0.081**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Age when finished High School -0.005** -0.008** -0.009** -0.009** -0.012** -0.013** -0.014** -0.013** -0.017** -0.017**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Continued into 10. grade -0.011** -0.016** -0.029** -0.035** -0.042** -0.040** -0.044** -0.046** -0.045** -0.049**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Standardized High School GPA 0.008** 0.016** 0.020** 0.025** 0.029** 0.031** 0.036** 0.041** 0.044** 0.042**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Dane (=1) 0.008 -0.009 0.005 -0.022 -0.018 0.000 0.008 0.020 0.009 0.016
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029) (0.034) (0.040) (0.042)
Gender (Male=1) 0.068** 0.092** 0.116** 0.133** 0.151** 0.169** 0.186** 0.202** 0.217** 0.228**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Father’s year of edu. 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother’s year of edu. -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001+ 0.002** 0.003** 0.002* 0.003** 0.004** 0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2-step IV estimation
Business educated 0.039* 0.034+ 0.063** 0.043+ 0.074** 0.080** 0.115** 0.119** 0.080* 0.128**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.036)
Birth Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Graduation Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs 25663 26786 26999 25467 24050 22581 21168 19931 18628 17171
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the hourly wage measured in November 1-10 years after graduation. All controls are also included in the IV estimations. The instruments
are quarter-of-birth dummies, and the reference group includes individuals born in the first quarter. In all estimations, we use predicted probabilities obtained by estimating a specification
of the selection equation that is equal to the specification in column (1) of Table 3. Thus, 𝜒2 and 𝑝 values from testing 𝐻0, where 𝐻0 : 𝛾𝑄2 = 0, 𝛾𝑄3 = 0, 𝛾𝑄4 = 0, can be seen in Table
3. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1. The sample is restricted to individuals with annual earnings above DKK 200,000
in 2008.
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Table 7 shows the estimation results, and Figure 4 shows the estimated business wage premium,
with the corresponding confidence intervals across years after graduation. Our OLS results show a
constant and statistically significant business education wage premium of approximately 8% across all
years after graduation. The IV estimations show slightly different results. The wage premium from
a master’s degree in business is increasing with the years after graduation. The estimated business
wage premium is approximately 4% one year after graduation and is only statistically significant at the
10% level. By contrast, the business wage premium is 13% 10 years after graduation and statistically
significant at the 1% level.
The estimated business education wage premium might increase because a master’s degree in busi-
ness economics provides an individual with more employment opportunities and, in turn, work through
enhanced experience. In addition, the value of the skills learned in business school perhaps increases
with labor market experience, as individuals learn how to better use their acquired skills in a labor
market context. The estimated business wage premium observed in Table 6 is approximately 15%,
which corresponds well with this explanation because the results in Table 6 rely on a sample that
includes individuals with, on average, more than 10 years of labor market experience (see summary
statistics in Table 1).
Figure 4: Estimated Business Wage Premium Across Years After Graduation
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If hourly wage outcomes are a measure of productivity, the findings in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that
a business education provides students with more productive human capital than other fields in the
social sciences do and that the returns to these skills increase with the years on the labor market.
The studies of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and Bennedsen et al. (2006), among others, show that
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the CEO and the differences in management practices can explain differences in firm performance.
Particularly with regard to business programs, this type of education might provide the degree holder
with certain managerial abilities that manifest themselves in improved firm productivity and, in turn,
higher wages.
However, business school graduates are also more likely to obtain private sector employment, where
wages, on average, are higher, which may also explain the observed wage premium. Table 1 shows that,
in 2008, the average hourly wages in the private sector and in the public sector were DKK 395.87 and
DKK 291.01, respectively. In Table 1, we can also observe how business school graduates are much
more likely to work in the private sector (86%, i.e., 10,388 individuals, in the private sector and 14%,
i.e., 1,631 individuals, in the public sector). This finding indicates that the high probability of private
sector employment is likely to explain the estimated business wage premium. Additionally, Altonji
et al. (2012) show a major decrease in the impact of any major when occupation controls are included
in the model. We do not include a private sector dummy in the model because it introduces additional
endogeneity (selection into private sector employment). However, to better understand the estimated
business education wage premium, Section 7 models the probability of private sector employment as
dependent on education type.
6.2 The Gender Wage Gap
In addition to the estimated wage premium, the results in Table 7 also reveal a gender wage gap. In
particular, we observe an estimated gender wage gap of 7% in the first year after graduation, 15% in
the fifth year after graduation, and as high as 23% in the tenth year after graduation. Thus, the gender
wage gap more than doubles in the first five years after graduation. Figure 5 presents these findings
graphically.
The gender wage gap is not an unknown phenomenon and has been documented many times, with
a growing body of literature that shows that the gender wage gap can, to some extent, be explained
by differences in educational attainment (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2010; Joensen and Nielsen, 2015). For
instance, using a sample of MBAs who graduated from the Booth School of Business (at the University
of Chicago) between 1990 and 2006, Bertrand et al. (2010) show that, when controlling for differences
in business school courses and grades, differences in career interruption, and differences in weekly hours
worked, the gender wage gap disappears. Given these results, the estimated gender wage gap in Table 7
is somewhat surprising, as we consider a very homogeneous sample with individuals who have received
the same level of education.
46
Figure 5: Estimated Gender Wage Gap Across Years After Graduation
(a) Estimated Gender Wage Gap
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(b) Estimated Gender Wage Gap
- With and Without 𝐷𝐵𝐸 Included
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To test the impacts of field of study on the gender wage gap, we estimate the model with and
without 𝐷𝐵𝐸 . In Figure 5b, we show the estimated gender wage gap across models with and without
the business education dummy. The figure shows that the gender wage gap only decreases slightly
after controlling for the type of master’s degree (including 𝐷𝐵𝐸 in the regression).
Figure 6: Estimated Gender Wage Gap Across Years After Graduation
- Comparing Individuals With and Without Children
(a) Comparing Individuals With Children
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(b) Comparing Individuals Without Children
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
G
en
de
r w
ag
e 
ga
p
0 2 4 6 8 10
Years after graduation
Estimated gender gap with business dummy
Estimated gender gap without business dummy
Five percent confidence bound with business dummy
Five percent confidence bound without business dummy
In addition to field of study, Bertrand et al. (2010) show that differences in career interruptions,
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such as maternity leave, explain a large part of the gender wage gap. To understand the impact
of children on the estimated gender wage gap, we re-estimate the wage equation with two samples,
namely, individuals with and without children “x” years after graduation.26 Figure 6 presents the
results. Figures 6a and 6b clearly show that children explain a large part of both the initial gender
wage gap and its subsequent increase, even though individuals in our sample are very similar in terms
of education. This result also corresponds well with the results presented in Table 6, which reports
a gender wage gap of 10-20%, with men receiving a wage premium associated with children in the
household and women receiving a wage penalty for having children in the household. Because we do
not include any post-treatment variable, we have not controlled for weekly hours worked or job sector.
Thus, these factors may also partly explain the gender wage gap and the observed increase across years
after graduation, as seen in Bertrand et al. (2010).
Using Danish data, Nielsen et al. (2004) show that women in the private sector are punished
much more for birth-related leave compared with women in the public sector; they argue that seeking
employment in the public sector might in fact be a rational choice for women. Thus, it might be that
some women who expect to have children in the near future deliberately self-select into the public
sector, where they experience more family-friendly policies and a much smaller birth-related wage
penalty. This could potentially explain the gender wage gap that appears one year after graduation
as this self-selection into the public sector could introduces a lower starting wage and a corresponding
wage gap between recent graduates.
7 Results: Private Sector Employment
Eighty-seven percent of the business graduates in our samples were hired in the private sector in
2008 (see Table 1 on page 29), which could explain the estimated wage gap between individuals
with master’s degrees in business economics and management and individuals with master’s degrees
in the social sciences. Unsurprisingly, business schools supply more employees to the private sector
than universities, but different factors may contribute to this increased probability of private sector
employment. The profile and curriculum at a business school may be better suited to the private sector,
which makes individuals with a master’s degree in business more attractive to private sector employers,
or students may already know that they prefer to be employed in the private sector before enrolling in
a business school. Again, the question concerns causality and understanding whether students decided
to seek private employment before enrolling in a business school or become interested in private sector
26Figure A.1 in the appendix show the share of individuals with children across years after graduation.
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employment after enrolling is important. As the Danish labor market is very segregated in terms
of gender, with more women employed in the public sector and more men employed in the private
sector, knowledge about the relationship between business schools and employment sectors may also
be important in understanding how to influence choices based on gender.
Table 8: Probability of Private Sector Employment
Linear Probability Model
OLS estimation 2-step IV estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Business educated 0.340** 0.332** 0.334** 0.332** 0.380** 0.362** 0.371** 0.372**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
Age when finished High School -0.018** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.006+ -0.005 -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Continued into 10. grade -0.025** -0.023** -0.023** -0.023** -0.019** -0.016* -0.014* -0.015*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Standardized High School
GPA
-0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Dane (=1) -0.007 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.031 0.030 0.029
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Gender (Male=1) 0.138** 0.084** 0.140** 0.084** 0.135** 0.086** 0.133** 0.085**
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
2008: Children<18 in the fam-
ily (=1)
-0.077** -0.077** -0.058** -0.059**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Gender (Male=1) * Children
(=1)
0.083** 0.083** 0.078** 0.073**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
2008: Experience 0.001 0.001+ 0.007** 0.007**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father’s year of edu. 0.002+ 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002+ 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother’s year of edu. 0.002+ 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Location Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Graduation Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
𝜒2 17.907 16.971 19.366 19.236
𝑝 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
No. of obs 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if an individual was employed in the private sector in 2008. The
instruments are quarter-of-birth dummies, and the reference group includes individuals born in the first quarter. 𝜒2 and 𝑝 come
from testing 𝐻0, where 𝐻0 : 𝛾𝑄2 = 0, 𝛾𝑄3 = 0, 𝛾𝑄4 = 0. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1. The sample is restricted to individuals with annual earnings above DKK 200,000 in 2008.
In this section, we estimate the probability of private sector employment. As in the previous section,
we use an IV approach to overcome the selection problem associated with master’s program choice.
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Table 8 shows the results from the estimations of Equation (1) (OLS) and Equation (5) (IV), with
the dependent variable as a dummy that takes a value one if an individual was hired in the private
sector in 2008. Figure 7 graphically presents the differences between the OLS and IV estimates of the
probability of obtaining private sector employment.
As expected, the OLS results presented in column (1)-(4) of Table 8 reveal a positive association
between business education and private sector employment and show an increased probability (ap-
proximately 34 percentage points) of private sector employment for those with a master’s degree in
business. The IV estimate in Table 8 shows a statistically significant business education premium of
approximately 36-38 percentage points. Again, a comparison of the OLS results and the IV results, as
shown in Figure 7, suggests that the OLS estimates are downward biased. However, the OLS and IV
estimates are not significantly different from one another.
Figure 7: Estimated Business Education Effect on Private Sector Employment Across Model
Specifications
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The IV estimates in column (5)-(8) of Table 8 suggest that the probability of private sector employ-
ment is 36-38 percentage points higher for individuals with a master’s degree in business economics and
management compared with individuals with a master’s degree in the social sciences. Thus, enrolling
in a master’s program at a business school increases the probability of private sector employment
significantly.
In addition to the aforementioned results on the business education effect, we also observe that
men are 14 percentage points more likely to be employed in the private sector and that having children
younger than 18 in the household significantly decreases the probability of private sector employment,
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but this decrease only applies to women with children. In addition, we find that parents’ education is
not significant in the model.
Most individuals with a business education are ultimately employed in the private sector, which
is not terribly surprising given the nature of business school curricula. However, the labor market in
Denmark is relatively segregated both in terms of gender and educational background, which requires
further consideration. Thus, from a policy perspective, the results may be helpful when considering
different aspects of the current labor market and the skill supply. Firstly, encouraging women to enroll
at business schools might make them more likely to be employed in the private sector, which potentially
could reduce the gender wage gap. Moreover, if less-able students are more likely to select into a
business education and if a business education increases the probability of private sector employment,
the supply of initial human capital might be lower in the private sector compared with the supply in
the public sector. Additionally, highly skilled individuals who graduate with a master’s degree from a
university might have opportunities in the private sector that they do not realize because they are not
encouraged to seek private sector employment.
8 Robustness
To validate our results, we conduct a series of robustness estimations. The results from these esti-
mations are presented in Appendix B. Robustness is tested along two different dimensions. We test
whether our results are sensitive to alternative model specifications, to the inclusion of individuals
who had annual earnings below 200,000 Danish kroner (DKK) in 2008, and the exclusion of outliers.
Moreover, we apply an alternative definition of our instrument and estimate using a standard 2SLS
approach.
We first test the robustness of our results to the wage measure. Thus, we perform estimations of
Equation (1) and Equation (5), where the dependent variable is the annual earnings in 2008. Table B.2
reports the results. The results remain practically unchanged, and we observe a significant business
wage premium.
One might also worry that the results are primarily driven by outliers. Thus, as a robustness test,
we exclude wage observations that lie above or below the 99th and 1st percentile and re-estimate the
model. The results are presented in Table B.1. The estimated coefficients remain virtually unchanged
compared with the results show in Table 6.
The hourly wage measured in November 2008 might not be a perfect measure of an individual’s
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productivity, as an individual might have only been employed for a short period that year and this
period then included the last months of 2008. In the paper, we account for this possibility by excluding
individuals with annual earnings below DKK 200,000 in 2008. To test whether our results are robust to
this sampling, we re-estimate our models with an extended sample, including individuals with annual
earnings below DKK 200,000 in 2008. The hourly wage results are presented in Table B.3 and Table
B.4, and the annual earning results are presented in Table B.5. Both Table B.3 and Table B.4 reveal
results that are qualitatively the same as those reported in Section 6, but the estimates in Table B.4 are
not as significant. By contrast, the results in Table B.5 are more ambiguous and show an insignificant
business wage premium. However, examine the data more carefully reveals that the results in Table
B.5 are sensitive to the inclusion of annual earnings observations below 10,000 DKK (approximately
1500 US dollars) and below 50,000 DKK (approximately 7400 US dollars). Individuals with annual
earnings below 10.000 DKK and below 50,000 DKK could reasonable be considered outside the labor
market, which makes the results in Table B.5 difficult to interpret.
We estimate the probability of private sector employment with an LPM. The LPM is sometimes
problematic, as it is not limited to the unit interval and thus can predict probabilities outside this
interval. However, if the explanatory variables are also bounded or are mostly dummies, as in our
case, the LPM often constitutes an acceptable alternative. To test whether our results are robust to
model choice, we re-estimate Equation (1) with a probit model, and the results are presented in Table
B.6. Table B.6 shows that the average marginal effects obtained after probit estimations are almost
identical to the estimated marginal effects obtained from the LPM.
To test the sensitivity of the results to our preferred instrument, we re-estimate our models using
a different definition of the instrument. Table B.7 and Table B.8 show the results of our estimations,
where the instrument is a continuous variable that counts the days between January 1 and the student’s
birthday. Both Table B.7 and Table B.8 show almost unchanged results, with only slightly different
𝜒2-statistics from the test of the instruments’ significance in the selection equation.
Finally, we also perform standard 2SLS estimations with the two different instruments. The results
from the wage regression are presented in Table B.9 and Table B.10, and the results from estimating
the probability of private sector employment are presented in Table B.11. As expected, the results from
Table B.9 and Table B.10 show less precise IV estimates and thus much less significant results. However,
Table B.9 still shows a positive business wage premium, and the estimates are not significantly different
from the ones presented in Table 6. The results in Table B.10 are a bit more ambiguous and shows
mostly a insignificant business education effect. The sign of the business education effect is negative
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in the first year after graduation and turns positive from the 6th year after graduation. However,
the coefficients are not significantly different from zero and the standard errors are large; thus, the
estimates are actually not significantly different from the results presented in Table 7. Estimating the
probability of private sector employment using 2SLS reveals larger point estimates than those presented
in Table 8. Again, the 2SLS estimates in Table B.11 have large standard errors, meaning they are less
precise and have corresponding broad confidence intervals. This in fact means that the estimates are
not significantly different from the ones presented in Table 8. However, the magnitude of the point
estimates gives reason to some concern. Finally, B.9 and B.11 shows how the 2SLS results are robust
across the two different instruments, despite differences in the reported 𝐹 -statistics.
9 Conclusion
Using Danish register data, this paper conducts an analysis of the consequences and advantages of
graduating with a master’s degree in business economics and management compared with graduating
with a master’s degree in other social sciences. To do so, we estimate a general wage equation and
model the probability of private sector employment conditional on educational attainment using Danish
register data. To address the endogeneity of educational selection, we apply an IV approach, in which
we use educational maturity as our exogenous determinant of master’s program choice.
We claim that educational maturity is an important determinant of fields of study, and we argue
that individuals who are less educationally mature are more likely to self-select into business education,
as this type of field of study is more general and allows for more diversity in the curriculum. We measure
educational maturity by season of birth, and we claim that season of birth is exogenous to future labor
market outcomes in the case of Denmark. Moreover, season of birth is a significant determinant of
field of study in all our estimations, which makes it a relevant instrument.
Our results show that individuals who complete a master’s program in business economics and
management obtain, on average, a wage premium of approximately 12-17%. This business education
wage premium is smaller when measured close to graduation and increases with the years after grad-
uation. The latter finding indicates that the returns to a master’s degree in business economics and
management are enhanced with labor market experience. Comparing our IV and OLS results shows
that the OLS estimates are downward biased, which indicates negative selection into business educa-
tion. In terms of gender, our results surprisingly show that controlling for having a master’s degree
in business economics and management does not reduce the observed gender wage gap. Parenthood
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actually increases the gender wage gap, as it is positively associated with wage outcomes for men and
negatively associated with wage outcomes for women.
When modeling the probability of private sector employment, our results show that individuals
with a master’s degree in business economics and management are, on average, 36-38 percentage points
more likely to be employed in the private sector. Because wages are generally higher in the private
sector, this increase in the probability of private sector employment is likely a main explanation for the
observed wage gap between a master’s degree in business and a master’s degree in the social sciences.
Although individuals with a master’s degree in business unsurprisingly seek private sector employment,
our results pave the way for a broader discussion about how to ensure diverse skills and competences
across the public and private sectors in Denmark.
Finally, in 2008, 72% of the men in our sample were hired in the private sector, whereas only 55%
of the women were hired in the private sector. This imbalance might partially explain the wide gender
wage gap that we observe. Although the gender-segregated labor market in Denmark is primarily
caused by the differences in family-friendly policies across sectors, policymakers may still offer some
ideas on how to address the gender wage gap through education.
Before coming to any definitive conclusions about the impact of a master’s degree in business eco-
nomics and management, more research in this area is still recommended and such research should
consider alternative methods to address the endogeneity of master’s program choice. If the results are
consistent across different methods, they will be further validated, particularly because IV estimation
hinges on the exogeneity assumption, which cannot be tested. In addition, before offering further con-
clusions about the observed gender wage gap, more research is needed. For instance, we must perform
analyses that include more explanatory variables, such as course-specific variables and measures of
weekly hours worked.
First and foremost, this paper shows that field-of-study choice plays an important role in eventual
labor market outcomes. In addition to offering more insights into the impact and consequences of
master’s program choices, from a policy perspective, this paper also provides insights into the selection
process of fields of study. As our results show that individuals born later in the year (and with
lower levels of educational maturity) are more likely to choose business education, policymakers should
perhaps consider how students are guided when deciding on their tertiary education. This insight will
be especially useful if policymakers intend to have an impact on students’ educational choices.
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Appendix A Additional Statistics
Figure A.1: Share of Individuals With Child(ren) Across Years After Graduation
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Figure A.2: Histograms of High School GPA*
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* In order to comply with the discretion rules of Statistic Denmark, we have excluded observations with high school GPA above
11 or below 6.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics Across Quarter of Birth
Quarter of birth
1 2 3 4 Total
Full sample:
High School GPA 8.84 8.83 8.84 8.82 8.83
(0.83) (0.82) (0.82) (0.84) (0.83)
Age when finished High School 19.38 19.33 19.18 19.08 19.25
(0.94) (0.80) (0.85) (0.89) (0.88)
Hourly wage in 2008 356.77 355.54 357.70 364.89 358.48
(244.91) (241.61) (306.89) (277.02) (268.07)
Father’s year of edu. 13.01 13.08 13.13 12.93 13.04
(4.34) (4.30) (4.26) (4.45) (4.33)
Mother’s year of edu. 12.77 12.70 12.87 12.78 12.78
(3.52) (3.53) (3.42) (3.51) (3.50)
Business educated:
High School GPA 8.52 8.52 8.53 8.50 8.52
(0.80) (0.78) (0.79) (0.80) (0.79)
Age when finished High School 19.36 19.32 19.15 19.07 19.23
(0.83) (0.68) (0.70) (0.80) (0.76)
Hourly wage in 2008 384.33 379.24 387.08 379.83 382.58
(285.88) (263.72) (413.28) (232.58) (306.83)
Father’s year of edu. 12.91 12.97 12.99 12.86 12.94
(4.08) (4.06) (4.11) (4.16) (4.10)
Mother’s year of edu. 12.53 12.47 12.65 12.47 12.53
(3.37) (3.51) (3.28) (3.44) (3.40)
University educated:
High School GPA 9.04 9.04 9.04 9.03 9.04
(0.79) (0.78) (0.77) (0.79) (0.78)
Age when finished High School 19.38 19.35 19.20 19.08 19.26
(1.01) (0.88) (0.93) (0.94) (0.95)
Hourly wage in 2008 339.34 339.74 338.80 354.84 342.74
(213.19) (224.31) (209.75) (302.87) (238.08)
Father’s year of edu. 13.08 13.16 13.24 12.99 13.12
(4.52) (4.48) (4.36) (4.66) (4.50)
Mother’s year of edu. 12.94 12.88 13.03 13.02 12.96
(3.63) (3.54) (3.51) (3.54) (3.55)
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Table A.2: The Selection into a Business Education
Linear Probability Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Born 2. quarter 0.021** 0.020** 0.021** 0.021**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Born 3. quarter 0.017* 0.016* 0.018* 0.018*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Born 4. quarter 0.029** 0.027** 0.030** 0.029**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Days Between 1. January and
Birthday (divided by 100)
0.010** 0.009** 0.010** 0.010**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age when finished High School 0.008* 0.010** 0.012** 0.012** 0.008* 0.011** 0.013** 0.013**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Continued into 10. grade 0.008 0.013+ 0.014* 0.014* 0.008 0.012+ 0.014* 0.013*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Standardized High School
GPA
-0.172** -0.174** -0.173** -0.173** -0.173** -0.174** -0.173** -0.173**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dane (=1) -0.099** -0.069* -0.071* -0.071* -0.099** -0.069* -0.071* -0.071*
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Gender (Male=1) 0.061** 0.051** 0.059** 0.050** 0.061** 0.051** 0.059** 0.050**
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009)
2008: Children<18 in the fam-
ily (=1)
-0.030** -0.031** -0.030** -0.031**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Gender (Male=1) * Children
(=1)
0.015 0.011 0.015 0.011
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
2008: Experience 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father’s year of edu. -0.003** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.003** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother’s year of edu. -0.007** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.007** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Location Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Graduation Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
𝐹 5.498 5.066 5.817 5.790 15.258 14.139 16.474 16.430
𝑝 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. of obs 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if an individual enrolled in a master’s in business economics and
management. 𝐹 and 𝑝 comes from testing the (joint) significance of the instruments. Robust standard errors are computed and
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1. The sample is restricted to individuals with annual earnings above
DKK 200,000 in 2008.
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Table A.3: High School GPA Regressed on Quarter of Birth
OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Men Women
Born 2. quarter 0.005 0.016 -0.007
(0.013) (0.018) (0.018)
Born 3. quarter 0.012 0.002 0.022
(0.013) (0.018) (0.019)
Born 4. quarter 0.002 -0.004 0.009
(0.014) (0.019) (0.020)
Father’s year of edu. 0.015** 0.013** 0.016**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Mother’s year of edu. 0.025** 0.027** 0.023**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Gender (Male=1) -0.163**
(0.009)
Birth Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Graduation Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
𝑝 0.819 0.720 0.401
No. of obs 30418 16681 13737
Note: The dependent variable is High School GPA. 𝑝 come from testing 𝐻0, where 𝐻0 : 𝛾𝑄2 = 0, 𝛾𝑄3 = 0, 𝛾𝑄4 = 0. Robust
standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1. The sample is restricted to
individuals with annual earnings above DKK 200,000 in 2008.
Figure A.3: Average Hourly Wage Across Years After Graduation*
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* The hourly wage has been inflation adjusted with 2000 as the basis year.
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Appendix B Robustness
Table B.1: Robustness: The Return to a Business Education - Wage Estimations
Sample Excluding Wage Observations Below and Above the 99 and 1 Percentile
OLS estimation 2-step IV estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Business educated 0.062** 0.058** 0.052** 0.052** 0.142** 0.157** 0.137** 0.145**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Age when finished High School -0.017** -0.016** -0.010** -0.010** -0.017** -0.017** -0.011** -0.011**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Continued into 10. grade -0.041** -0.040** -0.037** -0.037** -0.042** -0.041** -0.038** -0.039**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Standardized High School
GPA
0.035** 0.034** 0.033** 0.034** 0.049** 0.051** 0.048** 0.050**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Dane (=1) -0.027 -0.020 -0.024 -0.026 -0.019 -0.013 -0.018 -0.020
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Gender (Male=1) 0.183** 0.103** 0.176** 0.101** 0.178** 0.098** 0.171** 0.097**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
2008: Children<18 in the fam-
ily (=1)
-0.044** -0.047** -0.041** -0.044**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Gender (Male=1) * Children
(=1)
0.127** 0.117** 0.126** 0.116**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
2008: Experience 0.017** 0.016** 0.016** 0.016**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father’s year of edu. 0.002** 0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother’s year of edu. 0.001+ 0.001 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Location Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Graduation Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
𝜒2 18.204 17.213 19.732 19.582
𝑝 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
No. of obs 29823 29823 29823 29823 29823 29823 29823 29823
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the hourly wage measured in November of 2008. Wage observations below and
above the 99 and 1 percentile are excluded. The instruments are quarter-of-birth dummies, and the reference group includes
individuals born in the first quarter. 𝜒2 and 𝑝 come from testing 𝐻0, where 𝐻0 : 𝛾𝑄2 = 0, 𝛾𝑄3 = 0, 𝛾𝑄4 = 0. Robust standard
errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1. The sample is restricted to individuals with
annual earnings above DKK 200,000 in 2008.
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Table B.2: Robustness: The Return to a Business education - Wage Estimations
Dependent Variable is the Logarithm of Annual Earnings
OLS estimation 2-step IV estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Business educated 0.067** 0.063** 0.055** 0.055** 0.153** 0.181** 0.156** 0.166**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Age when finished High School -0.020** -0.019** -0.012** -0.013** -0.020** -0.020** -0.013** -0.014**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Continued into 10. grade -0.046** -0.045** -0.041** -0.041** -0.047** -0.046** -0.042** -0.043**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Standardized High School
GPA
0.043** 0.042** 0.041** 0.042** 0.058** 0.062** 0.059** 0.061**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Dane (=1) -0.012 -0.008 -0.012 -0.016 -0.004 0.000 -0.005 -0.009
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Gender (Male=1) 0.251** 0.124** 0.241** 0.121** 0.245** 0.118** 0.235** 0.116**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
2008: Children<18 in the fam-
ily (=1)
-0.088** -0.092** -0.085** -0.089**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Gender (Male=1) * Children
(=1)
0.199** 0.186** 0.197** 0.185**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
2008: Experience 0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 0.020**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father’s year of edu. 0.003** 0.002* 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother’s year of edu. 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Location Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Graduation Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
𝜒2 17.907 16.971 19.366 19.236
𝑝 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
No. of obs 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the annual earnings (including tax-free earnings) measured in 2008. The
instruments are quarter-of-birth dummies, and the reference group includes individuals born in the first quarter. 𝜒2 and 𝑝 come
from testing 𝐻0, where 𝐻0 : 𝛾𝑄2 = 0, 𝛾𝑄3 = 0, 𝛾𝑄4 = 0. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1. The sample is restricted to individuals with annual earnings above DKK 200,000 in 2008.
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B.1 Estimations on Expanded Sample
Table B.3: The Return to a Business Education - Wage Estimations
OLS estimation 2-step IV estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Business educated 0.058** 0.055** 0.049** 0.050** 0.122** 0.163** 0.120** 0.147**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Age when finished High School -0.019** -0.018** -0.012** -0.013** -0.019** -0.019** -0.013** -0.014**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Continued into 10. grade -0.043** -0.040** -0.038** -0.038** -0.043** -0.042** -0.039** -0.039**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Standardized High School
GPA
0.039** 0.038** 0.038** 0.038** 0.050** 0.056** 0.050** 0.055**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Dane (=1) -0.013 -0.005 -0.009 -0.012 -0.007 0.002 -0.005 -0.005
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Gender (Male=1) 0.208** 0.114** 0.201** 0.111** 0.205** 0.110** 0.197** 0.108**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
2008: Children<18 in the fam-
ily (=1)
-0.031** -0.038** -0.025** -0.032**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Gender (Male=1) * Children
(=1)
0.153** 0.144** 0.150** 0.141**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
2008: Experience 0.017** 0.016** 0.017** 0.016**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father’s year of edu. 0.002* 0.001+ 0.002** 0.002** 0.002* 0.002* 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother’s year of edu. 0.002* 0.002+ 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Location Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Graduation Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
𝜒2 16.607 15.681 17.519 17.330
𝑝 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
No. of obs 30884 30884 30884 30884 30884 30884 30884 30884
Note: The dependent variable is log of the hourly wage measured in November of 2008. The instruments are quarter-of-birth
dummies, and the reference group includes individuals born in the first quarter. 𝜒2 and 𝑝 come from testing 𝐻0, where
𝐻0 : 𝛾𝑄2 = 0, 𝛾𝑄3 = 0, 𝛾𝑄4 = 0. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
+ p<0.1. The sample also includes individuals with annual earnings below DKK 200,000 in 2008.
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Table B.4: The Return to a Business Education - Wage Estimations
OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Wages measured year after graduation 1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5 year 6 year 7 year 8 year 9 year 10 year
Business educated 0.071** 0.083** 0.079** 0.078** 0.080** 0.076** 0.083** 0.080** 0.078** 0.078**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Age when finished High School -0.005* -0.008** -0.009** -0.010** -0.011** -0.014** -0.014** -0.013** -0.017** -0.018**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Continued into 10. grade -0.012** -0.016** -0.028** -0.035** -0.042** -0.040** -0.044** -0.045** -0.044** -0.049**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Standardized High School GPA 0.008** 0.016** 0.020** 0.025** 0.029** 0.030** 0.036** 0.040** 0.043** 0.042**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Dane (=1) 0.008 -0.008 0.003 -0.022 -0.016 -0.002 0.005 0.018 0.006 0.009
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.033) (0.039) (0.041)
Gender (Male=1) 0.068** 0.093** 0.117** 0.135** 0.153** 0.170** 0.187** 0.203** 0.218** 0.228**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Father’s year of edu. 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother’s year of edu. -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001* 0.002** 0.003** 0.002** 0.003** 0.004** 0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2-step IV estimation
Business educated 0.022 0.018 0.053* 0.035 0.068** 0.053+ 0.104** 0.085* 0.040 0.100+
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.032) (0.040) (0.046) (0.051)
Birth Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Graduation Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs 25978 27117 27318 25714 24264 22782 21350 20093 18763 17288
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the hourly wage measured in November 1-10 years after graduation. All controls are also included in the IV estimations. The instruments
are quarter-of-birth dummies, and the reference group includes individuals born in the first quarter. In all estimations, we use predicted probabilities obtained by estimating a specification
of the selection equation that is equal to the specification in column (1) of Table 3. Thus, 𝜒2 and 𝑝 values from testing 𝐻0, where 𝐻0 : 𝛾𝑄2 = 0, 𝛾𝑄3 = 0, 𝛾𝑄4 = 0, can be seen in Table
3. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1. The sample also includes individuals with annual earnings below DKK 200,000
in 2008.
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Table B.5: Robustness: The Return to Business Education - Wage Estimations
Dependent Variable is the Logarithm of Annual Earnings
OLS estimation 2-step IV estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Business educated 0.037** 0.034** 0.026** 0.026** 0.018 0.114** -0.011 0.068
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.045) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042)
Age when finished High School -0.018** -0.017** -0.009** -0.009** -0.018** -0.018** -0.008** -0.009**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Continued into 10. grade -0.042** -0.040** -0.036** -0.036** -0.042** -0.041** -0.036** -0.037**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Standardized High School
GPA
0.035** 0.034** 0.034** 0.034** 0.032** 0.047** 0.027** 0.041**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Dane (=1) -0.007 -0.001 -0.011 -0.011 -0.009 0.004 -0.011 -0.008
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027)
Gender (Male=1) 0.257** 0.155** 0.150** 0.150** 0.258** 0.152** 0.246** 0.149**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007)
2008: Children<18 in the fam-
ily (=1)
-0.015* -0.025** -0.025** -0.011 -0.022**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Gender (Male=1) * Children
(=1)
0.167** 0.153** 0.153** 0.164** 0.152**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
2008: Experience 0.025** 0.025** 0.026** 0.025**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father’s year of edu. 0.003** 0.002* 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.002** 0.003** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother’s year of edu. 0.003** 0.002** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Location Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Graduation Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
𝜒2 16.627 15.723 17.630 17.436
𝑝 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
No. of obs 30873 30873 30873 30873 30873 30873 30873 30873
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the annual earnings (including tax-free income) measured in 2008. The
instruments are quarter-of-birth dummies, and the reference group includes individuals born in the first quarter. 𝜒2 and 𝑝 come
from testing 𝐻0, where 𝐻0 : 𝛾𝑄2 = 0, 𝛾𝑄3 = 0, 𝛾𝑄4 = 0. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1. The sample also includes individuals with annual earnings below DKK 200,000 in 2008.
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B.2 Probit and LPM Estimation of Private Sector Employment
Table B.6: Robustness: Probability of Private Sector Employment
Probit and LPM Estimation
LPM estimation Probit estimation - AME
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Business educated=1 0.340** 0.332** 0.334** 0.332** 0.338** 0.329** 0.331** 0.330**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age when finished High School -0.018** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.016** -0.016** -0.016**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Continued into 10. grade=1 -0.025** -0.023** -0.023** -0.023** -0.027** -0.025** -0.024** -0.025**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Standardized High School
GPA
-0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Dane (=1)=1 -0.007 0.012 0.012 0.012 -0.001 0.019 0.019 0.018
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Man 0.138** 0.084** 0.140** 0.084** 0.134** 0.134** 0.136** 0.133**
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
2008: Children<18 in the fam-
ily (=1)=1
-0.077** -0.077** -0.030** -0.032**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Gender (Male=1) * Children
(=1)=1
0.083** 0.083**
(0.011) (0.011)
2008: Experience 0.001 0.001+ 0.001 0.001+
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father’s year of edu. 0.002+ 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002+ 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother’s year of edu. 0.002+ 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002+ 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Location Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Graduation Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if an individual was employed in the private sector in 2008. Columns
(5)-(8) report average marginal effects (AME) computed after the probit estimation. Robust standard errors are computed and
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1. The sample is restricted to individuals with annual earnings above
DKK 200,000 in 2008.
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B.3 Estimation Using Alternative Instrument
Table B.7: The Return to a Business Education - Wage Estimations
2-step IV estimation
Instrument 1 Instrument 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Business educated 0.154** 0.172** 0.147** 0.155** 0.153** 0.171** 0.146** 0.154**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Age when finished High School -0.019** -0.019** -0.013** -0.014** -0.019** -0.019** -0.013** -0.014**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Continued into 10. grade -0.044** -0.043** -0.040** -0.040** -0.044** -0.043** -0.040** -0.040**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Standardized High School
GPA
0.056** 0.059** 0.055** 0.057** 0.056** 0.059** 0.055** 0.057**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Dane (=1) -0.005 -0.000 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 -0.000 -0.004 -0.007
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Gender (Male=1) 0.202** 0.099** 0.194** 0.098** 0.202** 0.099** 0.194** 0.098**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
2008: Children<18 in the fam-
ily (=1)
-0.049** -0.053** -0.049** -0.053**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Gender (Male=1) * Children
(=1)
0.161** 0.152** 0.161** 0.152**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
2008: Experience 0.016** 0.015** 0.016** 0.015**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father’s year of edu. 0.002** 0.002* 0.003** 0.003** 0.002** 0.002* 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother’s year of edu. 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Instrument 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠
Location Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Graduation Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
𝜒2 17.907 16.971 19.366 19.236 16.329 15.503 18.084 17.887
𝑝 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. of obs 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the hourly wage measured in November of 2008. The instruments in columns
(1)-(4) are quarter-of-birth dummies and the instrument in columns(5)-(8) is a continuous variable that counts the days between
individual 𝑖’s birthday and January 1. 𝜒2 and 𝑝 comes from testing 𝐻𝑗0 𝑗 = 1, 2, where 𝐻
1
0 : 𝛾𝑄2 = 0, 𝛾𝑄3 = 0, 𝛾𝑄4 = 0 and
𝐻20 : 𝛾Days = 0. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1. The
sample is restricted to individuals with annual earnings above DKK 200,000 in 2008.
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Table B.8: Probability of Private Sector Employment
Linear Probability Model
2-step IV estimation
Instrument 1 Instrument 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Business educated 0.380** 0.362** 0.371** 0.372** 0.381** 0.363** 0.373** 0.373**
(0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
Age when finished High School -0.006+ -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006+ -0.005 -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Continued into 10. grade -0.019** -0.016* -0.014* -0.015* -0.019** -0.016* -0.014* -0.015*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Standardized High School
GPA
-0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Dane (=1) 0.014 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.014 0.031 0.030 0.029
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Gender (Male=1) 0.135** 0.086** 0.133** 0.085** 0.135** 0.086** 0.133** 0.084**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
2008: Children<18 in the fam-
ily (=1)
-0.058** -0.059** -0.058** -0.059**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Gender (Male=1) * Children
(=1)
0.078** 0.073** 0.077** 0.073**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
2008: Experience 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father’s year of edu. 0.002+ 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002+ 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother’s year of edu. 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Instrument 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠
Location Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Graduation Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
𝜒2 17.907 16.971 19.366 19.236 16.329 15.503 18.084 17.887
𝑝 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. of obs 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if an individual was employed in the private sector in 2008. The
instruments in columns (1)-(4) are quarter-of-birth dummies and the instrument in columns(5)-(8) is a continuous variable that
counts the days between individual 𝑖’s birthday and January 1. 𝜒2 and 𝑝 comes from testing 𝐻𝑗0 𝑗 = 1, 2, where 𝐻
1
0 : 𝛾𝑄2 = 0,
𝛾𝑄3 = 0, 𝛾𝑄4 = 0 and 𝐻
2
0 : 𝛾Days = 0. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, + p<0.1. The sample is restricted to individuals with annual earnings above DKK 200,000 in 2008.
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B.4 Standard 2SLS
Table B.9: The Return to a Business Education - Wage Estimations
2 Stage Least Square
2SLS IV estimation
Instrument 1 Instrument 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Business educated 0.209 0.183 0.352+ 0.333 0.199 0.172 0.362+ 0.342
(0.204) (0.210) (0.206) (0.204) (0.213) (0.219) (0.214) (0.211)
Age when finished High School -0.020** -0.019** -0.015** -0.016** -0.020** -0.019** -0.015** -0.016**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Continued into 10. grade -0.045** -0.043** -0.043** -0.043** -0.045** -0.043** -0.043** -0.043**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Standardized High School
GPA
0.066+ 0.061+ 0.091* 0.088* 0.064+ 0.059 0.093* 0.089*
(0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
Dane (=1) 0.000 0.001 0.011 0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.011 0.006
(0.031) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) (0.032) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
Gender (Male=1) 0.198** 0.099** 0.182** 0.089** 0.199** 0.099** 0.182** 0.088**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
2008: Children<18 in the fam-
ily (=1)
-0.049** -0.047** -0.049** -0.047**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Gender (Male=1) * Children
(=1)
0.161** 0.150** 0.161** 0.150**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
2008: Experience 0.015** 0.014** 0.015** 0.014**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Father’s year of edu. 0.002* 0.002 0.003** 0.003** 0.002* 0.002 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother’s year of edu. 0.003+ 0.003 0.005* 0.005* 0.003+ 0.003 0.005* 0.005*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Instrument 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠
Location Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Graduation Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 5.498 5.066 5.817 5.790 15.258 14.139 16.474 16.430
𝑝𝐽 0.427 0.408 0.429 0.440
No. of obs 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the hourly wage measured in November of 2008. The instruments in columns
(1)-(4) are quarter-of-birth dummies and the instrument in columns(5)-(8) is a continuous variable that counts the days between
individual 𝑖’s birthday and January 1. The F-statistic comes from testing 𝐻𝑗0 𝑗 = 1, 2, where 𝐻
1
0 : 𝛾𝑄2 = 0, 𝛾𝑄3 = 0, 𝛾𝑄4 = 0
and 𝐻20 : 𝛾Days = 0. 𝑝
𝐽 is the p-value from the Sargan-Hansen test, which tests the null hypothesis that instruments are
uncorrelated with the error term. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
+ p<0.1. The sample is restricted to individuals with annual earnings above DKK 200,000 in 2008.
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Table B.10: The Return to a Business Education - Wage Estimations
2 Stage Least Square
2SLS IV estimation
Wages measured year after graduation 1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5 year 6 year 7 year 8 year 9 year 10 year
Business educated -0.399* -0.239 -0.148 -0.294 -0.035 0.268 0.185 0.587* 0.256 0.345
(0.156) (0.146) (0.144) (0.215) (0.199) (0.225) (0.224) (0.272) (0.224) (0.229)
Age when finished High School -0.016** -0.016** -0.014** -0.012** -0.013** -0.015** -0.013** -0.014** -0.014** -0.012**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Continued into 10. grade -0.011+ -0.017** -0.030** -0.034** -0.042** -0.043** -0.044** -0.052** -0.046** -0.052**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Standardized High School GPA -0.067* -0.034 -0.015 -0.037 0.010 0.065 0.053 0.127** 0.072+ 0.084*
(0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.037) (0.035) (0.040) (0.039) (0.048) (0.039) (0.040)
Dane (=1) -0.039 -0.042+ -0.022 -0.050+ -0.027 0.026 0.021 0.054 0.028 0.034
(0.027) (0.023) (0.025) (0.030) (0.029) (0.038) (0.036) (0.047) (0.045) (0.049)
Gender (Male=1) 0.096** 0.112** 0.130** 0.156** 0.158** 0.157** 0.179** 0.171** 0.206** 0.209**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017)
Father’s year of edu. -0.000 0.001+ 0.002* 0.001 0.002* 0.004** 0.004** 0.005** 0.004** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother’s year of edu. -0.003* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.004* 0.003 0.006** 0.004* 0.006**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Instrument 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄
Birth Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Graduation Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 6.074 5.518 5.534 3.449 3.287 2.947 3.090 3.447 3.840 4.457
No. of obs 25663 26786 26999 25467 24050 22581 21168 19931 18628 17171
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the hourly wage measured in November 1-10 years after graduation. The instruments are quarter-of-birth dummies, and the reference
group includes individuals born in the first quarter. The F-statistic comes from testing 𝐻10 : 𝛾𝑄2 = 0, 𝛾𝑄3 = 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑𝛾𝑄4 = 0. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1. The sample is restricted to individuals with annual earnings above DKK 200,000 in 2008.
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Table B.11: Probability of Private Sector Employment
2 Stage Least Square
Linear Probability Model
2SLS IV estimation
Instrument 1 Instrument 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Business educated 0.864** 0.840** 0.890** 0.900** 0.966** 0.949** 0.991** 1.001**
(0.278) (0.288) (0.275) (0.275) (0.302) (0.313) (0.296) (0.295)
Age when finished High School -0.009* -0.009+ -0.008 -0.008 -0.010* -0.009* -0.009+ -0.009+
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Continued into 10. grade -0.024** -0.023** -0.023* -0.023** -0.025** -0.025** -0.024** -0.025**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Standardized High School
GPA
0.081+ 0.077 0.085+ 0.087+ 0.099+ 0.095+ 0.103* 0.105*
(0.048) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) (0.052) (0.054) (0.051) (0.051)
Dane (=1) 0.062 0.064 0.067 0.066 0.072 0.071 0.075+ 0.074+
(0.045) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.048) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044)
Gender (Male=1) 0.105** 0.062** 0.102** 0.058** 0.099** 0.056** 0.096** 0.053**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
2008: Children<18 in the fam-
ily (=1)
-0.044** -0.043** -0.041** -0.040**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Gender (Male=1) * Children
(=1)
0.070** 0.067** 0.068** 0.066**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
2008: Experience 0.004+ 0.003+ 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Father’s year of edu. 0.003* 0.003+ 0.003* 0.003* 0.004* 0.003+ 0.004* 0.004*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Mother’s year of edu. 0.004+ 0.004 0.004+ 0.005+ 0.005* 0.005+ 0.005+ 0.005*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Instrument 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑄 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠
Location Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Graduation Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 5.498 5.066 5.817 5.790 15.258 14.139 16.474 16.430
𝑝𝐽 0.878 0.897 0.866 0.830
No. of obs 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418 30418
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if an individual was employed in the private sector in 2008. The
instruments in columns (1)-(4) are quarter-of-birth dummies and the instrument in columns(5)-(8) is a continuous variable
that counts the days between individual 𝑖’s birthday and January 1. The F-statistic comes from testing 𝐻𝑗0 𝑗 = 1, 2, where
𝐻10 : 𝛾𝑄2 = 0, 𝛾𝑄3 = 0, 𝛾𝑄4 = 0 and 𝐻
2
0 : 𝛾Days = 0. 𝑝
𝐽 is the p-value from the Sargan-Hansen test, which tests the
null hypothesis that instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1. The sample is restricted to individuals with annual earnings above DKK 200,000
in 2008.
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- Evidence from Business School Students
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Abstract
Using detailed educational data on graduates from Copenhagen Business School (CBS), this
paper uses within-master’s program variation in course selection and performance to model the
relationship between detailed educational characteristics and labor market outcomes, which we
measure by both the probability of attaining a leadership role and hourly wages. We find that
choosing courses in management is a significant predictor of leadership and that individuals who
have diversified curricula with many different types of classical business school courses are more
likely to attain leadership roles. By contrast, we find that educational diversification outside classi-
cal business school courses is insignificant in our model. Consistent with previous findings, we also
observe that particularly finance and accounting courses are significantly associated with higher
wage outcomes. Finally, we observe a strong gender effect when modeling the selection of course
types.
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1 Introduction
Firms are important contributors to growth, which might explain why the determinants of firm pro-
ductivity have received increasing attention in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Although many
findings in the literature indicate that high-quality management is important for firms’ performance
(e.g, Bennedsen et al., 2006; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010; Lazear, 2012; Bloom et al., 2013) and that
chief executive officers (CEOs) with general managerial abilities are rewarded with higher wages (e.g.,
Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004; Custódio et al., 2013), we still know little about the type of educational
skills that are, in fact, demanded in the market for leaders.1 Using a unique dataset containing de-
tailed educational information about individuals who enrolled to pursue a Master of Science (MSc)
in Economics and Business Administration at Copenhagen Business School (CBS) between 1984 and
1991, we estimate the relationship between educational choices, such as the type of master’s elective
courses taken and overall educational profiles, and labor market outcomes, which we measure by the
attainment of leadership positions and wage outcomes. The results of this analysis help us understand
the educational skills that are, in fact, valued in leadership positions.
Theorists suggest that the most able leaders are generalists (Lazear, 2012) and that the increased
importance of general managerial skills has resulted in increased wages for CEOs and in more external
hires than internal promotions (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004, 2007). Evidence from the empirical liter-
ature suggests that variation in management practices corresponds with variation in firm productivity
and corporate decisions (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010; Bloom et al.,
2013). The empirical literature also finds that the CEO play an important role in firm performance
(e.g., Bennedsen et al., 2006, 2007), that high-quality management enhances worker productivity (e.g.,
Lazear et al., 2012) and that CEOs with general managerial skills receive significantly higher wages
(e.g., Custódio et al., 2013). Such findings suggest that hiring leaders with managerial skills and a
breadth of knowledge is one way of improving firm performance.
Managerial skills are general skills that can be transferred across firms and industries, and these
skills are distinct from firm- or sector-specific human capital. Managerial skills can be thought of as
(1) the knowledge and experience that an individual gains by working in different positions or as a
manager (i.e., managerial skills from the labor market) or (2) the managerial and general knowledge
that an individual gains through tertiary education (i.e., through a management education). This pa-
per considers the latter type of managerial skills, namely, managerial skills that are acquired through
1Lazear (2012) is one of the few researchers to provide insights into this topic by using data on MBA graduates from
Stanford to model the relationship between educational characteristics and the probability of attaining a leadership role.
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education, and estimates its associations with labor market outcomes. The literature has primarily
measured managerial skills with different types of labor market experiences and has estimated their
impact on wages (e.g., Custódio et al., 2013; Falato et al., 2015). By contrast, we measure individuals’
managerial skills based on their management education and the extent of their educational diversi-
fication, and we model the relationship between managerial skills and the probability of attaining
a C-level position; a C-level position is defined as employment on a firm’s executive board.2 As in
previous studies, we also consider wages as an outcome variable.
The empirical literature that investigates the influence of detailed education choices on leadership
is limited, with Lazear (2012) serving as a prominent exception. Using data on MBA students from
Stanford, Lazear (2012) shows that individuals with diversified curricula and those who take economics
courses are more likely to become leaders.3 Inspired by the work of Lazear (2012), we contribute to the
literature by estimating the potential relationship between management education and the probability
of attaining a C-level position. Assuming that firms will take advantage of the gains achieved through
improved management practices, we expect that individuals with managerial skills are more likely to
attain C-level positions. Our access to very detailed educational data on CBS graduates allows us to
empirically model this relationship.
Lazear (2012) also tests whether wide-ranging labor market experience is associated with leadership.
Using data on Stanford MBA students, Lazear (2012) shows that individuals who have played many
different roles in the labor market are also more likely to secure leadership positions. Along the same
lines, Custódio et al. (2013) show that CEOs with general knowledge due to diverse positions in the
labor market are the highest paid. Building on these results, we expect that individuals who choose to
diversify their curricula through educational choices are more likely to attain C-level positions. Using
detailed educational data from CBS, we test this theory by creating empirical measures of individuals’
educational diversification and estimate the relationship between these measures and the probability
of attaining leadership roles.
This paper primarily focuses on the determinants of leadership. However, we also estimate the
relationship between individuals’ detailed educational information and wage outcomes. By doing that,
we get a better understanding of if and how curricular differences within a specific field of study
2The self-employed and entrepreneurs are not considered C-level individuals.
3Lazear (2012) introduces a theoretical model of leadership that implies that the most able leaders are generalists,
not specialists. Using data on MBA students from Stanford who were surveyed about their labor market experiences,
Lazear (2012) tests and confirms his theoretical predictions. Similarly, Falato et al. (2015) estimate a significant premium
of different credentials/skills in relation to a CEO’s pay. Falato et al. (2015) measure credentials based on an indicator of
individuals’ reputations, their career track records, and the quality/competitiveness of their undergraduate institutions
(the indicator of education is not a measure of field of study).
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explain differences in wage outcomes. Thus, in contrast to the ample research assessing the return
to particular fields of study, we evaluate the “return” to education on a more detailed level. Studies
have already shown that fields of study such as business and engineering are associated with a wage
premium (e.g., James et al., 1989; Blundell et al., 2000; Arcidiacono, 2004; Hamermesh and Donald,
2008; Altonji et al., 2012) and that math-related skills have an important impact on wage outcomes
(e.g., Joensen and Nielsen, 2009; Bertrand et al., 2010; Joensen and Nielsen, 2015). If certain skills
are associated with leadership and if leadership is associated with higher wages, we expect that this
relationship will be reflected in wage outcomes. Moreover, based on the findings in the literature, we
expect math-related skills to be positively related to wages.
Because our results show that certain course types are positively related to both leadership and
wages, we examine the mechanism underlying students’ course choices within a specific master’s pro-
gram. The literature has almost exclusively focused on the drivers of major choices, and the findings
reveal that gender, abilities, expected future earnings, peer effects, and individual preferences are the
main determinants of post-undergraduate decisions (e.g., Montmarquette et al., 2002; Arcidiacono,
2004; De Giorgi et al., 2010; Zafar, 2013). Combining the detailed educational data from CBS with the
data from Statistics Denmark allows us to identify the individual characteristics that drive the choice
of specific course types and the construction of a certain educational profile.
Our access to a detailed dataset with information on individuals who enrolled in the MSc in Eco-
nomics and Business Administration program at CBS between 1984 and 1991 and graduated between
1986 and 1996 enables us to conduct our empirical studies. These data allow us to compare individu-
als who graduated from the same master’s program but who displayed differences in terms of course
selection and performance. For all individuals, we are able to observe what we call an “educational
portfolio”, which we define as a vector containing the following information: (i) the course types taken
during the master’s program, (ii) the master’s GPA, and (iii) the degree of educational diversification.
Because students who pursue an MSc in Economics and Business Administration take almost entirely
elective courses, we observe high variation in the educational portfolios across individuals. This varia-
tion in educational choices allows us to estimate the potential relationship between detailed educational
characteristics and labor market outcomes.
Due to the structure of the MSc in Economics and Business Administration, students almost
exclusively take elective courses, which means that the course choices are endogenous in a regression
model. Thus, without any exogenous determinants of course selection, which would allow us to perform
Instrumental Variables (IV) estimations, we cannot conclude anything about the causal impact of such
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educational choices. However, an empirical analysis that is meant to provide a detailed description of
the people in leadership positions and their educational characteristics are still valuable. Particularly
because the literature on detailed educational decisions and leadership is limited, a study like ours
can still be informative and uncover correlations whose causal mechanics can be explored in future
research.
We combine the educational data from CBS with the Danish register data and data from the Danish
Business Authority, thereby creating a matched employer-employee dataset. With the Danish register
data, we gain access to detailed background information on the individuals in our sample, and the
Danish Business Authority data provide information on individual who sat on the executive boards
of firms that already existed or were founded during the 2000–2010 period. Combining these three
data sources enables us to identify individuals who had a C-level position as their main occupation
in a Danish joint stock company during the 2000–2010 period and to match this information with
educational history, other labor market measures and additional background information.
Overall, this paper contributes to the literature in several ways. We provide insights into the
mechanisms underlying selection into specific courses and the labor market consequences of these
course selections. Our results suggest a significant and positive association between management
courses and the probability of leadership, which complements the results of Bloom and Van Reenen
(2010) and Bloom et al. (2013). Furthermore, our results indicate that individuals with a diversified
curriculum from their master’s program are more likely to attain a C-level position, which is in line
with the findings of Lazear (2012). However, our results on educational diversification are ambiguous.
In particular, our results show that the impact and significance of educational diversification depends
on the set of courses underlying the measure of educational diversification. We find that a diversified
curriculum of classical business courses, such as management, marketing, finance, organization, and
accounting, is positively associated with subsequent leadership roles. By contrast, being more broadly
diversified is insignificant in our estimations. Moreover, we show that certain course combinations are
stronger predictors of leadership than other course combinations. Overall, our results suggest that
diversification among subjects that complement each other is a good predictor of leadership, whereas
overly broad diversification is not.
Turning to the wage estimations, our results show that courses in management, marketing, finance
and accounting show a positive and significant coefficient in our model, which is in line with previous
findings (Bertrand et al., 2010; Lazear, 2012; Joensen and Nielsen, 2009). Controlling for C-level
positions in the wage equation indicates that the marketing wage premium is partly driven by the
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increased probability of attaining a leadership position.
When estimating the selection into specific course types, we observe a strong gender effect, as
women are less likely to choose courses in finance and accounting and more likely to choose courses in
marketing and organization. Such results reveal that women are less likely to choose the course types
that we find to be associated with an increased probability of attaining a C-level position and with
higher wages. Finally, we also see that course supply is significant in the course selection equation,
indicating that universities can have an impact on students’ course choices through their course catalog
offerings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the background for the analysis
and presents related research. Section 3 introduces the analytical framework, which is based on the
background described in Section 2. Section 4 describes the institutional details of the studied master’s
program at CBS, and Section 5 presents the data from three different datasets. Section 6 and 7 discuss
the results, and Section 8 tests the robustness of these results. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Background and Related Literature
Despite the vast amount of research on the determinants of firm performance and productivity, fewer
studies have been concerned with the impact and importance of managers and management practices
on firm performance (e.g., Bennedsen et al., 2006; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, 2010; Bloom et al.,
2013; Falato et al., 2015). Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) show that variation in management practices
potentially explains the persistent and otherwise unexplained differences in firm productivity. They
show that firms with better management practices are larger, perform better and are more likely
to survive. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) measure the differences in management practices across
firms and countries and show that market competition and family firms are the two main factors that
explain differences in management practices. Firms in highly competitive markets tend to be better
managed, whereas firms that pass on leadership to the eldest son are poorly managed. Finally, Bloom
et al. (2013) conduct an analysis on a sample of Indian firms; a random sub-sample of these firms was
offered assistance with their management practices (the treatment effect). Bloom et al. (2013) compare
the productivity of these firms with the productivity of the firms in the control group and find that
good management practices improved firm productivity by up to 17%.
Along the same lines as Bloom and Van Reenen (2007, 2010), Bennedsen et al. (2006, 2007) inves-
tigate the value of CEOs and show that firm performance varies depending on the CEO. Bennedsen
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et al. (2006) hypothesize that family deaths increases the time that a CEO spends with his or her
family and, using Danish firm level data, find that both the deaths of top managers or members of
their immediate family negatively affects firm performance. Bennedsen et al. (2007) show that passing
the CEO position on to a family member instead of an external CEO has a considerable negative
causal impact on firm performance; therefore, they suggest that professional, non-family CEOs are
more valuable to firms than family CEOs.
Falato et al. (2015) formulate two hypotheses, stating (1) that CEOs with better credentials will
receive higher wages and (2) that CEOs with better credentials are more likely to improve firm perfor-
mance and, in turn, benefit shareholders. CEOs’ credentials are measured by their reputations, their
career track records, and the quality of their educational background, and Falato et al. (2015) find that
all measures of credentials are positively associated with pay. Moreover, they find that CEOs with
better credentials have a positive impact on the performance of medium-sized and large firms.
Similar to Falato et al. (2015), Custódio et al. (2013) evaluate CEO skills based on their impact on
wages. Custódio et al. (2013) create a measure of managerial skills based on managerial experience from
the labor market and find that CEOs with general managerial skills receive, on average, significantly
higher wages. Finally, Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) and Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) present a
theoretical model that predicts that an increase in the importance of more general managerial skills
results in an increase in CEO wages and in external hiring (compared with internal promotions).
Lazear (2012) presents a theoretical model of leadership and shows that, within the frame of
this model, good leaders, given a certain ability level, have skills and knowledge in many different
areas. In short, leaders are generalists as opposed to specialists. Lazear (2012) argues that leaders
must be able to make quick decisions within many different areas and thus require a broad skill set.
To test his theoretical predictions, Lazear (2012) uses data on students from the MBA program at
Stanford Graduate School of Business (GSB). He finds that students with a narrow curriculum at
Stanford are less likely to become leaders and that diversified experience in the labor market increases
the probability of attaining leadership positions. These results are in line with the expectation that
leaders are generalists. Furthermore, he finds that taking economics courses is positively associated
with leadership, whereas finance courses are insignificant when estimating the probability of attaining
leadership positions. By contrast, finance courses show a significant and positive impact in an estimated
wage equation.
As we are interested in the relationship between detailed educational choices and labor market
outcomes, we also draw from the literature on the returns to education. Although this literature is
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vast and still growing (e.g., Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Card, 1999; Blundell et al., 2000; Arcidiacono,
2004; Altonji et al., 2012; Kirkebøen et al., 2014; Altonji et al., 2015), only a few studies have focused
on determining the association between specific course choices at the tertiary level and labor market
outcomes (e.g., Athey et al., 2007; Bertrand et al., 2010; Lazear, 2012). Similarly, Joensen and Nielsen
(2009, 2015) seek to uncover the impact of high school course choices on labor market performance.
Joensen and Nielsen (2015) and Bertrand et al. (2010) are mainly concerned with the influence
of course choices in reducing gender differences in the labor market. Using a pilot scheme that ex-
ogenously makes acquiring advanced high school mathematics more attractive to and less costly for
high-performing girls, Joensen and Nielsen (2015) show that high school mathematics have a positive
and causal impact on girls’ eventual labor market performances. Bertrand et al. (2010) study the
careers of MBAs who graduated from the Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago be-
tween 1990 and 2006. They find that the gender wage gap between these MBAs can be explained by
differences in business school courses and grades, differences in career interruption (such as maternity
leave), and differences in weekly hours worked. In particular, Bertrand et al. (2010) find that the share
of finance courses is positively and significant correlated with wage outcomes and accounts for a large
part of the gender wage gap. In general, math-related skills are often found to be positively related to
labor market outcomes (e.g., James et al., 1989; Hamermesh and Donald, 2008; Joensen and Nielsen,
2009; Bertrand et al., 2010; Joensen and Nielsen, 2015).
3 Conceptual Framework
This paper aims to determine the relationship between specific educational characteristics and both
the probability of leadership and wage outcomes. We consider an individual to occupy a leadership
position if he or she is on a firm’s executive board. Throughout this paper, we will refer to individuals
on a firm’s executive board as those with C-level positions.
Building on the theoretical and empirical findings presented in the previous section, we assume that
managerial skills are important for firm productivity, and we expect that firms hire individuals with
such abilities. As such, we expect that individuals with a management education (and the assumed
high-quality managerial skills) are more likely to attain C-level positions. Moreover, inspired by the
theoretical predictions and empirical findings of, for instance, Lazear (2012) and Custódio et al. (2013),
we expect that a good leader has a broad knowledge base and general skills. Thus, we expect that
individuals who diversify their curricula via course selection will also more likely to attain C-level
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positions. These two things are not mutually exclusive. In fact, high-quality leaders presumably, to
a certain degree, do both. Finally, based on the findings in the literature (e.g., Joensen and Nielsen,
2009; Bertrand et al., 2010; Lazear, 2012; Joensen and Nielsen, 2015), we expect math-related courses
to be positively associated with wage outcomes.
To test which types of detailed educational characteristics that are actually associated with lead-
ership and wages, we specify two regression equations: Equation (1) and Equation (2). Equation (1)
is estimated by a probit model, and Equation (2) is estimated by standard Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS).
𝑃 (𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖) = Φ
(︁
𝛽0 + 𝛽
′𝑍𝑖 + 𝛼′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡
)︁
(1)
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽
′𝑍𝑖 + 𝛼′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 (2)
𝑦𝑖 is either a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the individual held a C-level position (Equation
(1)) or the logarithm of the hourly wage (Equation (2)). 𝑍𝑖 is a 𝑟 × 1 vector of 𝑟 variables that
captures the individual’s educational characteristics and choices. Accordingly, 𝛽 is a 𝑟 × 1 vector
of parameter estimates. We will refer to 𝑍𝑖 as the educational portfolio, which we will define and
describe more carefully in Section 5.2. 𝜃𝑡 represents graduation-year fixed effects, where 𝑡 indicates the
graduation year. Graduation-year fixed effects are included to control for macroeconomic conditions
and corresponding labor market fluctuations in the graduation year, as they can have an impact on
the “first job opportunity” and have longer-term implications. Finally, 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of personal
characteristics.
4 Institutional Details
The analyses in this paper are based on a dataset with detailed educational information on individuals
who enrolled to pursue a MSc in Economics and Business Administration at CBS from 1984-1991.
By detailed educational information, we mean information about individuals’ mandatory and elective
courses and their grades in all courses. Because we use data on individuals who graduated from the
same master’s program but took different electives, we are able to model the relationship between
detailed educational characteristics and labor market outcomes.
Between 1984 and 1991, CBS only offered one master’s program in economics and business, namely,
an MSc in Economics and Business Administration. The educational structure was reformed in 1992,
and, instead of a very general master’s program with many electives, CBS introduced a number of
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different master’s programs. To compare the impact of individuals’ specific course choices—in contrast
to the impact of different master’s programs—on labor market outcomes, we only consider individuals
who enrolled before 1992. After the reform, CBS decided that 1996 would be the last year in which
individuals from the old scheme could graduate. Thus, we have also limited our sample to individuals
who graduated before 1996. In so doing, we have a sample of individuals from the same master’s
program who show high variation in the types of courses selected.
In the 1984-1991 period, the MSc in Economics and Business Administration at CBS was structured
as follows: the program included a 2-year full-time curriculum, and students were expected to com-
plete 1,800 working hours (WH) each year. Entering the program, students had only one mandatory
course/project, apart from the mandatory master’s thesis. In 1984 and 1985, the mandatory course
was general economics, whereas the mandatory course from 1986-1991 was called “Advanced Project
Work”. Both courses required the completion of a report, which was mostly performed in groups. The
syllabus was more or less the same across these two differently titled courses, and only the evaluation
format changed between 1985 and 1986. The remainder of the program consisted of electives and a
master’s thesis.4
For the mandatory course, the master’s thesis, and the electives, the workload was distributed as
900 WH, 900 WH and 1,800 WH, respectively. This structure means that students who pursue an
MSc in Economics and Business Administration at CBS generally decide how they will put together
their curriculum and whether they want to be specialists or generalists.5 For the elective part of the
program, students may choose to enroll in, for instance, four 400-WH courses and one 200-WH course
or three 400-WH courses and three 200-WH courses. As such, the total number of courses can vary a
bit across individuals.
The described structure of the master’s program means that we cannot avoid talking about self-
selection. By design, individuals self-select into electives. Thus, when estimating the relationship
between course choices and labor market outcomes, we cannot distinguish between the selection effect
and the pure course effect (more about this later). However, this structure ensures enough variation in
course choices across individuals to compare the labor market outcomes of individuals who graduated
with the same master’s degree, though with different course choices and curricula.
4A complete list of the departments that offered electives is presented alongside the share of our sample who took at
least one course in the given department in Table A.1 on page 111.
5Some guidelines recommend certain courses be taken together, but, overall, students are free to choose courses.
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5 Data
Our access to three different data sources allows us to create a matched employer-employee dataset,
which enables us to estimate Equations (1) and (2). The core of our analysis utilizes data with
detailed educational information on individuals who graduated with an MSc in Economics and Business
Administration from CBS between 1986 and 1996. These individuals make up our sample and are
the foundation for our analysis. Combining these data with data from Statistics Denmark and the
Danish Business Authority provides us with information on labor market achievements and background
characteristics of these individuals.
5.1 Labor Market and Background Data
When creating our estimation data, the first step involves merging the educational data from CBS
with the administrative register data from Statistics Denmark. In so doing, we obtain information on
individuals’ backgrounds and eventual labor market outcomes. From Statistics Denmark, we obtain
labor market information from the Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (IDA). The IDA
covers the total population of workers in Denmark and allows us to identify and match workers and
firms consistently over time. The latter is important because it enables us to identify the firms in
which individuals had their primary occupation.
As we are interested in modeling the probability of attaining leadership roles, we need to identify the
individuals who constitute a firm’s executive board (C-level individuals). As the data from Statistics
Denmark only enable us to determine whether an individual is considered a “manager”, we use data from
the Danish Business Authority because these data have information on individuals on the executive
boards of all joint stock companies that already existed or were founded during the 2000–2010 period.
By combining the data from Statistics Denmark and the Danish Business Authority, we can identify
individuals who were wage employed and had a registered C-level position as their main occupation in
November of each year from 2000–2010.6 As such, we do not regard the self-employed or entrepreneurs
as holding a C-level position.7
Although the labor market information is based on the 2000–2010 period, we have not created a
6We only use information obtained in November of each year. Thus, if individuals hold C-level positions for instances
in the first 6 months of the year but not in November, these individuals are not registered as holding C-level positions
in that year.
7The data from the Danish Business Authority contains information about individuals on executive boards and
boards of directors. This information is extremely important for a study like ours. However, the data are messy, and
some individuals have missing or inconsistent information with regard to the variable of interest. We exclude these
observations. To ensure that we do not incorrectly classify someone as a C-level individual, only individuals who are
reported to sit on a firm’s executive board in the Danish Business Authority data and to hold a top position (or listed
as wage-employed without a label) in Statistics Denmark are considered C-level individuals.
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panel. Because we want to capture the potential association between detailed educational information
(time invariant) and labor market outcomes, the panel dimension does not offer additional information.
Instead, we create a cross-sectional dataset with individual-level means over the considered period.
When computing the individual-level means over the 2000–2010 period, we exclude years in which an
individual is not observed in the Statistics Denmark database. If individuals live outside Denmark,
they are not found in the data, and we cannot know whether they are active in the labor market
outside Denmark.
Creating cross-sectional data means that we formulate our main dependent variable as a binary
variable that is equal to one if an individual had a C-level position at least once during the 2000–2010
period and zero otherwise. For our wage regressions, we create a dependent variable that is the mean
hourly wage across the ten-year period. We discard observations in which the hourly wage rate is
unobserved or is measured with inadequate precision according to Statistics Denmark, and we also
exclude wage observations for self-employed individuals. We categorize missing wage observations as
“non-C-level”, which means that we perform our wage and C-level estimations on two different samples.
From Statistics Denmark we also obtain specific information on individuals, including information
about the children in the household and civil status (married or single). We rely on information
obtained in 2000—the first year from which we have labor market information. Excluding non-Danes
who studied at CBS, individuals with missing background information and those who did not appear
in the data during the 2000–2010 period, we have a sample of 1,835 individuals who graduated with an
MSc in Economics and Business Administration from CBS between 1986 and 1996. Table 1 presents
summary statistics on all the non-educational variables.
Table 1 shows that 12% of our sample held a C-level position at least once during the 2000–2010
period. The average number of years that these individuals held a C-level position was 3.90 years.8
Women account for 33% of our sample, but only 4% of the women held a C-level position at least once.
By contrast, 16% of the men in the sample held a C-level position once during the 2000–2010 period.
Sixty-seven percent of the C-level sample was married in 2000, and 67% had children in 2000. By
contrast, only 60% of the non-C-level individuals were married in 2000, and only 59% had children. As
expected, we see a significant wage difference between C-level and non-C-level individuals and between
men and women.9
Table 1 also shows that C-level individuals had been on the labor market longer than non-C-level
individuals in 2000 (the time between their graduation and 2000). The inclusion of graduation-year
8Figure A.1 presents the distribution if the years as a C-level individual are included.
9Note that 1 US dollar is equal to approximately 6.53 DKK.
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fixed effects in our regression models ensures that we control for this variation in years on the labor
market across individuals.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
All Not
C-level
C-level Difference Men Women Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gender, female=1 0.33 0.37 0.11 0.26***
(0.47) (0.48) (0.31)
Father with manager position 0.10 0.091 0.18 -0.088*** 0.10 0.096 0.0085
(0.30) (0.29) (0.38) (0.31) (0.30)
Time since graduation 8.02 7.92 8.73 -0.80*** 8.17 7.74 0.43***
(2.47) (2.42) (2.71) (2.57) (2.22)
Children in 2000 0.60 0.59 0.67 -0.080** 0.58 0.65 -0.067***
(0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.49) (0.48)
Married in 2000 0.57 0.55 0.67 -0.11*** 0.55 0.59 -0.039
(0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50) (0.49)
Age in 2000 35.1 35.0 35.4 -0.40** 35.3 34.6 0.73***
(2.64) (2.66) (2.48) (2.63) (2.60)
Average hourly wage in DKK 362.4 331.8 580.3 -248.5*** 403.0 281.2 121.8***
(239.6) (193.4) (382.6) (262.0) (158.8)
C-level position 0.12 0.16 0.039 0.12***
(0.33) (0.37) (0.19)
Number of years as CEO 3.90
(2.84)
No. of obs 1835 1612 223 1835 1222 613 1835
Note: Means and standard errors in parenthesis are reported in Columns (1), (2), (3), (5), and (6). Column (4) reports the
mean difference between the sample of not C-level individuals and the sample of C-level individuals and Column (7) reports the
mean difference between men and women. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
5.2 Educational Data
All the individuals in our sample enrolled in the MSc in Economics and Business Administration
program at CBS between 1984 and 1991 and graduated between 1986 and 1996. Excluding non-
Danes and individuals with missing labor market or background information, we have very detailed
educational information on a sample of 1,835 individuals.10 Using the educational data from CBS,
we create what we will refer to as an educational portfolio (𝑍𝑖). For each individual, we create an
educational portfolio that contains information on educational achievements at CBS, specific course
types taken, and the extent of educational specialization/diversification. Table 2 shows the variables
included in the educational portfolio and summary statistics.
10In our sample, we keep students who either have a bachelor’s degree from somewhere outside CBS or have grad-
uated with a Bachelor of Science in Economics and Business Administration. This criterion means that we exclude
approximately 50 students with a different bachelor’s degree from CBS.
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The educational portfolio includes five dummy variables, each indicating whether a student took
courses in a specific department. The five departments considered are Business Economics and
Leadership, Accounting, Marketing, Finance, and Organization and Labor Market Soci-
ology, which we consider the five classical business school departments at CBS. We focus on these
departments because the course types that they offer correspond with the most common types of
C-level positions in firms, namely, the CEO, the chief operations officer (COO), the chief financial
officer (CFO), and the chief marketing officer (CMO); therefore, these five departments ex ante can
be expected to be relevant for leadership. Moreover, they all offer courses that are considered classical
courses for a business education.11
Table 2: Educational Portfolio
Variable Definition All Not C-level C-level Diff.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Man𝐷
Equal 1 if at least one course was taken at the Dep.
of Business Economics and Leadership
0.70 0.69 0.82 -0.13***
(0.46) (0.46) (0.39)
Acc𝐷
Equal 1 if at least one course was taken at the Dep.
of Accounting
0.17 0.16 0.22 -0.060**
(0.38) (0.37) (0.42)
Mar𝐷
Equal 1 if at least one course was taken at the Dep.
of Marketing
0.61 0.61 0.62 -0.012
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Fin𝐷
Equal 1 if at least one courses was taken at taken at
the Dep. of Finance
0.23 0.22 0.30 -0.081**
(0.42) (0.41) (0.46)
Org𝐷
Equal 1 if at least one course was taken at the Dep.
of Organization and Labor Market Sociology
0.38 0.39 0.33 0.062*
(0.49) (0.49) (0.47)
Diversification 1
Total number of different departments/courses in the
educational portfolio
2.91 2.90 3.00 -0.098
(0.88) (0.88) (0.83)
Diversification 2
Total number of different classical business
departments/courses (C) in the educational portfolio
2.09 2.07 2.29 -0.22***
(0.70) (0.71) (0.63)
Master GPA
Grade point average from the Master program.
Calculated based on the Danish 13-grading scale.
8.50 8.50 8.52 -0.026
(0.83) (0.83) (0.82)
Entry GPA
Measure of ability when entering the master program.
Average over high school and bachelor GPA.
7.70 7.67 7.86 -0.18***
(0.70) (0.68) (0.80)
Starting age Age when starting at the master program
23.8 23.9 23.6 0.26**
(1.73) (1.76) (1.48)
Number of students 1835 1612 223
Note: Means Standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported in Columns (1)-(3). Column (4) reports the mean difference
between the sample of not C-level individuals and the sample of C-level individuals. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
11Individuals pursuing an MSc in Economics and Business Administration at CBS had the option of taking electives
in the departments listed in Table A.1. The departments that offered classical business courses are labeled with C
(classical), and the remaining departments are labeled with O (other). Except for International Economy and
Management, the departments labeled with C are those in which most students took courses. International Economy
and Management is not included in the pool of considered departments because it does not offer what we consider to be
classical business school courses; it instead offers a very broad supply of courses, ranging from development economics
to international management.
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To test whether educational diversification increases the probability of leadership, the educational
portfolio also includes measures of educational diversity. CBS is a large institution and offers a wide
variety of courses in its departments. As such, diversification across all the departments at CBS
alone might not be positively associated with leadership. The study guidelines from CBS support this
assumption, as they suggest certain course combinations for different careers, indicating that not all
courses are well suited for all types of labor market participation. To test how the type and the extent of
educational diversification is associated with leadership, we create two different measures of educational
diversification. Our first measure, Diversification 1, counts the total number of departments in which
a student took courses, and our second measure, Diversification 2, counts the number of classical
departments in which a student took courses.
Table 2 reveals that the share of individuals with management courses differs across C-level in-
dividuals and non-C-level individuals. When pooling all the years, the share of C-level individuals
and non-C-level individuals who took management courses is 0.82 and 0.68, respectively, which reveals
significantly different shares. Figure 1 reflects similar findings across enrollment years.12
Figure 1: Share of Students With Management Courses Across Enrollment Year and C-level
Status
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Table 2 and Figure 2 show the degree of educational diversification across enrollment years and
C-level/non-C-level individuals. Table 2 shows a significant difference between C-level and non-C-level
12Figure 1 shows a relatively sharp decline in the share of individuals taking management courses from 1989 to 1990.
This drop can likely be explained by a measurement error in the data due to the 1992 reform of the master’s program
in question. The reform is reflected in the data; courses taken under the umbrella of the new system are not labeled
by department. As such, some courses taken after 1992 (mostly students enrolled in 1990 and 1991) might be wrongly
categorized as “other”, which means that we might underestimate the share of students who took management courses in
1990 and 1991. We thus risk comparing students with management courses to students with and without management
courses. As such a comparison would only make our results weaker, we do not considered it a crucial threat to our
results.
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individuals in the second measure of diversification, Diversification 2, but no significant difference in
the first diversification measure, Diversification 1. Figure 2 separately indicates the same pattern
across enrollment years.
Figure 2: Diversification Across Enrollment Years and C-level Status
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The master’s GPA is also included in the educational portfolio. Until 2007, grades in Denmark
were rewarded according to the Danish “13” grading scale. On this grading scale, the highest grade is
13, which only an exceptionally independent and excellent performance merits, and the lowest passing
grade is 6. The “13” grading scale never awards a value of 12, meaning that it jumps from 11 to
13, and students almost never receive a 13. An average of 8 indicates that a student is just above
the average.13 To ease the interpretation of the estimated coefficients when GPA is included in the
regression models, we use a standardized measure of master’s GPA. This means that we include a
standardized measure of the master’s GPA computed as 𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑠 = 𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖−𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑠𝑞(𝐺𝑃𝐴) , such that it has mean
zero and standard deviation one.
6 Results
6.1 Educational Characteristics and Labor Market Outcomes
Table 3 reports the results from the estimations of Equations (1) and (2). Columns (1)-(6) present the
results from estimating the probability of attaining a C-level position, and columns (7)-(12) present
the results from the estimated wage equation. Columns (1)-(4) show that management course(s) are a
13See the Main Appendix A of this thesis for a translation of the Danish grading scale.
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very strong predictor of leadership and that this result is robust to the inclusion of additional course
dummies. Across all specification, we observe a strong correlation between management courses and the
probability of leadership positions, which confirms our expectations. This positive relationship might
result from management education improving managerial skills, which improves firm performance and,
in turn, increases the probability of being hired for a C-level position. However, the estimated positive
relationship may result from individuals with leadership skills being more likely to sort into management
courses; thus, the estimated effect may be due to self-selection. We will discuss self-selection further
later in this section.
Adding additional course-specific dummies to the regression reveals that management, marketing,
and accounting are the course types that significantly predict leadership. However, the marketing
dummy only enters the model significantly when we also control for finance (see columns (3) and (4)).
Thus, the significant and positive coefficient on the marketing dummy is sensitive to the reference
group. By contrast, organization and finance are insignificant in the C-level regressions. The latter
finding is in line with the results of Lazear (2012), who also finds that finance courses are insignificant
in predicting leadership.
The results in columns (2)-(4) of Table 3 also suggest that having a combination of management,
accounting and marketing in the educational portfolio is associated with a higher probability of at-
taining a C-level position compared with only having one or two of these course types in the portfolio.
Moreover, we observe that the included course dummies are jointly significant (𝑝 < 0.01). These results
indicate that diversification is positively associated with the probability of attaining a C-level position.
To investigate the importance of educational diversification further, we include our two measures of
educational diversification, namely, Diversification 1 and Diversification 2. Diversification 1 counts
the total number of different departments/courses that are represented in the educational portfolio,
and Diversification 2 counts the number of classical departments/courses (C) that are represented in
the educational portfolio.
Columns (5) and (6) present the results from the estimations that include the diversification mea-
sures. Because the diversification measures are created based on the course dummies, we do not include
the diversification measures together with the course dummies in the regressions, as doing so would
lead to multicollinearity. Interestingly, columns (5) and (6) show that diversification between a limited
and relevant pool of courses is a good predictor of leadership, whereas broader diversification is insignif-
icant in the estimations (Diversification 2 enters significant and Diversification 1 enters insignificant).
These results provide a deeper and more intuitive understanding of the association between leadership
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Table 3: Baseline Results - The Impact of Course Choice
C-level Probit Regression Wage OLS Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Man𝐷 =1 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.054** 0.067*** 0.077*** 0.074***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Acc𝐷 =1 0.063*** 0.057** 0.062** 0.159*** 0.114*** 0.110***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
Mar𝐷 =1 0.022 0.028* 0.033** 0.013 0.058*** 0.053**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Fin𝐷 =1 0.021 0.027 0.177*** 0.171***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.029) (0.029)
Org𝐷 =1 0.018 -0.016
(0.017) (0.021)
Diversification 1 0.011 0.022**
(0.008) (0.011)
Diversification 2 0.040*** 0.074***
(0.010) (0.013)
Standardized master GPA 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.011 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.044*** 0.049***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Gender, female=1 -0.138*** -0.134*** -0.131*** -0.132*** -0.139*** -0.136*** -0.300*** -0.284*** -0.264*** -0.263*** -0.299*** -0.296***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Starting age -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Father with manager position=1 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.089*** 0.085*** 0.101*** 0.103*** 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.101*** 0.097***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
Children in 2000 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.044* 0.045** 0.040* 0.040* 0.045* 0.043*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Married in 2000 0.033* 0.034* 0.034* 0.033* 0.035** 0.033* 0.101*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.103***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Age in 2000 0.067 0.069 0.070 0.071 0.083 0.078 0.115 0.139* 0.148* 0.148* 0.130* 0.122
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.066) (0.065) (0.078) (0.078) (0.076) (0.076) (0.078) (0.078)
Age in 2000 squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002* -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑝 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. of obs 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1795 1795 1795 1795 1795 1795
Note: Through columns (1)-(6) the dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the individual held a C-level position at least once during the 2000–2010 period. Through columns
(7)-(12) the dependent variable is the logarithm of the average hourly wage during the 2000–2010 period. Columns (1)-(6) report average marginal effects (AME). When computing
AMEs for dummy variables, we report the effect from the discrete change from 0 to 1. 𝑝 is the 𝑝-value from testing the hypothesis that all included course dummies are jointly significant.
Graduation-year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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and diversification. Broad diversification or diversification outside the classical business school topics
does not predict leadership, whereas diversified knowledge within a relevant pool of courses is a good
predictor of future leadership.
Using data on MBAs from Stanford, Lazear (2012) finds that having a specialized education has
a negative impact on the probability of attaining leadership. We find that only diversification within
a pool of classical business school course types is a significant predictor of leadership. Because the
course catalog at Stanford GSB is probably not as broad as the course catalog at CBS, Diversification
2 likely functions much like the measure of education generalization used by Lazear (2012). Thus, our
finding might be well in line with the finding of Lazear (2012).
Turning to the results from estimating the wage equation (columns (7)-(12)), unsurprisingly, we
observe that particularly finance and accounting enter the wage equation with a positive and significant
coefficient. Although we are unable to determine causality, it is worth noting that the coefficient on the
finance dummy is very large. The findings that both accounting and finance are important for wage
outcomes complements the literature that shows that mathematics is positively correlated (even causal)
with wage outcomes (e.g., Joensen and Nielsen, 2009, 2015). Finance enters the model significantly
and with a positive sign, which also confirms the findings of Bertrand et al. (2010) and Lazear (2012).
Additionally, management is significant in the wage equation with a positive, though relatively
small, coefficient. Given the results from the C-level regressions, this finding is not overly surpris-
ing. However, the question becomes whether management in itself is associated with a positive wage
premium or the relationship works through the increased probability of attaining a C-level position.
Section 6.3 discusses this question further.
Moreover, after controlling for finance courses, marketing enters the wage equation positively and
significantly. Thus, marketing does not offer a wage premium when compared with individuals with
finance courses. However, when controlling for finance courses, we observe a positive and significant
correlation between wage outcomes and marketing courses.
The master’s GPA is insignificant in the C-level regression, though positively and significantly
correlated with wage outcomes. A one-unit increase in the master’s GPA increases wages outcomes by
4.5%. Having a father who once held a manager position is also positively and significant associated
with both leadership and wages.14 Finally, being married in 2000 enters with a positive and significant
coefficient in both the C-level and wage regressions. Having children in 2000 also positively influences
the wage regression. As being married and having children are found to have positive effects for men
14We obtain data on parents from the Danish Register Data, and these “management positions” could also be lower-
level managers.
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and negative effects for women, these results are most likely driven by men.
Section 4 described the structure of the master’s program and self-selection into electives. Due to
self-selection into course types, we cannot distinguish between the selection effect and the pure course
type effect in our estimations. Thus, one explanation for the positive association between attaining a
C-level position and taking management courses (or any other course type) could be that individuals
who are already aiming to attain a C-level position during their studies are focused and, in turn, choose
management courses. Another explanation for this positive relationship could be that management
courses provide students with skills that make them well suited to leadership, which will make them
more likely to be hired for a C-level position. Thus, the relationship between management courses and
leadership could result from either a pure course effect or a pure selection effect.
In other words, we cannot determine whether a management education makes students better
leaders and, in turn, increases their probability of attaining a C-level position or if students are pre-
determined to be leaders before choosing management courses. Their upbringing and the characteristics
of their parents are important in developing leadership ambitions later in life. However, the ability to
lead a firm in a globalized economy in which conditions constantly change might not be pre-determined.
Thus, today’s leaders have likely engaged in an educational process at some point that enables them
to lead under such conditions (see also Custódio et al., 2013). This means that our results are likely
driven by both a management education effect and a selection effect. The distinction between these
two effects and the identification of a “management education effect” is something that should be
investigated in future research.
6.2 Complementarity or Diversification?
The results in Table 3 suggest that educational diversification among a pool of relevant courses is a good
predictor of future leadership, whereas broad diversification is not necessarily valued for leadership.
Furthermore, the results suggest that management, marketing, and accounting are the important
courses for leadership positions. In this section, we further investigate the mechanisms that drive the
diversification results.
Figure 3 shows the share of students with certain course combinations who took at least one
management course. Thus, Figure 3 provides an indication of how students combine course types.15
We see that a large share of the students combine management and marketing. Given that 61% of
the students have marketing in their educational portfolios and only 23% and 17% have finance and
15Table A.2 shows the corresponding numbers, and Table A.3 shows additional summary statistics across course types.
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accounting, respectively, in their educational portfolios, the large share of individuals with marketing
and management is perhaps not surprising. However, in Figure 3c, we see that the share of students
that combined finance and accounting is slightly larger (4.6%) than both the share of students that
combined finance and marketing (3.8%) and the share of students that combined accounting and
marketing (2.1%), even though many more students took marketing courses compared with finance
and accounting courses. Additionally, Figure 3a shows that the share of students with organization and
marketing is larger than the share of students with marketing and finance and the share of students
with organization and finance. Figure 3b shows a similar picture to that in Figure 3a, though with
accounting rather than finance. Overall, the figures indicate that students are more willing to combine
courses that are similar in terms of demanded and taught skills.
Figure 3: Course Combinations Given Management=1
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To understand whether a complementarity effect exists between different course types, we include
complementarity dummies that correspond to the 8 groups depicted in Figures 3a-3c in our model
and estimate the probability of attaining a C-level position using a linear probability model. We
estimate using the linear probability model to ease the interpretation of the marginal effects of our
complementarity dummies. This means that we specify Equation (3) as follows and estimate it using
OLS:
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽
′𝑍𝑖 + 𝛼′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 (3)
𝑦𝑖 is the C-level dummy, and both 𝑋𝑖 and 𝜃𝑡 are defined as in Equation (1). For each regression, the ed-
ucational portfolio, 𝑍𝑖, now contains 8 complementarity dummies. Thus, we investigate whether, given
at least one management course in the educational portfolio, some course combinations are stronger
predictors of C-level positions than others. To examine the impact of management courses on the
course combinations, we also estimate the model with dummies that represent the same combinations
and with Man𝐷 = 0. Table 4 presents the results from the estimations of Equation (3).
Table 4 shows that management in combination with either finance, accounting or marketing is a
good predictor of future leadership. Furthermore, combinations of marketing and organization (column
(1) and (3)) or finance and accounting (column (5)), conditioned on having at least one management
course, enters the regression significantly and positively. The results from column (5) also show that the
combination of finance and accounting (together with management) predicts leadership more strongly
than the combination of management and finance or of management and accounting. Moreover, we
observe that combinations of, for instance, management, finance and organization; management, ac-
counting and organization; or management, finance and marketing are insignificant in the regressions.
Comparing the results in columns (1), (3) and (5) to the results in columns (2), (4) and (6),
we observe that the effect of diversification is conditioned on having a management course in the
educational portfolio. Diversification without management in the educational portfolio can actually
be negatively associated with leadership. For instance, combinations of marketing and organization
courses without a management course enters the model with a significant and negative sign.
The results from columns (1), (3) and (5) indicate that, conditioned on having at least one man-
agement course, diversification within course types that somehow complement one another is a strong
predictor of leadership. For instance, combining marketing and organization or finance and account-
ing is a significant predictor of leadership, whereas combining finance and organization is not. We
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interpret
Table 4: Complementarity or Diversification
Linear Probability Model
Man𝐷=1 Man𝐷=0 Man𝐷=1 Man𝐷=0 Man𝐷=1 Man𝐷=0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.114 0.190
(0.143) (0.187)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.015 -0.032
(0.044) (0.054)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.032 -0.016
(0.059) (0.083)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.002 -0.118***
(0.034) (0.038)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.102*** -0.047
(0.034) (0.033)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.009 -0.036
(0.022) (0.032)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.067** -0.053**
(0.027) (0.021)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.051*** -0.053**
(0.019) (0.022)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.034 -0.107***
(0.119) (0.029)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.038 0.051
(0.054) (0.085)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.105 -0.044
(0.066) (0.054)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.103*** -0.024
(0.040) (0.039)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.034 -0.142***
(0.032) (0.016)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.008 -0.053*
(0.023) (0.030)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.069** -0.041*
(0.027) (0.022)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.042** -0.050**
(0.019) (0.023)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 -0.074** -0.081***
(0.037) (0.030)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.115* -0.052
(0.066) (0.054)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.043 0.021
(0.043) (0.074)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.028 0.022
(0.044) (0.066)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.118** -0.017
(0.046) (0.040)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.067* -0.104***
(0.039) (0.033)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 -0.003 -0.075***
(0.021) (0.027)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.051*** -0.054***
(0.017) (0.017)
Individual course effects included No No No No No No
No. of obs. 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the individual held a C-level position at
least once during the 2000–2010 period. In all estimations, we have included the same controls as in Table 3.
Graduation-year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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this finding as a complementarity effect, whereby diversification within similar areas is beneficial for
leadership.
Many factors may explain this complementarity effect. First, although individuals should diversify
their educational portfolios and skill sets, different types of abilities are preferred for different C-level
positions within a firm. For instance, the combination of finance and accounting may be beneficial for
a CFO, whereas marketing may be more important for a CMO. Second, individuals who know their
strengths and weaknesses understand how to take advantage of their specific abilities and, in turn,
seek diversification in an area in which they perform best. These individuals might also be better at
recognizing the strengths of others (e.g., employees), which is likely a valuable quality in a leader.
Overall, the results point towards the same conclusions as in Section 6.1. Diversification within a
narrow area is a significant and positive predictor of leadership, whereas broad educational diversifica-
tion is not significantly associated with leadership.
6.3 Direct or Indirect Wage Relationship
Table 3 presents our baseline results, which show a positive association between wage outcomes and
management, marketing, accounting and finance courses, although the magnitude of these estimates
differs significantly across the different course types. Despite that we cannot determine causality,
an understanding of the relationship between course types and wage outcomes might still help us
better understand the positive relationship between business education and wage outcomes, which has
been documented in the literature (e.g. James et al., 1989; Blundell et al., 2000; Arcidiacono, 2004;
Hamermesh and Donald, 2008; Altonji et al., 2012).
To investigate whether the course wage premiums of management, marketing, and accounting result
from the increased probability of attaining a C-level position or work through a direct channel, we
include a C-level dummy in all the regressions in addition to the course-specific explanatory variables.
This C-level dummy takes a value one if the individual had a C-level position at least once during
the 2000–2010 period. We want to investigate whether we capture a positive relationship between
management courses and wage outcomes because management predicts leadership and leaders earn
more or, instead, a more direct relationship exists between management courses and wage rates. If the
management dummy loses its prediction power when the C-level dummy is included, a more indirect
relationship is implied (similar for marketing and accounting dummies).
Table 5 presents the results from these estimations. Unsurprisingly, the C-level dummy enters the
wage equation with a significant and positive sign. This result holds true across all specifications.
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Moreover, all the course dummies stay significant in the wage regression. However, the marketing
dummy is sensitive to the inclusion of the C-level dummy and is only significant at the 10% level in
column (3). As such, part of the marketing wage premium might be driven by the increased probability
of attaining a C-level position. For all the course dummies, we observe that the magnitude of the
estimated coefficients decreases slightly compared with the baseline results. However, the differences
between the estimated coefficients are not significant. Overall, the results indicate that course types
within management, accounting, and finance are all directly related to wage outcomes.
Table 5: Wage Estimation - Direct or Indirect Relationship
OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
C-level position 0.387*** 0.392***
(0.034) (0.034)
Diversification 2 0.074*** 0.057***
(0.013) (0.013)
Man𝐷 =1 0.074*** 0.051**
(0.021) (0.020)
Acc𝐷 =1 0.110*** 0.087***
(0.032) (0.031)
Mar𝐷 =1 0.053** 0.037*
(0.022) (0.021)
Fin𝐷 =1 0.171*** 0.159***
(0.029) (0.028)
Org𝐷 =1 -0.016 -0.024
(0.021) (0.020)
No. of obs 1795 1795 1795 1795
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average hourly wage during the 2000–2010
period. In all estimations, we have included the same controls as in Table 3. Graduation-year fixed
effects are included. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
7 What Determines Course Selection
The results from the previous section show that the selection of course types and the extent of spe-
cialization/diversification within a master’s program is important for labor market outcomes. Because
educational choices predict labor market outcomes, understanding course selection mechanisms is es-
sential. To better understand the determinants of course choices, we estimate selection into the five
main course types: management, marketing, finance, accounting, and organization.
The literature has shown that field-of-study choice is fundamental for labor market outcomes (e.g.,
James et al., 1989; Arcidiacono, 2004; Hamermesh and Donald, 2008; Altonji et al., 2012; Hastings et al.,
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2013; Webber, 2014; Altonji et al., 2015). Because of this relationship, selection into majors has received
ample attention. Studies have found that gender, abilities, expected future earnings, peer effects and
individual preferences are important determinants of field-of-study selection (e.g. Montmarquette et al.,
2002; Arcidiacono, 2004; Ost, 2010; De Giorgi et al., 2010; Arcidiacono et al., 2012; Zafar, 2013).
However, the selection into specific types of electives has not been carefully investigated. Despite the
importance of determining the mechanisms underlying course selection, this paper does not offer an
in-depth analysis of this topic. As in the previous section, our results are meant to uncover interesting
patterns and to guide further research.
7.1 Empirical Framework
To examine selection into course types, we estimate a regression equation (Equation 4).
𝑃 (𝑦𝑐𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖) = Φ
(︁
𝛼0 + 𝛼
′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜂𝑡
)︁
(4)
where 𝑦𝑐𝑖 is a dummy that indicates whether an individual 𝑖 has a particular course type 𝑐 in his or her
educational portfolio. 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of individual characteristics, such as age at enrollment, gender,
entry GPA, and a dummy that indicates whether the father once held a managerial position. 𝜂𝑡 refers
to enrollment-year fixed effects. We formulate entry GPA as the average of the bachelor’s GPA and
the high school GPA. As such, we do not have to exclude too many observations due to missing values
either in the bachelor’s or the high school GPA. If the bachelor’s GPA or the high school GPA is
missing, we replace entry GPA with the GPA that is not missing. In two extended regressions, we also
include (1) the supply of each specific course type during the enrollment period and (2) the share of
individuals with managerial positions in the municipality of residence in the four years prior to entering
CBS. Table 6 presents summary statistics on the explanatory variables.
The course supply cannot be obtained directly from the data, but it can be created based on
available information. We create a measure of the number of different courses to which an individual
is exposed during enrollment, which we consider a proxy for course supply. For each pair of enrollment
and graduation years, we create this proxy by counting all the different courses in each department,
except for the courses listed for individual 𝑖. We exclude individual 𝑖 when counting course names to
ensure that we do not create a measure that is correlated with the outcome by design (Angrist, 2014).
To obtain a measure that is comparable across all periods, we consider the course supply to be the
number of one course type relative to the total number of courses—i.e., the share of a certain course
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type. Table 7 presents the mean statistics across enrollment years.
In a standard setting of supply and demand, we would assume that supply and demand are de-
termined simultaneously. However, in this setting, the course catalog is created before students are
able to choose courses. The demand in one year is likely to impact the supply in the next, but the
determination of supply and demand in the former does not happen at the same time.
Table 6: Summary Statistics
All 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Father with manager position 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.089 0.11 0.11
(0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.29) (0.31) (0.31)
Entry GPA 7.70 7.67 7.64 7.94 7.93 7.61
(0.70) (0.70) (0.68) (0.70) (0.77) (0.66)
Gender, female=1 0.33 0.31 0.36 0.21 0.17 0.42
(0.47) (0.46) (0.48) (0.41) (0.38) (0.49)
Starting age 23.8 23.8 23.9 23.8 23.7 24.0
(1.73) (1.72) (1.69) (1.92) (1.66) (1.76)
Municipality share of manager
level individuals
0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.012
(0.0091) (0.0096) (0.0094) (0.0081) (0.0090) (0.0091)
No. of obs 1835 1289 1124 315 413 700
Note: Means are reported and standard errors in parentheses.
Table 7: Supply of Courses Across Enrollment Year
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Supply of management courses 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.11
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Supply of accounting courses 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.06
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Supply of marketing courses 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.20 0.18
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Supply of finance courses 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.18
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Supply of organization courses 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.17
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
No. of obs 125 184 164 221 252 274 266 349
Note: The supply of a course type are calculated as the share relatively to all courses offered. Means are reported and computed
as the mean across all individuals within each enrollment year. Standard errors in parentheses.
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7.2 Results
Table 8 presents the results from the estimations of Equation 4. Across all the specifications, we
observe a significant gender effect. Our results show that women are less likely to choose management
(only 10% significance), finance and accounting, whereas they are more likely to choose marketing
and organization. These results are important, as they show that women are less likely to choose the
course types that we find to be associated with higher wages and the increased probability of attaining
a C-level position.
Furthermore, pre-determined ability—measured as entry GPA—is significant in most of the course
selection equations. Accounting and finance attract students with high entry GPAs, whereas the
opposite is true for marketing and organization. Because entry GPA plays a role in course selection, it
might impact the interpretation of the estimated relationship between course types and labor market
outcomes (see Table 3). If highly capable individuals are more likely to choose finance and accounting,
the observed wage premium for finance and accounting might be caused by these individuals’ ability
levels and not so much by a course-specific effect. However, as we control for master’s GPA when
estimating the association with labor market outcomes, the problem is likely to be negligible.
Panel A also shows that the labor market history of the father does not play a significant role in the
course selection equation. By contrast, the share of individuals with manager positions in a municipality
shows a positive and significant association with the selection of management and marketing and a
negative association with the selection of accounting. The municipality share reflects the environment
in which the students lived. This measure is clearly correlated with family background and perhaps
merely reflects the characteristics of the parents, as they are likely responsible for students’ place of
residence prior to enrollment. Thus, this measure might only be a proxy for background characteristics.
However, it could also capture spillover or peer effects from the surrounding environment, whereby
individuals are more likely to choose courses that are related to leadership because they observe those
around them who occupy leadership positions.
102
Table 8: Course Choices
Probit estimation
Dependent Variable: Management Accounting Marketing Finance Organization Management Accounting Marketing Finance Organization
Panel A: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Standardized Entry GPA -0.017 0.061*** -0.056*** 0.080*** -0.054*** -0.017 0.061*** -0.056*** 0.079*** -0.054***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
Starting age -0.000 0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Gender, female=1 -0.045* -0.109*** 0.108*** -0.162*** 0.126*** -0.047** -0.108*** 0.107*** -0.162*** 0.126***
(0.023) (0.018) (0.025) (0.019) (0.025) (0.023) (0.018) (0.025) (0.019) (0.025)
Father with manager position=1 0.032 -0.040 0.055 -0.008 0.038 0.020 -0.035 0.048 -0.003 0.034
(0.034) (0.027) (0.037) (0.032) (0.038) (0.034) (0.027) (0.038) (0.032) (0.038)
Municipality share of manager level indi-
viduals
4.456*** -2.193** 2.630** -1.663 1.212
(1.191) (1.015) (1.291) (1.102) (1.241)
Panel B: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Standardized Entry GPA -0.021* 0.062*** -0.056*** 0.079*** -0.054*** -0.021* 0.064*** -0.057*** 0.081*** -0.056***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
Starting age -0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.005 -0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Gender, female=1 -0.045* -0.109*** 0.108*** -0.162*** 0.126*** -0.044* -0.110*** 0.108*** -0.162*** 0.126***
(0.023) (0.018) (0.025) (0.019) (0.025) (0.023) (0.018) (0.025) (0.019) (0.025)
Father with manager position=1 0.030 -0.040 0.055 -0.007 0.038 0.029 -0.039 0.054 -0.005 0.038
(0.033) (0.027) (0.037) (0.032) (0.038) (0.033) (0.027) (0.037) (0.032) (0.038)
Supply of management courses 1.496*** 1.769*** -0.965* 0.420 -0.951* 0.744
(0.454) (0.558) (0.503) (0.640) (0.530) (0.614)
Supply of accounting courses 0.824 0.707 0.125 -0.095 -0.876 1.226
(0.634) (0.882) (0.819) (0.996) (0.804) (0.950)
Supply of marketing courses 0.106 0.614 0.271 0.211 0.350 0.213
(0.568) (0.632) (0.508) (0.681) (0.540) (0.677)
Supply of finance courses -0.410 0.503 0.527 0.315 -0.489 -0.164
(0.584) (0.653) (0.538) (0.710) (0.606) (0.693)
Supply of organization courses 0.108 -0.284 0.856** 0.346 0.792* 0.205
(0.530) (0.540) (0.433) (0.610) (0.466) (0.598)
No. of obs 1679 1679 1679 1679 1679 1679 1679 1679 1679 1679
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the individual took at least one course at the Department of Management, Accounting, Marketing, Finance, or
Organization, respectively. Average Marginal Effects (AME) are reported. When computing AMEs for dummy variables, we report the effect from the discrete change from 0
to 1. Enrollment-year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Finally, in Panel B, we observe a positive effect of the management course supply on the probability
of choosing management courses. Additionally, the management course supply enters the selection
equation for accounting and finance negatively, which might reflect an increase in the supply and, in
turn, the probability of selection into management courses, thus decreasing the probability of selection
into accounting or finance courses. Thus, an increase in the management course supply will lead
students to substitute accounting and finance courses for management courses. The results from Panel
B indicate some sort of substitution effect among course types, but they also suggest that educational
institutions can have an impact on their students’ course selection.
8 Robustness
To test the sensitivity of our results, we perform a battery of robustness checks. The results of these
estimations are presented in Appendix B.
One may worry that the results are driven by a correlation between those who have been on
the labor market longest and their propensity to take management courses. Obviously, students who
graduated in 1986 are more likely to be leaders in 2010 than students who graduated in 1996 due to the
former’s extra years on the labor market. If students who graduated in 1986 took more management
courses (or other course types) than students who graduated in 1996, the results might be driven by
this difference. To test if our results are robust to potential scenario, we create another dependent
variable, namely a dummy that equals 1 if the individual had a C-level position at least once in the 19
years since his or her CBS enrollment (𝐷𝐶19). As such, we only count C-level positions until 2005 for
individuals who enrolled in 1984, and we count C-level positions until 2010 for individuals who enrolled
in 1991.16 In so doing, we ensure that individuals have been on the labor market for a comparable
time period. Table B.4 reports the estimation of Equation (1) with 𝐷𝐶19 as our dependent variable.
The results are qualitatively the same as the main results, but the coefficients on 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 and 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 are
slightly weaker in terms of significance. Overall, this finding indicates that a correlation between the
enrollment year and management education are not driving the results.
Because the data attained from the Danish Business Authority contain inconsistent and missing
observations, we exclude some of the information in this data. To test the robustness of our results to
the data source, we perform our estimations by exclusively relying on the data from Statistics Denmark.
In so doing, we define our dependent variable as a dummy variable that is equal to one whenever an
16We use enrollment year instead of graduation year because we are unable to account for work experience during the
master’s program. In Denmark, students often work and pursue degrees simultaneously, which often means that they
prolong the duration of their studies.
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individual held a managerial position according to Statistics Denmark. As such, we likely also consider
lower-level managerial positions compared with our original measure of C-level individuals. The results
are presented in Table B.5, which shows that the results on both management and marketing courses
are robust to this specification of the dependent variable. Moreover, we find that our second measure
of educational diversification remains significant at the 10% level.
When estimating the model with the inclusion of the “complementarity dummies”, we have not
included dummies to control for a single-course effect (see Table 4). The exclusion of the single-course
dummies might cause the estimates to suffer from an omitted variable bias. Thus, as a robustness
test, we re-estimate the model and include these single-course dummies. Table B.6 shows the results
from estimations in which 5 single-course dummies are included, and Table B.7 shows the results
from estimations in which we include all the complementarity dummies together (meaning both where
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0 and 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1). The results from these estimations are qualitatively the same as the ones
presented in Table 4. In fact, the single-course dummies are insignificant in the model presented in
Table B.6 (they are not reported).
Having established that narrow educational diversification is positively associated with leadership,
we expect to observe “diminishing marginal return to course choices”.17 This expectation is natural
given the observed effect of educational diversity—as every student has a limited number of courses in
their educational portfolios, an increase in the number of courses in one department will necessarily
lead to a decrease in the number of courses in another department and, in turn, a potential decrease
in diversification. Thus, to test the robustness of our diversification result, the share (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒) of a
course type and the share squared (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒2) are included, and the model is estimated using a linear
probability model.18 The hypothesis of diminishing marginal returns to course type choices leads us to
expect that 𝛽𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 > 0 and 𝛽𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒2 < 0. Table B.8 shows the results. As expected, for both management
and marketing, 𝛽𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 is significant and positive, and 𝛽𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒2 is negative. For management, marketing,
and organization, 𝛽𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 and 𝛽𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒2 are jointly significant in all the specifications. The remaining
course shares, except for accounting, show the expected and economically meaningful signs, but they
are not consistently significant across all the specifications.
Finally, to examine the sensitivity of our results to the model chosen, we estimate a Tobit model
with the fraction of years holding a C-level position on the left-hand side. Table B.10 presents the
17As we cannot establish causality, referring to the estimated coefficient on the course dummies as the return to
a specific course type might seem misleading. However, even if the effect is caused by either self-selection or skill
accumulation, the positive correlation can somehow be thought of as a return, and we will refer to it as such.
18In Table B.3, we only include the shares. The results are qualitatively equivalent to those in Table B.8. Table B.9
shows the estimations from a probit model.
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results and confirms the findings in Table 3—management, marketing and accounting remain significant
predictors of leadership.
To ensure that our results from the wage estimations are not driven by outliers, we exclude the
wage observations above and below the 99th and 1st percentiles, respectively, and re-estimate the wage
equation. Table B.11 present the results from these estimations. The results are qualitatively the same
as those in Table 3.
9 Conclusion
This paper estimates the relationship between educational profiles and labor market outcomes. Based
on the theoretical and empirical results in the literature, we expect that students who take management
courses and students with diversified educational portfolios are more likely to attain C-level positions.
Moreover, we expect that math-related courses are positively associated with wage outcomes.
Our access to detailed educational data on students enrolled in the same master’s program at
CBS and data from Statistics Denmark and the Danish Business Authority allows us to conduct our
analyses. Because of the structure of the MSc in Economics and Business Administration at CBS, we
can compare individuals who graduated from the same master’s program but who show considerable
variation in their selection of electives and the extent of their educational diversification.
Our empirical results confirm our expectations and are consistent with other results in the litera-
ture and several other underlying explanations (e.g., Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, 2010; Lazear, 2012;
Bloom et al., 2013). We show that having a diversified educational portfolio within classical business
school disciplines is associated with an increased probability of attaining a C-level position. Further-
more, we show that taking management courses is a strong predictor of leadership. Our results also
show that certain course combinations are stronger predictors of leadership than others. In particular,
we show that combinations of courses that are similar in terms of required and obtained skills are
stronger predictors of leadership than combinations of dissimilar courses.
To explain our results we suggest some out of many potential reasons. Perhaps firms benefit from
C-level individuals with diversified knowledge among classical business school topics and managerial
abilities and are thus more likely to hire such people. However, the estimated effect could also be
driven by self-selection. Most likely, our results are caused by both things.
Estimating a wage equation, we show that finance, accounting, marketing and management courses
are positively correlated with wage outcomes. The wage premium associated with marketing is sensitive
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to the inclusion of a C-level dummy in the model, which indicates that the marketing wage premium
might be caused to some extent by the increased probability of attaining a leadership position.
Summarizing the results, we show that not only the master’s degree but also the ways in which a
student puts together his or her curriculum in that master’s program are important for labor market
outcomes. The results summarized above motivated us to also investigate the mechanisms underlying
elective course selection and we, therefore, estimated 5 course selection equations. Our results show
that high school GPA, gender, course supply, and the characteristics of the previous area of residence
are significant in the course selection equations.
Despite the lack of a causal interpretation, our results can still contribute to policy considerations,
as they open a discussion regarding the importance of education type for leadership. If firms hire
individuals with a management education because they contribute positively to productivity, policy-
makers might want to encourage pre-university students to consider this aspect when choosing their
education. However, we do not identify the channels or reasons for the estimated positive association
between management education and leadership, and our results could just as well result from self-
selection. Thus, more research that is capable of uncovering the causal mechanism is needed before
explicit policy recommendations can be offered.
Therefore, extensions and further research are worth considering. First, establishing a causal
relationship between educational profiles and leadership potential is an obvious next step. However, the
identification of a specific course effect requires, for one, a valid instrument. Moreover, investigating
whether C-level individuals with a management education in fact have a positive influence on firm
productivity would also be interesting. Such analyses could be conducted by adding firm performance
to our data and modeling firm performance as dependent on the educational characteristics of C-
level individuals. However, to identify a potential causal impact of improved management on firm
performance, one would need exogenous variation in the change/turnover of C-level individuals, which
probably is the largest obstacle for such a study.
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Appendix A Descriptive Statistic
Table A.1: Departments at CBS
Name of institute Share of sample that took at least one course
C
Marketing 0.61
Organization and Labor Market Sociology 0.38
Business Economics and Leadership (Management) 0.70
Finance 0.23
Accounting 0.17
Information technology and Financial Management 0.07
O
Applied Computer Science 0.03
Educational research 0.01
Applied statistic 0.03
European Trade Law 0.04
Macro Economics 0.05
Social Sciences 0.07
Traffic, Tourist and Regional Economics 0.13
International Economy and Management 0.29
Note: C refers to the set of Classical courses for business education and O refers to other courses.
Table A.2: Diversification or Complementarity - Summary Statistics
Mean (std.er) Mean (std.er) Mean (std.er)
Org=1,Fin=1,Mar=1 0.003 Org=1,Acc=1,Mar=1 0.004 Acc=1,Fin=1,Mar=1 0.003
(0.057) (0.062) (0.052)
Org=0,Fin=1,Mar=1 0.037 Org=1,Acc=1,Mar=0 0.019 Acc=1,Fin=0,Mar=1 0.021
(0.189) (0.137) (0.142)
Org=1,Fin=1,Mar=0 0.018 Org=0,Acc=1,Mar=1 0.020 Acc=1,Fin=0,Mar=0 0.032
(0.133) (0.139) (0.175)
Org=0,Fin=0,Mar=0 0.052 Org=0,Acc=1,Mar=0 0.059 Acc=0,Fin=1,Mar=1 0.038
(0.222) (0.235) (0.190)
Org=0,Fin=1,Mar=0 0.086 Org=0,Acc=0,Mar=0 0.079 Acc=1,Fin=1,Mar=0 0.046
(0.281) (0.270) (0.210)
Org=1,Fin=0,Mar=0 0.101 Org=1,Acc=0,Mar=0 0.100 Acc=0,Fin=1,Mar=0 0.058
(0.301) (0.300) (0.233)
Org=1,Fin=0,Mar=1 0.114 Org=1,Acc=0,Mar=1 0.113 Acc=0,Fin=0,Mar=0 0.121
(0.318) (0.317) (0.326)
Org=0,Fin=0,Mar=1 0.292 Org=0,Acc=0,Mar=1 0.309 Acc=0,Fin=0,Mar=1 0.385
(0.455) (0.462) (0.487)
Reference group 0.298 Reference group 0.298 Reference group 0.298
(0.457) (0.457) (0.457)
Obs. 1835 1835 1835
The numbers are based on individuals with 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1 in their educational portfolio.
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Table A.3: Summary Statistics Across Courses
Across 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷
All 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1 Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mar𝐷 0.61 0.56 0.63 -0.074***
(0.49) (0.50) (0.48)
Acc𝐷 0.17 0.24 0.14 0.092***
(0.38) (0.43) (0.35)
Fin𝐷 0.23 0.27 0.21 0.065***
(0.42) (0.44) (0.40)
Org𝐷 0.38 0.49 0.34 0.15***
(0.49) (0.50) (0.47)
Diversification 1 2.91 2.68 3.01 -0.33***
(0.88) (0.94) (0.83)
Diversification 2 2.09 1.56 2.32 -0.76***
(0.70) (0.63) (0.60)
No. of obs 1835 546 1289 1835
Across 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷
All 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Man𝐷 0.70 0.66 0.73 -0.065***
(0.46) (0.47) (0.45)
Acc𝐷 0.17 0.35 0.059 0.29***
(0.38) (0.48) (0.24)
Fin𝐷 0.23 0.43 0.097 0.33***
(0.42) (0.50) (0.30)
Org𝐷 0.38 0.47 0.33 0.14***
(0.49) (0.50) (0.47)
Diversification 1 2.91 3.01 2.84 0.17***
(0.88) (0.92) (0.84)
Diversification 2 2.09 1.91 2.21 -0.31***
(0.70) (0.77) (0.63)
No. of obs 1835 711 1124 1835
Across 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷
All 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1 Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Man𝐷 0.70 0.73 0.59 0.14***
(0.46) (0.45) (0.49)
Mar𝐷 0.61 0.70 0.21 0.49***
(0.49) (0.46) (0.41)
Fin𝐷 0.23 0.16 0.56 -0.40***
(0.42) (0.36) (0.50)
Org𝐷 0.38 0.42 0.22 0.20***
(0.49) (0.49) (0.41)
Diversification 1 2.91 2.80 3.45 -0.65***
(0.88) (0.83) (0.89)
Diversification 2 2.09 1.99 2.57 -0.58***
(0.70) (0.66) (0.69)
No. of obs 1835 1520 315 1835
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Table A.4: Summary Statistics Across Courses
Across 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷
All 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1 Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Man𝐷 0.70 0.72 0.64 0.078***
(0.46) (0.45) (0.48)
Mar𝐷 0.61 0.71 0.26 0.45***
(0.49) (0.45) (0.44)
Acc𝐷 0.17 0.098 0.42 -0.33***
(0.38) (0.30) (0.49)
Org𝐷 0.38 0.45 0.15 0.30***
(0.49) (0.50) (0.36)
Diversification 1 2.91 2.78 3.36 -0.58***
(0.88) (0.83) (0.89)
Diversification 2 2.09 1.98 2.48 -0.50***
(0.70) (0.66) (0.70)
No. of obs 1835 1422 413 1835
Across 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷
All 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1 Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Man𝐷 0.70 0.75 0.62 0.14***
(0.46) (0.43) (0.49)
Mar𝐷 0.61 0.67 0.53 0.14***
(0.49) (0.47) (0.50)
Acc𝐷 0.17 0.22 0.099 0.12***
(0.38) (0.41) (0.30)
Fin𝐷 0.23 0.31 0.087 0.22***
(0.42) (0.46) (0.28)
Diversification 1 2.91 2.80 3.08 -0.28***
(0.88) (0.85) (0.89)
Diversification 2 2.09 1.95 2.33 -0.39***
(0.70) (0.64) (0.73)
No. of obs 1835 1135 700 1835
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Figure A.1: Distribution of Years as C-level - Sample of C-level Individuals
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Appendix B Robustness
Table B.1: The Impact of Course Choice - C-level Regression
Probit estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Man𝐷 =1 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.055***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Acc𝐷 =1 0.040* 0.046** 0.055**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
Mar𝐷 =1 0.012 0.009 0.037**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
Fin𝐷 =1 0.022 0.027 0.032
(0.020) (0.020) (0.023)
Org𝐷 =1 -0.007 -0.002 0.017
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
No. of obs 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the individual held a C-level position at least once during
the 2000–2010 period. Average marginal effects (AMEs) are reported. When computing AMEs for dummy variables, we
report the effect from the discrete change from 0 to 1. In all estimations, we have included the same controls as in Table 3.
Graduation-year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.2: The Impact of Course Choice - Wage Regression
OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Man𝐷 =1 0.054** 0.067*** 0.057*** 0.072*** 0.046** 0.074***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Acc𝐷 =1 0.145*** 0.153*** 0.110***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.032)
Mar𝐷 =1 -0.028 -0.031 0.053**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022)
Fin𝐷 =1 0.178*** 0.186*** 0.171***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029)
Org𝐷 =1 -0.080*** -0.075*** -0.016
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
No. of obs 1795 1795 1795 1795 1795 1795 1795 1795 1795 1795
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average hourly wage during the 2000–2010 period. In all estimations, we
have included the same controls as in Table 3. Graduation-year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are computed
and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table B.3: The Impact of Course Choice - C-level Regression
Shares as Regressors
C-level regression (Probit) Wage regression (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Man𝑆 0.105*** 0.144*** 0.151*** 0.147*** 0.077 0.131** 0.210*** 0.163***
(0.039) (0.043) (0.045) (0.047) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.060)
Acc𝑆 0.170** 0.164** 0.159** 0.456*** 0.382*** 0.328***
(0.070) (0.072) (0.075) (0.098) (0.100) (0.106)
Mar𝑆 0.038 0.046* 0.041 0.020 0.111*** 0.063
(0.027) (0.027) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.044)
Fin𝑆 0.043 0.037 0.474*** 0.413***
(0.056) (0.061) (0.080) (0.085)
Org𝑆 -0.011 -0.117**
(0.038) (0.052)
No. of obs 1835 1835 1835 1835 1795 1795 1795 1795
Note: Through columns (1)-(4) the dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the individual held a C-level position at
least once during the 2000–2010 period. Through columns (5)-(8) the dependent variable is the logarithm of the average hourly
wage during the 2000–2010 period. Columns (1)-(4) report average marginal effects (AME). When computing AMEs for dummy
variables, we report the effect from the discrete change from 0 to 1. In all estimations, we have included the same controls as
in Table 3. Graduation-year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.4: The impact of Course Choice - C-level Regression
Re-definition of the Depend Variable
Probit estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Man𝐷 =1 0.032** 0.034** 0.035** 0.038***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Acc𝐷 =1 0.037* 0.033 0.040*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Mar𝐷 =1 0.017 0.020 0.028*
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Fin𝐷 =1 0.013 0.023
(0.018) (0.019)
Org𝐷 =1 0.028*
(0.016)
Diversification 1 0.005
(0.007)
Diversification 2 0.032***
(0.009)
Standardized master GPA 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Gender, female=1 -0.125*** -0.123*** -0.121*** -0.123*** -0.126*** -0.123***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Starting age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Father with manager position=1 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.083*** 0.080***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Children in 2000 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Married in 2000 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.041** 0.043*** 0.041**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Age in 2000 0.065 0.065 0.066 0.069 0.075 0.073
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059)
Age in 2000 squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
No. of obs 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the individual held a C-level position at least once during the
first 19 years since the enrollment year (𝐷𝐶19). Average marginal effects (AMEs) are reported. When computing AMEs for
dummy variables, we report the effect from the discrete change from 0 to 1. Graduation-year fixed effects are included. Robust
standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
117
Table B.5: The impact of Course Choice - C-level Regression
Re-definition of the Depend Variable
Probit estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Man𝐷 =1 0.061** 0.060** 0.060** 0.058**
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Acc𝐷 =1 0.030 0.028 0.025
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
Mar𝐷 =1 0.060** 0.063** 0.059**
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027)
Fin𝐷 =1 0.010 0.006
(0.031) (0.032)
Org𝐷 =1 -0.012
(0.026)
Diversification 1 -0.016
(0.013)
Diversification 2 0.030*
(0.016)
Standardized master GPA 0.049*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.050***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Gender, female=1 -0.089*** -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.089*** -0.095*** -0.089***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Starting age 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Father with manager position=1 0.048 0.046 0.045 0.046 0.051 0.047
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038)
Children in 2000 0.047* 0.045* 0.045 0.045 0.046* 0.047*
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Married in 2000 0.059** 0.062** 0.062** 0.062** 0.060** 0.060**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Age in 2000 0.142 0.134 0.135 0.134 0.153 0.155*
(0.095) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094) (0.094)
Age in 2000 squared -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002* -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
No. of obs 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the individual held a manager position according to Statistics
Denmark at least once during the 2000–2010 period. Average marginal effects (AMEs) are reported. When computing AMEs
for dummy variables, we report the effect from the discrete change from 0 to 1. Graduation-year fixed effects are included.
Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.6: Complementarity or Diversification
Linear Probability Model
Man𝐷=1 Man𝐷=0 Man𝐷=1 Man𝐷=0 Man𝐷=1 Man𝐷=0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.053 0.151
(0.150) (0.190)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 -0.013 -0.073
(0.053) (0.059)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 -0.009 -0.032
(0.068) (0.087)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.042 -0.095**
(0.043) (0.043)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.094** -0.063
(0.042) (0.040)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.016 -0.013
(0.031) (0.035)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.055* -0.055**
(0.030) (0.027)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.072*** -0.055**
(0.024) (0.024)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 -0.046 -0.166***
(0.124) (0.046)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 -0.015 0.019
(0.064) (0.090)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.059 -0.106*
(0.072) (0.062)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.084* -0.058
(0.049) (0.047)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.080** -0.116***
(0.036) (0.025)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.021 -0.027
(0.030) (0.033)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.056* -0.041
(0.030) (0.028)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.063*** -0.051**
(0.023) (0.024)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 -0.128** -0.164***
(0.050) (0.045)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.073 -0.107*
(0.074) (0.062)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.025 0.004
(0.058) (0.079)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.019 -0.008
(0.057) (0.071)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.086 -0.066
(0.055) (0.050)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.082* -0.098**
(0.048) (0.042)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.025 -0.039
(0.028) (0.030)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.056*** -0.053***
(0.019) (0.019)
Individual course effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the individual held a C-level position at
least once during the 2000–2010 period. In all estimations, we have included the same controls as in Table 3.
Graduation-year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.7: Complementarity or Diversification
Linear Probability Model
(1) (2) (3)
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.120 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.036 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 -0.065*
(0.144) (0.121) (0.037)
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.021 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.040 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.123*
(0.046) (0.056) (0.066)
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.039 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.107 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.050
(0.062) (0.068) (0.044)
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.008 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.106** 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.036
(0.038) (0.043) (0.045)
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.109*** 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.036 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.126***
(0.038) (0.036) (0.047)
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.015 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.010 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.075*
(0.028) (0.029) (0.040)
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.073** 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.071** 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.004
(0.032) (0.032) (0.023)
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.057** 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.045* 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.058***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.019)
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.247 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 -0.055* 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 -0.025
(0.188) (0.033) (0.031)
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.023 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.102 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.001
(0.057) (0.087) (0.055)
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.039 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.006 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.077
(0.085) (0.057) (0.075)
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 -0.065 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.027 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.078
(0.042) (0.043) (0.067)
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.008 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 -0.092*** 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.040
(0.038) (0.025) (0.042)
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 0.017 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 -0.004 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 1,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 -0.048
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.001 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 1, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1 0.009 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 0 -0.021
(0.027) (0.029) (0.028)
Observations 1835 1835 1835
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the individual held a C-level position at least once during the 2000–2010 period. In all estimations, we have
included the same controls as in Table 3. Graduation-year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
The reference group in Column (1) is 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1
The reference group in Column (2) is 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1
The reference group in Column (3) is 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝐷 = 0, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝐷 = 0,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐷 = 1
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Table B.8: The Impact of Course Choice - C-level Regression
Diminishing Return to Specialization
Linear Probability Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Man𝑆 0.184* 0.175* 0.170
(0.104) (0.105) (0.106)
Man2𝑆 -0.124 -0.085 -0.063
(0.197) (0.197) (0.198)
Acc𝑆 0.047 0.131 0.091
(0.181) (0.185) (0.189)
Acc2𝑆 0.140 0.114 0.154
(0.390) (0.393) (0.393)
Mar𝑆 0.172** 0.193** 0.212**
(0.077) (0.079) (0.083)
Mar2𝑆 -0.245*** -0.224** -0.232**
(0.091) (0.093) (0.093)
Fin𝑆 0.180 0.193
(0.128) (0.144)
Fin2𝑆 -0.308 -0.239
(0.204) (0.213)
Org𝑆 0.028 0.085
(0.085) (0.091)
Org2𝑆 -0.159 -0.141
(0.110) (0.111)
𝑝1 0.010 0.007 0.010
𝑝2 0.244 0.032 0.100
𝑝3 0.014 0.048 0.036
𝑝4 0.320 0.398
𝑝5 0.001 0.372
No. of obs 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835
Note: Linear Probability Model. The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the individual held a C-level position
at least once during the 2000–2010 period.. 𝑝𝑖, 𝑖 = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), is the p-value form testing the hypothesis 𝐻 : 𝛽𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 =
0, 𝛽𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒2𝑖
= 0. For instance, 𝑝1 corresponds to the test that 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑆 = 0 and 𝑀𝑎𝑛
2
𝑆 = 0. In all estimations, we have included
the same controls as in Table 3. Graduation-year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are computed and reported
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.9: The Impact of Course Choice - C-level Regression
Diminishing Return to Specialization
Probit estimation - Diminishing return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Man𝑆 0.117*** 0.129*** 0.130***
(0.040) (0.042) (0.047)
Acc𝑆 0.085 0.169 0.135
(0.108) (0.113) (0.116)
Mar𝑆 0.041 0.074** 0.082**
(0.029) (0.033) (0.040)
Fin𝑆 0.107 0.122
(0.085) (0.099)
Org𝑆 0.047 0.103
(0.073) (0.079)
No. of obs 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if an individual had a C-level position at least once in the period from
2000–2010. Average Marginal Effects (AME) are reported. We included 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 and 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒2 in the regressions and due to the
functional form of the Probit, the AME is the overall effect from these two components. In all estimations, we have included
the same controls as in Table 3. Graduation-year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are computed and reported
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table B.10: The Impact of Course Choice - C-level Tobit Regression
Dependent Variable is Share of Years as C-level
Tobit regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Man𝐷 =1 0.157** 0.170*** 0.174*** 0.186***
(0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Acc𝐷 =1 0.188*** 0.171** 0.186***
(0.066) (0.068) (0.069)
Mar𝐷 =1 0.080 0.104* 0.123**
(0.055) (0.059) (0.061)
Fin𝐷 =1 0.077 0.101
(0.064) (0.067)
Org𝐷 =1 0.071
(0.058)
Diversification 1 0.037
(0.027)
Diversification 2 0.136***
(0.034)
No. of obs 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835
Note: Tobit estimation. The dependent variable is the fraction of years an individual held a C-level position at least once during
the 2000–2010 period. In all estimations, we have included the same controls as in Table 3. Graduation-year fixed effects are
included. Robust standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
122
Table B.11: The Impact of Course Choice - Wage Regression
Extreme Wage Observations are Excluded
OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Man𝐷 =1 0.064*** 0.076*** 0.083*** 0.082***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Acc𝐷 =1 0.146*** 0.108*** 0.107***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.028)
Mar𝐷 =1 0.015 0.052*** 0.050**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Fin𝐷 =1 0.146*** 0.143***
(0.025) (0.026)
Org𝐷 =1 -0.008
(0.020)
Diversification 1 0.019*
(0.010)
Diversification 2 0.073***
(0.012)
Standardized master GPA 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.044*** 0.049***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Gender, female=1 -0.289*** -0.275*** -0.258*** -0.258*** -0.289*** -0.285***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Starting age -0.011 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.011 -0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Father with manager position=1 0.069** 0.071** 0.068** 0.068** 0.070** 0.066**
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Children in 2000 0.038* 0.039* 0.035* 0.035* 0.039* 0.037*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Married in 2000 0.091*** 0.094*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.093*** 0.093***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Age in 2000 0.071 0.092 0.100 0.100 0.087 0.080
(0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069)
Age in 2000 squared -0.001 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
No. of obs 1787 1787 1787 1787 1787 1787
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average hourly wage during the 2000–2010 period. Wage observations
below or above the top or bottom one percentiles have been excluded. Graduation-year fixed effects are included. Robust
standard errors are computed and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
123
Chapter 3
Dropping Out of University:
Estimating Peer Effects Using Randomly Assigned Groups
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Abstract
In this paper I analyze the impact of peers on achievements in tertiary education. Using unique
educational data on students who were randomly assigned to peer groups, I investigate the impact
of peers on students’ decisions to drop out and on their first-year GPAs. Within-school and across-
peer-group variations in peer quality allow me to estimate a peer effect. My main finding is that
women in peer groups with high ability levels are more likely to drop out during the first year.
This is particularly true for women in the lower half of the ability distribution. By contrast, men
are unaffected by their peers. Including a measure of peer group rank in my model shows that for
women, peer group rank is a stronger determinant of the probability of dropping out than is own
high school GPA. Finally, my results show a positive peer effect on the educational performance
only of women in the lower half of the ability distribution.
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1 Introduction
Most people have experienced peer effects in their lives. Following your high school friend into high-
level math courses might lead you to become a university mathematician and being inspired and helped
by your peers in school is likely to improve your educational performance. In this paper, using unique
data on students at the largest bachelor’s program at Copenhagen Business School (CBS), who were
randomly assigned into peer groups, I estimate a relationship between peer group ability level and
individual academic achievements, as measured by the probability of dropping out during the first year
and by first-year GPA.
During the past 15 years, peer effects in education have received increased attention in the litera-
ture (e.g., Sacerdote, 2001; Carrell et al., 2009; Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009; Duflo et al., 2011;
Lavy et al., 2012; Carrell et al., 2013). The determinants of educational achievement are worth under-
standing because education is a significant determinant of labor market success and is influential on
other individual-level outcomes, such as crime, health status, and family formation (e.g., Angrist and
Krueger, 1991; Arcidiacono, 2004; Altonji et al., 2012; Hjalmarsson et al., 2011). However educational
institutions can also benefit from insights into peer effects when they want to reduce dropout rates or
improve students’ performances. Despite the vast literature on peer effects, the results remain ambigu-
ous, and most studies are concerned with the effects in primary and secondary education. Moreover,
few researchers have investigated the relationship between university dropout rates and the ability
levels of peers (Johnes and McNabb, 2004; Booij et al., 2015). The main contribution of this paper is
thus the identification of an effect of peer group ability level on individuals’ probability of dropping
out during the first year of university. I also estimate potential peer effects on university performance
as measured by first-year GPA.
There are several reasons it is worth understanding the determinants of the decision to drop out.
For instance, students who decide not to complete their studies will probably not use the human
capital they gained in the courses they have already taken. They have also taken up spaces at their
university that could have been filled by other students. Furthermore, either they delay their labor
market entrance by postponing a potential graduation or they enter the labor market with a lower level
of education, which both are likely to be important for their lifetime earnings. This is an inefficient use
of time and resources by students, universities, and society. If universities are to minimize this waste
of resources, they will need to understand the mechanisms behind their students’ decisions to drop
out. Of course, if a student has enrolled in a field he or she is not suited to, quitting may be the best
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decision. But dropping out because of other academic problems or social discomfort may not be the
optimal solution for the student. Greater knowledge of students’ reasons for dropping out thus opens
up the possibility of reducing dropout rates and improving both the efficiency of universities and the
conditions for their students.
The main challenge in estimating a peer effect is handling the econometric problems of self-selection
and reflection (Manski, 1993). Analyses made without addressing these problems will result in biased
estimates. Self-selection occurs when a student selects his or her own peers. Reflection occurs when
the behavior of the peer group and the behavior of the individual happen simultaneously (two-way
causality).1 A unique data set describing students enrolled in the largest bachelor’s program in business
economics at Copenhagen Business School (CBS) between 1996 and 2004 allows me to overcome these
two problems. In addition to detailed educational information about students’ performances, the data
set contains information on smaller groups that students were randomly assigned to when they enrolled.
Students were assigned to exercise classes on the basis of these groups and I use these tutorial groups
as my measure of peer groups and thereby avoid the problem of endogenous group formation. The data
also allow me to circumvent the problem of reflection with their detailed information on pre-university
performance. Using high school GPA as a proxy for quality, I create pre-determined and exogenous
measures of peer quality.
Despite the unique features of the data, this paper faces potential threats to identification. Unoffi-
cial sorting in and out of peer groups (endogenous subgroup formation) might make my results weaker
and neglected heterogeneity in the probit model (which I use to estimate the probability of dropping
out) might cause the estimates to suffer from attenuation bias. I discuss these issues in detail and
argue that they are not crucial threats to identification.
To get a grip on the channels through which peer effects work, I estimate alternative specifications
of a standard linear-in-means model. For instance, students affect each other in several ways, and
some peers might be more important to an individual’s academic performance than others. To better
understand how the potential peer effect works, I allow for heterogeneous peer effects. I also estimate
a potential peer effect across multiple subgroups, as this makes it possible to determine which students
are the most responsive to peer influence.
1The classic example of this is in educational performance. If the performance of an individual is affected by the
performance of his or her peer group, the opposite holds true as well. It is less obvious that this problem occurs in the
relationship between the decision to drop out and the peer group’s performance. But peer group performance is likely
to influence an individual’s decision to drop out, and both the consideration of and the decision to drop out are likely
to affect the individual’s academic performance, which in turn will affect that of the peer group. Thus even though the
relationship between the individual’s decision to drop out and the peer group’s performance is not a classic example of
what Manski (1993) calls reflection, one still needs to be aware of two-way causality there.
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Moreover, I follow recent literature on the affects of rank on educational performance (e.g., Murphy
and Weinhardt, 2014; Elsner and Isphording, 2015). For instance, Elsner and Isphording (2015) show
that ability rank in a high school cohort is associated with a student’s probability of finishing high
school, attending college and completing a college degree. I complement this literature by investigating
whether ability rankings in peer groups also play a role at the university level—specifically, whether
and how they affect the decision to drop out. If individuals have rank concerns regarding their closest
peers, it could affect the students’ development of self-confidence and academic self-concepts, which
might affect their probability of dropping out. Particularly if students’ closest peers do not reflect the
larger population, the developed academic self-concept could be misleading. I compare the effects of
peer group rank and absolute ability level (as measured by high school GPA), by estimating a model
with and without high school GPA as a determinant. The results of these estimations can help us
understand whether it is an individual’s absolute ability level (high school GPA) or a comparison
effect (peer group ranking) that is more important in a case of dropping out.
My main findings are that women’s probability of dropping out is increased by peers’ ability level
and men’s is unaffected. This means that women’s chances of remaining in university are adversely
affected by the ability levels of their peers; this is especially true for women in the lower half of
the ability distribution. In addition, peer quality has a positive and significant effect on educational
performance only for women in the lower half of the ability distribution. Interestingly, female students
who are not pushed out by the ability levels of their peers are in fact the ones who benefit from higher
peer quality.
When a measure of peer-group ability rank is included, my results show that women who rank
highly in their peer groups are less likely to drop out. Furthermore, for women, peer-group ranking is
a stronger predictor of dropout probability than is high school GPA. By contrast, men’s probability
of dropping out is unaffected by ability ranking but still significantly decreasing in high school GPA.
Thus women’s relative ability among close peers is statistically important to the dropout decision, but
their absolute ability level is not. This means that whereas women are more affected by peer group
rank than ability level, the opposite is true for men.
It is puzzling that women with high-quality peers should be more likely to drop out. In the
psychology literature, similar behavior is explained by the big-fish-little-pond effect (BFLPE; e.g.,
Marsh and Parker, 1984; Marsh and Hau, 2003). This is the hypothesis that students compare their
own academic abilities with those of their peers to form their academic self-concepts (Marsh and Hau,
2003). One implication of this is that students might be better off with low-ability peers, as this would
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not have a negative impact on their self-concepts. In the present case, it might be that students with
high-quality peers tend to underestimate their own abilities, and this low self-evaluation might be the
reason they leave their programs. The literature showing that women are less willing to compete than
men of the same ability levels is related to this too (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund,
2007, 2010). If groups with high average ability levels also have high levels of internal competition, it
might explain why women with high-quality peer groups are more likely to drop out.
The fact that peer group rank is important for women’s decisions to drop out but high school
GPA is not could indicate that women compare themselves to their close peers, and this comparison
affects their decision to drop out, while their true ability levels are not taken into account. If the peer
group comparison leads to a lower academic self-concept, and this in turn leads to dropping out, my
results indicate that non-cognitive traits such as academic self-confidence and academic self-esteem
are also important for the decision to drop out. This result is in line with previous studies finding
that non-cognitive traits are important for both educational and other outcomes (e.g., Heckman and
Rubinstein, 2001; Valentine et al., 2004; Murphy and Weinhardt, 2014; Mendolia and Walker, 2014).
If probability of dropping out is affected by low academic self-esteem or a wrong self-concept, it is a
problem of imperfect information. Thus, from a policy point of view, educational institutions might
be able to reduce dropout rates by running campaigns to inform students, particularly women, of their
potential.
Unless peer effects are non-linear across types of students, there is nothing to be gained by sorting
students into peer groups. This was also pointed out by Carrell et al. (2009). For instance, moving
a student from one peer group into another would make one peer group gain the same amount of
ability as the other lost. Only if peer impacts were non-linear could reallocation of students result
in overall social gains. Because my results do reveal non-linear peer effects (on low-ability students
and women) they open the door for policy interventions. However, as Carrell et al. (2013) also show,
any such interventions should be considered carefully in advance.2 As I mentioned, my results and
my interpretations of them also open the way for other kinds of intervention. Because my results
indicate connections among peer ability level, academic self-concept, and the decision to drop out, not
only should interventions that reallocate students be considered, but so should interventions based on
providing information about students’ real ability levels, perhaps more strongly. Overall, my results
show that universities could realize benefits by paying more attention to peer group mechanisms and
2Carrell et al. (2013) conduct an experiment in which they assign students to peer groups in a way they expect to be
optimal. In contrast to their expectations, they observe that the students they intended to help were actually harmed
by this intervention.
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formations.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the background and the literature.
The peer effect literature is extensive, and Section 2 discusses only the most relevant studies in detail.
Section 3 describes the institutional setting of CBS and the structure of the bachelor’s program.
Section 4 introduces the econometric model, and Section 5 describes the data and tests the identifying
assumption of randomly assigned peer groups. Sections 6 and 7 report and discuss the results, and
Section 8 presents robustness checks. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Background and Literature
2.1 Econometric Challenges
Manski (1993) defines three kinds of effects that can make individuals in the same group more likely to
behave in similar ways. He distinguishes between (1) endogenous peer effects, (2) exogenous (contex-
tual) peer effects, and (3) correlation effects. Exogenous effects occur when an individual’s behavior is
influenced by “spillover” effects of the socio-economics characteristics of the peer group. Endogenous
effects occur when an individual’s behavior varies with that of the peer group. The endogenous and ex-
ogenous effects are often considered together as social peer effects. Correlation effects are group-specific
effects on the behavior of both the peer group and the individual.
Manski (1993) outlines the complex econometric problems involved in identifying these peer effects.
First, there is the problem of self-selection, in which individuals sort themselves into the groups that are
most beneficial to them. If self-selection is not addressed, the estimation of peer effects will be biased.
Second, there is the reflection problem. Manski (1993) uses the term “reflection” because the difficulty
resembles that of interpreting the almost-simultaneous movements of a person and his reflection in
a mirror. Econometrically speaking, the reflection problem corresponds to the problem of two-way
causality that arises from the interdependence of individual and peer group behavior. Self-selection
into peer groups and two-way causality of individual and peer group behavior, makes it difficult to
separating identify the different kinds of peer effects described above. Moreover, if the correlation
effect is not independent of the peer effects in question, the results can suffer from an omitted variable
bias.
Thus when one is estimating peer effects, the above mentioned challenges are present. This paper
addresses the self-selection problem, the problem of two-way causality, and argues that the correlation
effect is independent of it’s measure of peer group ability, but it does not attempt to distinguish
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endogenous and exogenous peer effects. Very few studies have managed to do that (e.g., Bramoullé
et al., 2009; De Giorgi et al., 2010); most have simply estimated what they refer to as a “social peer
effect”. Because peer effects on university dropouts are largely overlooked in the literature, any results
will add to our knowledge of them. Thus, this paper contributes to the literature even though it does
not separately identify the different peer effects.
More recently, Angrist (2014) has outlined problems of biased estimates and spurious correlations
when estimating peer effects, underlining the difficulties in estimating and interpreting a peer effect.
In order to understand the impact of such issues on my study, I perform (pseudo) placebo estimations
where artificial peer groups are created. If my placebo results are insignificant, it indicates that my
results are in fact a peer effect and not caused by a mechanical relationship, measurement errors, or
spurious correlations. In most of the cases, my placebo peer groups have no significant impact on
individuals’ outcomes. However, I do sometimes observe a significant placebo peer effect. This could,
however, be generated by the way I construct my artificial peer measures. I return to this in Section
8.
One of the things that Angrist (2014) shows is how measurement errors in behavior/performance at
both the individual and peer group level can lead to an overestimation of a peer effect. This is opposite
of what is commonly believed when measurement error is considered.3 However, building on the results
in Angrist (2014), Feld and Zölitz (2015) show, analytic and using Monte Carlo simulations, that with
random assignment of peer groups, the estimates of a peer effect will suffer only from attenuation bias
due to measurement errors. Relying on randomly assigned peer groups and pre-determined measure of
peer group performance, Feld and Zölitz (2015) continues with a similar strategy as presented in this
paper.
2.2 Previous Literature
Although there is extensive literature on peer effects at all educational levels, the vast majority of
the studies concentrate on peer effects on educational performance at primary, secondary, and high
school levels (e.g., Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009; Duflo et al., 2011; Lavy et al., 2012; Burke and
Sass, 2013; Vardardottir, 2013; Murphy and Weinhardt, 2014).4 Some papers have examined effects on
3Angrist (2014) relates the estimated peer effects to the difference in an IV estimator and a OLS estimator, where
the IV estimate comes from a regression that uses group dummies as instruments for individual 𝑖’s behavior and the
OLS estimate comes from regression 𝑖’s outcome on the group behavior. By relating the estimated peer effect to the
difference in these two estimated coefficients, Angrist (2014) show how measurement error in peer group and individual
behavior can result in an overestimation of a peer effect. This result is also deduced in Feld and Zölitz (2015).
4See also Sacerdote (2011) and Epple and Romano (2011) for very useful overviews of the methods and empirical
findings in education.
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performance at the tertiary level (e.g., Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003; Arcidiacono and Nicholson,
2005; Carrell et al., 2009; Han and Li, 2009; Carrell et al., 2013; Hasan and Bagde, 2013; Thiemanny,
2013), but only a few have looked at peer effects on university dropout rates (Johnes and McNabb,
2004; Booij et al., 2015). More papers have focused on establishing other determinants of the decision
to drop out of university (e.g., Smith and Naylor, 2001; Becker, 2001; Montmarquette et al., 2001;
Arulampalam et al., 2005; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2009). Peer effects on other behaviors,
such as alcohol consumption, exercise habits, and choice of major, have also been investigated (e.g.,
Sacerdote, 2001; De Giorgi et al., 2010; Ost, 2010; Carrell et al., 2011).
Different estimation strategies have been adopted to address the econometric difficulties pointed
out by Manski (1993). Some studies have used school- and pupil-fixed effects to address endogeneity
due to self-selection (e.g., Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009; Arcidiacono and Nicholson, 2005; Burke
and Sass, 2013). Others have used random assignment of roommates (e.g., Sacerdote, 2001; Han and
Li, 2009; Hasan and Bagde, 2013), classes, or peer groups (e.g., Carrell et al., 2009; Thiemanny, 2013;
Booij et al., 2015). Finally, some have used the method of discontinuity design to identify peer effects
(e.g., Duflo et al., 2011; Vardardottir, 2013).
When creating measures of peer quality, it is common to use pre-determined ability level as an
exogenous measure, because this lets one overcome the reflection problem (e.g., Ammermueller and
Pischke, 2009; Carrell et al., 2009; Lavy et al., 2012; Thiemanny, 2013; Burke and Sass, 2013). Only
a few studies have separately identified endogenous peer effects: Bramoullé et al. (2009) use students’
social network interactions to distinguish endogenous and exogenous effects, and De Giorgi et al. (2010)
use overlapping peer groups to do so.
Dropouts
The relationship between peer group ability and the probability of dropping out of university has not
been adequately explored in the literature. Few similar studies to this one have been carried out by
Johnes and McNabb (2004) and Booij et al. (2015), and related ones by Arulampalam et al. (2005)
and Smith and Naylor (2001).
Arulampalam et al. (2005) use data from the UK to investigate the impact of in-class variation
and rank on the probability of dropping out during the first year of university. They find that ranking
higher (or lower) decreases (or increases) the probability of dropping out by 1 percentage point for
men. They observe the same results for low-ability women but find no effect for high-ability women.
However, their sample consisted of 56 universities and 19 broad subject areas, and they used around
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a thousand groups with an average of 100 students each. Thus despite the similarities between our
studies, the captured effects might have different causes, and the results cannot be compared directly.
Smith and Naylor (2001) examine data on the cohorts of students enrolling in for three- and four-
year degree programs at UK universities in 1989 and 1990. They find that prior academic preparedness
and social integration at the university are important to probability of completion. They also find that
non-UK European students are significantly more likely to drop out than are UK students, and that
students who live off-campus are more likely to drop out. This impact of lack of social integration can
be interpreted as a sort of peer effect.
Using data on English university students, Johnes and McNabb (2004) investigate peer effects on
dropouts. They differentiate among three outcomes: completion of degree, academic failure (involun-
tary dropout), and dropout (voluntary) and therefore estimate a multinomial logit model. In addition
to individual-specific effects on the probability of dropping out, they also find that students who are
above the ability levels of their peers are more likely to quit voluntarily.
In a recent, related paper, Booij et al. (2015) examine data on first-year students in the undergrad-
uate program in economics and business at the University of Amsterdam in 2009–10, 2010–11, and
2011–12. They use tutorial groups as their definition of peer groups and create variation in the peer-
ability measures by assigning students randomly into peer groups on the basis of their pre-university
grades. In contrast with the present paper, they find no significant effect of average peer ability level on
the likelihood of dropping out. However, their results from simulation do suggest that switching from
ability-mixing to groups with three-way tracking can reduce dropout rates among low-ability students
by as much as 17 percentage points. Almost all studies of the determinants of dropping out find that
higher levels of academic aptitude and pre-determined abilities decrease the probability of dropping
out.
Peer Effects on Educational Performance
Researchers have recently started investigating the impact of ability ranking on educational perfor-
mance (Murphy and Weinhardt, 2014; Elsner and Isphording, 2015). These studies are, among other
things, inspired by the literature on the effects of workplace rankings on job satisfaction (e.g., Brown
et al., 2008; Card et al., 2012). Using English administrative data, Murphy and Weinhardt (2014) find
a significant rank effect on educational performance. They show that students with higher academic
ranks in a subject in primary school perform better in that subject in subsequent years, even among
new peers. On the basis of survey data, they argue that increased confidence is the most likely cause
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of this. Thus, their results indicate that non-cognitive traits such as confidence can have an impact
on educational performance. Along the same lines, Elsner and Isphording (2015) show that students
with higher ranks in high school are significantly more likely to finish high school and to attend and
finish college. They also show using survey data that students with higher ranks are more optimistic,
have higher perceived intelligence, and are helped more by their teachers, which could be potential
mechanisms for the positive association between cohort rank and educational achievement.
Sacerdote (2001), Han and Li (2009), and Hasan and Bagde (2013) use random assignments of
roommates to investigate peer effects in college. Sacerdote (2001) uses data from Dartmouth College
to estimate the impacts of roommates and dorm-mates on several outcomes, including GPA, choice
of major, and choice of fraternity. He finds a positive roommate effect on GPA and both roommate
and dorm-mate effects on the decision to join a fraternity. Using data on roommates in China, Han
and Li (2009) find that weak females benefit from stronger female peers and that strong females are
not harmed by weaker female peers. They also find that males do not respond to the academic levels
of their peers. Hasan and Bagde (2013) examine data from an engineering college in India at which
students are randomly assigned roommates. They too find a positive and significant roommate effect
on first-year performance. Moreover, they find that roommate effects persist through the first two
years only when the roommate is a high-performing student. The latter result indicates that students
become more selective of their peers the longer they are in college.
Carrell et al. (2009) study the random assignment of freshmen to squadrons in the US Air Force
Academy. Using a pre-determined measures of peer ability levels, they find significant peer effects.
Their results suggest that the lowest-ability students benefit the most from having high-ability peers.
However, Carrell et al. (2013), after implementing an optimal distribution of peers on the basis of their
own earlier results in Carrell et al. (2009), observe that the students they intended to help were actually
harmed by their intervention. This happened because students formed smaller subgroups with others
of the same ability levels, which had an adverse impact on the performance of low-ability students.
Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2005) investigate peer effects on academic achievement and choice of
specialization among students who graduated from a US medical school between 1996 and 1998. After
controlling for school-fixed effects, they find a significant peer effect only for female students. Moreover,
this effect persists only in educational performance (board exams), not in specialization preferences.
In a study related to my analyses of both performance and dropout rates, Thiemanny (2013)
measures student performance as a binary variable. Unlike this paper, however, her study models the
probability of passing the first year as dependent on peer-group characteristics and abilities. She uses
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a unique data set from the University of St. Gallen and finds positive effects of peer quality on the
academic performance of individuals who fall below the median of the distribution of peer quality. In
particular, she finds that for men, the probability of passing the first year increases with peer quality.
3 Bachelor’s Program Structure and Assignment of Peers
This paper uses a data set obtained from CBS containing information on students enrolled in the
three-year bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS between 1996 and 2004. This is the
largest bachelor’s program at CBS. It is structured as follows: During their three undergraduate years,
students mostly take mandatory courses taught by professors in large lecture rooms. They often have
exercise classes, run by teaching assistants, connected with these courses. When they enroll in the
bachelor’s program, students are randomly sorted into small groups and are assigned to the exercise
classes on the basis of these groups.5 In the exercise classes, the students solve problems together or
have the teaching assistant go through assignments on the blackboard. Students are likely interacting
much more in these exercise classes than in the lectures. I use the tutorial groups as my definition of
peer groups, which is a way of defining peer groups already applied in the literature (e.g., De Giorgi
et al., 2012; Feld and Zölitz, 2015; Booij et al., 2015).
My definition is based on the assumption that students attend the exercise classes and that peer
effects are thus fostered through interactions in these groups. The exercise classes are known to be
popular, and it is not uncommon for students to prefer them to the lectures, because they offer a better
opportunity for talking and asking questions. This means that the expectation that students attend
the exercise classes and spend the majority of their time at CBS with other students from their peer
groups is a plausible one. Importantly, because these peer groups are assigned randomly, I do not face
the standard econometric problem of self-selection of peer groups.
It is intended that students stay in their peer groups throughout the bachelor’s program. Under
certain circumstances, however, individuals can change groups and get new peers in their second or
third year. For example, if one group becomes too small, it may be merged with another. A student
might also actively choose to change groups. This is allowed, under very limited circumstances, in
the second and third years of study. If a student wants to change groups he or she must apply for
dispensation and find someone in the preferred group who is willing to switch. Because I use first-
year GPA and first-year dropout decisions as my dependent variables, the impact of peers (and other
5Sometimes one exercise class includes students from two of these groups. However, this is mostly in the second or
third year, when students can also choose electives.
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factors) is measured only through the first year of study, and later changes in peer groups do not create
a problem for my estimates.
Few stratification rules are implemented by CBS. The program’s administrators assign individuals
into groups on the basis of gender, nationality, and age. Students are distributed so that the proportions
of men and of Norwegians are approximately the same in all peer groups in a given year.6 The
administration also creates one or two “older” groups. These groups have a higher average enrollment
age and are likely to contain more students who have spent a couple of years working or studying other
subjects. Given that their members are older and are likely to have more experience, the impact of
peers in these groups might be either more or less important. I therefore control for the average age of
the group when estimating potential peer effects.7 The fact that the distribution into groups is based
on these three characteristics does not pose a difficulty for avoiding the problem of self-selection. In
fact, it guarantees very homogeneous peer groups in terms of these characteristics, which ensures that
it is not a group-composition effect that is captured in the estimations.
Despite the unique features of the data, one issue still requires consideration. Some students might
sort themselves into other exercise classes than the ones they were assigned to and thereby make
unofficial changes to peer groups. Unfortunately, the data do not allow me to identify this type of
behavior. However, such mistakes in the measurement of peers would only weaken my results as I
would risk consider some individuals as 𝑖’s peers even if they are not. The most serious consequences
of this is that if, for instance, men are more likely than women to make unofficial changes to their peer
groups, this could explain why I find no significant peer effect for men. Thus, the main consequences
is that I risk finding no peer-effect when there is in fact one. However, because such unofficial changes
are more likely to occur in the second and third years, after the students are familiar with the systems
and regulations of CBS, the problem is likely to be small.
4 Econometric Framework
Formally, my data on peer groups can be summarized by:
∙ Enrollment year, 𝑡, with 𝑡 = 1996, ..., 2004
∙ ∀ 𝑡: 𝐻𝑡 initial peer groups, where ℎ𝑡 is a particular peer group in year 𝑡 and ℎ𝑡 = [1, . . . ,𝐻𝑡].
6CBS has a large number of Norwegians enrolling every year. In order to avoid a “Norwegian” group, Norwegians
are distributed equally among groups.
7I account for the age differences by including the average starting age of one’s peer group and the average starting
age of the peer group squared (leave-out-mean) in all regressions. I have also done a battery of robustness estimations
with various ways of controlling for the average starting age of the peer group. The results remain across all specifications.
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∙ ∀ 𝑡, ℎ𝑡: 𝑁ℎ𝑡 students and for each student belonging to ℎ𝑡 we have 𝑁ℎ𝑡 − 1 peers.
In order to estimate a peer effect, I start out by specifying a reduced form linear-in-means model (e.g.,
Manski, 1993; Carrell et al., 2009).
𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛾𝑃−𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼𝑍−𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖ℎ𝑡 (1)
𝜀𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 𝑐ℎ𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖 (2)
𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑡 is the outcome variable of individual 𝑖 in peer group ℎ with enrollment year 𝑡. 𝑃−𝑖 is a measure
of peer quality, and accordingly 𝛾 is the peer effect. 𝑍−𝑖 is a vector of peer group characteristics
such as class size, male share, and average age; 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of individual-specific characteristics,
including type of high school, high school GPA, gender, enrollment age, place of residence five years
before entering CBS, and parental characteristics; and 𝜃𝑡 is a cohort-fixed effect. Finally, 𝑐ℎ𝑡 is an
unobserved peer-group-fixed effect, also referred to as the correlation effect. Because 𝑐ℎ𝑡 introduces
error correlation across individuals in the same peer group, I cluster all standard errors by peer group.
If 𝑐ℎ𝑡 is correlated with the explanatory variables, the model will suffer from omitted-variable bias. In
Section 4.1, I explain how 𝑐ℎ𝑡 is independent of 𝑃−𝑖, 𝑋𝑖, and 𝑍−𝑖, which means that the estimated
peer effects are not contaminated by omitted variable bias.
When the behavior of an individual, 𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑡, and of the peer group, 𝑃−𝑖, are determined simultaneously,
the model presented by Equations (1) and (2) suffers from the reflection problem described by Manski
(1993). To handle this, I create a measure of peer quality based on pre-determined characteristics of
the individuals in the peer group—specifically, on peers’ high school GPAs. I return to this in Section
5.1. Moreover, because peer groups are assigned randomly, the problem of endogenous selection into
peer groups is circumvented by construction.
When 𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑡 is a dummy equal to one if individual 𝑖 drops out during the first year, I model the
probability of dropping out using a probit specification captured by Equation (3).
𝑃 (𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 1) = Φ(𝛽0 + 𝛾𝑃−𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼𝑍−𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡) (3)
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Where the underlying assumptions of the probit model are:
𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 1[𝑦
*
𝑖ℎ𝑡 ≥ 0]
𝑦*𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛾𝑃−𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼𝑍−𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖ℎ𝑡
𝜀𝑖ℎ𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(0, 1)
If the assumption made in the probit model, namely that 𝜀𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 𝑐ℎ𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(0, 1), fails because
𝑐ℎ𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖 is distributed differently and 𝑐ℎ𝑡 has an impact on the outcome, it will introduce a problem
of neglected heterogeneity and cause the estimates to suffer from attenuation bias (but the sign of the
peer effect remains) (see section 15.7 in Wooldridge, 2010). By contrast with standard Ordinary Least
Square (OLS) methods, this is true even if 𝑐ℎ𝑡 is independent of all the explanatory variables. The main
consequence of this is that the estimated peer effect must be considered a lower bound (in absolute
terms). To test the consequences of potential neglected heterogeneity, I perform a robustness test in
which I estimate the probability of dropping out with a Linear Probability Model (LPM) and compare
the results to the ones obtained from probit estimation. The LPM and probit models give almost
identical results, which indicates that the neglected heterogeneity problem is minor or nonexistent.
Because students are assigned to peer groups randomly, it means that individual characteristics are
supposed to be uncorrelated with peer quality. Thus, the inclusion of 𝑋𝑖 in the regressions should not
affect the estimated peer effects. 𝑋𝑖 is included anyway because it provides more efficient estimates.
Moreover, the results on the individual-specific variables are also interesting for comparison purposes
and provide additional knowledge about dropout decisions. The estimates made with and without
individual characteristics are shown in Appendix Table B.2.
4.1 The Correlation Effect
One of the main problems in identifying a peer effect is that the behavior of the peer group can be
affected by unobserved group factors that might also affect individual behavior. Such group-specific
effects arise when the group is subjected to a common influence or shock that affects both individual
outcomes and group outcomes but is not modeled directly in the regression. This is what Manski
(1993) refers to as the correlation effect. If a study uses data from multiple schools, for instance, the
quality of the schools will be captured in the correlation effect. Because this paper uses data only
on students from CBS, the problem of confounding effects related to schools is not present (see also
Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009). This does not, however, completely eliminate the problem of bias
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due to the correlation effect.
Formally, the correlation effect enters the model through the error term, as shown in Equation
(1) and Equation (2). Here, the error term consist of two components: a group-specific effect, 𝑐ℎ𝑡 ,
and an individual-specific effect, 𝜖𝑖. The former, 𝑐ℎ𝑡 , might measure, for instance, the effect of a very
gifted teacher who raises or lowers the educational level of each individual and of the entire group
simultaneously. It might also capture various characteristics of the classrooms, such as its being too
dark or cold, or differences in time schedules among groups. If the group-specific effect is correlated
at the same time with the behavior of the group and the behavior of each individual, the estimated
peer-effect coefficients will be biased. However, because the measure of peer quality used in this study,
𝑃−𝑖, is pre-determined, neither classroom conditions nor teacher quality is correlated with it, which
ensures that this bias is not present.
Finally, if the groups are discriminated, positively or negatively, on the basis of pre-determined
characteristics, the group-specific effect could be correlated with my measure of peer quality. This
would be the case, for instance, if CBS matched teachers with peer groups so that better teachers were
consistently assigned to higher-level groups. But because this is not a policy of CBS, the predetermined
measures of peer quality are not correlated with the peer-group-specific effect.
In summary, there are two reasons that 𝑐ℎ𝑡 is not correlated with any of the measures of peer quality.
First, the measure of peer quality is based on pre-university characteristics and is thus predetermined
in the model. A common shock or a teacher effect that might affect the behavior of an individual
will not affect the measure of peers’ abilities. Furthermore, and importantly, CBS does not treat any
groups differently on the basis of high school GPA or any other factor. Thus all measures of 𝑃−𝑖 based
on pre-determined characteristics of the peers are independent of 𝑐ℎ𝑡 .
5 Data
This paper uses data on students who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS
between 1996 and 2004. The data include detailed educational information, such as course-specific
grades, dropout information, and first-year and high school GPAs. I combine these data with Danish
register data containing socio-economic information on the entire Danish population. This lets me
combine unique and detailed educational data with background characteristics that might also explain
educational choices and performances.
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5.1 Measuring Peer Quality
When individuals enroll in the business economics bachelor’s program at CBS each year, they are
randomly divided into small (peer) groups. The number of groups varies from 14 to 18. The number
of students in each group also varies, but has increased over time, as can be seen in Figure 1. This
development also shows the importance of including cohort-fixed effects when estimating on a pooled
sample.
Figure 1: Number of Students in Peer Groups across Enrollment Years*
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* Some peer groups have the same number of students which, for instance, explain why there is only 8 points for 2004.
In this paper, I measure peer quality by the ability level of the peer group. I use students’ high
school GPAs to create different measures of peer quality. The key feature of these measures is that
they are based on predetermined achievements and are therefore exogenous in the model: they have
not been determined simultaneously with individual behavior.8 The first measure of peer quality I use
is the average ability level of peers, as given by Equation (4):
𝐴−𝑖 =
𝑁ℎ∑︀
𝑗=1,𝑗 ̸=𝑖
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝐻𝑆𝑗
𝑁ℎ − 1 (4)
Here, 𝐺𝑃𝐴𝐻𝑆𝑗 is the high school GPA of individual 𝑗. I also measure peer quality by the shares of peers
with high school GPAs above and below the 80th and 20th percentile of the cohort’s GPA distribution.
I label these variables Share of high-ability peers and Share of low-ability peers, respectively. When
8This way of creating an exogenous measure of average peer ability is standard in the peer effect literature (e.g.,
Carrell et al., 2009; Lavy et al., 2012). An example is the work of Lavy et al. (2012), who conduct their analysis on
pupils in secondary schools (14 years) and use performance at age 11 as their prior-achievement measure.
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computing these shares, I consider the cohort high school GPA distribution excluding individual 𝑖’s
high school GPA. I do this for the same reason as I leave out individual 𝑖 in the measure of 𝐴−𝑖.
Because the peer groups are created on the basis of gender, nationality, and age, one might worry
that there is not enough variation in peer quality measures between groups. However, the program is
not an elite one and admits students of many ability levels.9 The variation in ability levels and the
random allocation into peer groups ensure sufficient variation in peer-group quality. This variation is
depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Histogram of Peer-Quality Measures, All Years Pooled
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Finally, to measure the impact of the standard deviation in peer quality, I compute the standard
deviation of high school GPAs within peer groups. Inclusion of the standard deviation is not common in
the literature, but is done by some (e.g., Booij et al., 2015). When creating all measures of peer quality,
9Fields like international business economics, medicine, and political science are extremely popular in Denmark,
which means that only students with very high GPAs from high school are allowed into these types of fields.
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I leave out 𝑖 in order to ensure that the measure is not correlated with the outcome by construction.
5.2 Summary Statistics and Background Variables
Access to the Danish register data allows me to combine educational information with background
characteristics of the students. This requires me to limit the study sample to Danes because it lets me
include background characteristics that are likely to be important for educational behavior. Moreover,
the background characteristics allow me to test the assumption of random assignment into peer groups.
I also exclude individuals with inconsistent or missing information (e.g., missing high school GPAs) in
the educational raw data.10 In total, I exclude approximately 10 percent of my original sample, which
leaves me with a sample of 4,340 students.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on all the relevant variables across different sub-samples. The
average first-year dropout rate across all years is 19%. Sixteen percent drop out of CBS without
supplying information on what they do afterward, and 3% transfer to other programs at CBS or other
business schools. Thiemanny (2013) uses data on first-year students at the University of St. Gallen and
shows that 7% of the sample drops out each semester and only 66% passes the first year. Compared to
this, a dropout rate of 19% does not seem unreasonable. For comparison, Carrieri et al. (2015) reports
a dropout rate of around 35% among first-year students in economics at the University of Salerno
between 2005 and 2010.
On average, students are 21 years old when they enter CBS and have a high school GPA just above
8. All GPAs are computed using the Danish “13” grading scale, on which the lowest passing grade is 6
and the highest grade is 13. A high school GPA of 8 indicates that a student is slightly above average.11
I find no major difference in performance or pre-determined ability between men and women. Most of
the students lived in Zealand for five years prior to enrollment, but around 15% of the sample came
from other parts of Denmark, mostly Jutland.
10Most individuals with missing high school GPAs are non-Danes. The administration at CBS translates the GPA
from foreign students into a Danish GPA whenever it is possible. In creating the measures of peer quality, 𝑃−𝑖, I relied on
information from the entire sample of students with available information on high school GPAs. Relying only on Danes
does not change my results. Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) show how peer effects can be biased due to measurement
error in peer group composition. However, in their example of within school peer effects, they show that the estimated
peer effect suffer only from attenuation bias.
11See the Main Appendix A of this thesis for a translation of the Danish grading scale.
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Table 1: Summary Statistic
All Without dropouts Men Women
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
In-university characteristics:
Regular dropout 0.16 (0.36) 0.15 (0.35) 0.17 (0.38)
Change of study within CBS 0.03 (0.18) 0.03 (0.17) 0.04 (0.19)
First Year GPA 7.63 (0.99)
𝐴−𝑖 8.30 (0.17) 8.30 (0.16) 8.30 (0.17) 8.30 (0.16)
Initial class male share 0.69 (0.06) 0.69 (0.06) 0.68 (0.05) 0.70 (0.06)
Initial class size 35.58 (4.43) 35.60 (4.37) 35.52 (4.46) 35.73 (4.35)
Share of high ability peers 0.18 (0.07) 0.18 (0.07) 0.18 (0.07) 0.18 (0.07)
Share of low ability peers 0.18 (0.08) 0.18 (0.08) 0.18 (0.08) 0.18 (0.08)
Pre-university characteristics𝐴:
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝐻𝑆 8.29 (0.80) 8.35 (0.79) 8.27 (0.82) 8.35 (0.74)
Starting age 21.47 (1.86) 21.41 (1.70) 21.51 (1.86) 21.38 (1.84)
Woman 0.31 (0.46) 0.30 (0.46) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00)
General high school 0.72 (0.45) 0.73 (0.45) 0.70 (0.46) 0.75 (0.43)
Jutland 0.09 (0.28) 0.09 (0.28) 0.08 (0.27) 0.10 (0.30)
Fyn and Bornholm 0.04 (0.19) 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.20) 0.03 (0.18)
Copenhagen 0.11 (0.32) 0.11 (0.31) 0.11 (0.32) 0.11 (0.31)
Greater Copenhagen 0.32 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47)
Frederiksborg 0.23 (0.42) 0.23 (0.42) 0.24 (0.43) 0.20 (0.40)
Father’s year of education*:
Missing 0.12 (0.32) 0.11 (0.32) 0.12 (0.32) 0.12 (0.32)
Mandatory edu. 0.13 (0.34) 0.12 (0.33) 0.13 (0.33) 0.13 (0.34)
General High School 0.04 (0.19) 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.18)
Business High School 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.12) 0.02 (0.14)
Professional Qualifications 0.28 (0.45) 0.29 (0.45) 0.27 (0.44) 0.31 (0.46)
Short Tertiary 0.04 (0.19) 0.04 (0.19) 0.04 (0.19) 0.04 (0.19)
Medium tertiary 0.17 (0.38) 0.17 (0.38) 0.18 (0.38) 0.16 (0.36)
Bachelor 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14)
Master’s or above 0.18 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39) 0.17 (0.37)
Mother’s year of education*:
Missing 0.05 (0.21) 0.04 (0.19) 0.05 (0.21) 0.04 (0.20)
Mandatory edu. 0.17 (0.37) 0.16 (0.37) 0.16 (0.36) 0.19 (0.39)
General High School 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.21) 0.04 (0.20)
Business High School 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.09)
Professional Qualifications 0.30 (0.46) 0.31 (0.46) 0.30 (0.46) 0.32 (0.47)
Short Tertiary 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 0.04 (0.21) 0.07 (0.25)
Medium Tertiary 0.28 (0.45) 0.29 (0.45) 0.30 (0.46) 0.24 (0.43)
Bachelor 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.08) 0.01 (0.12)
Master’s or above 0.09 (0.28) 0.09 (0.28) 0.09 (0.29) 0.07 (0.26)
No. of obs 4340 3562 2998 1342
Note: The sample includes Danes who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS between 1996 and 2004.
𝐴: The excluded location group is the rest of Zealand. *I handle the missing parental information by including dummies in
the regressions with the group with missing as my reference. Business and General High School are consider one group in the
regressions.
Figure 3a shows average first-year GPAs by peer group and enrollment year, and Figure 3b shows
dropout shares by peer group and enrollment year. The figures show variation among peer groups
in first-year GPAs and in dropout rates, which indicates that some kind of group effect is probably
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occurring, but whether this is caused by variation in peer quality or in other group characteristics cannot
be determined from the graphs alone. This is why an econometric model is needed. By estimating an
empirical model that allows educational behavior to depend on peer quality, I can investigate whether
individual educational behavior during the first year of study can be explained by variation in peer
quality or must stem from other factors. Figures 3a and 3b also show variation in group behavior
across enrollment years, which again underlines the importance of including cohort-fixed effects when
estimating on a pooled sample. Finally, Figure 3c shows average high school GPAs by peer group and
enrollment year. Variation can be observed across both enrollment years and peer groups, but less
than in Figures 3a and 3b.
Figure 3: Educational Behavior Across Peer Groups and Enrollment Years*
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* Note: Figure 3a only consider the sample of students that did not drop out during the first year.
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5.3 Identifying Assumption: Random Assignment of Peer Groups
In order to consistently estimate a peer effect, the model assumes that individuals were assigned to their
peer groups randomly and that there is therefore no self-selection. If individuals selected their own peer
groups, variations in peer group quality would be caused by this selection. For instance, if high-ability
individuals formed groups together to benefit from high-level peers, the estimated peer effect would be
upward biased.12 The absence of self-selection is thus crucial for identifying the estimated peer effect.
Because of the random assignment, peer quality and individual characteristics, both observed and
unobserved, should be uncorrelated by construction. To test whether peer group assignment has
the properties that one would expect under random assignment, I test whether individual-specific
observables are in fact uncorrelated with one of my measures of peer ability, 𝐴−𝑖, by regressing 𝐴−𝑖
on all controls. If the assignment is truly random, there should be no significant correlation between
the background variables and 𝐴−𝑖. Table B.1 shows the results of the estimations. Unsurprisingly, it
reveals no significant correlation between 𝐴−𝑖 and almost any individual-specific controls. Enrollment
age enters the regressions as significant. This is not surprising, as individuals are assigned to groups
on the basis of enrollment age. Few educational characteristics of the father are also significant when
estimating on the sample of women. However, all education dummies are jointly insignificant as can
be seen from the p-values reported in the bottom of Table B.1. These results support the assumption
of random assignment of peers.
Table B.2 shows estimations made with and without individual characteristics included as controls.
The fact that the estimated peer effect does not change significantly in magnitude between specifications
means that none of the additional explanatory variables takes any power from the peer quality measures,
which they would do if they were correlated with the peer quality measure. This also supports the
assumption of random assignment of peers.
6 Results: Dropouts
6.1 Baseline Results
Table 2 reports the average marginal effects from a probit estimation of Equation (3), with 𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑡 as
a binary variable equal to one if the student dropped out during the first year. The results of the
estimations on the full sample reveal a significant peer effect on the probability of dropping out.
12Lavy et al. (2012) formulate it it this way: “...the identifying assumption is that the variation of peer quality over
time or across classes is idiosyncratic and uncorrelated with students’ potential outcomes and background.”
145
Estimating by gender reveals that this result is driven by women. Specifically, women’s probability
of dropping out increases with peer quality (𝐴−𝑖 and Share of high ability peers), whereas men’s
probability of dropping out is unaffected by peer quality. Thus, for women, a high-quality peer group
increases the probability of dropping out during the first year. Moreover, the dropout probability for
women is decreasing in the share of males in the peer group, which is consistent with the findings
of Johnes and McNabb (2004), who show that women are less likely to drop out if they are grouped
with a high proportion of males. The finding that women are more affected by their peers is in line
with the literature showing that females are more affected than males by school interventions, peer
interactions, and educational inputs (e.g., Arcidiacono and Nicholson, 2005; Angrist et al., 2009; Han
and Li, 2009; Ost, 2010; Lavy et al., 2012). The standard deviation of the peer group ability distribution
is insignificant across all estimations (columns 7–9).
Table 2: Probability of Dropping Out - Probit Estimation
All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Peer effects:
Share of high ability peers 0.217** 0.106 0.517***
(0.092) (0.097) (0.169)
Share of low ability peers 0.101 0.105 0.086
(0.095) (0.106) (0.157)
𝐴−𝑖 0.076 0.019 0.222***
(0.048) (0.051) (0.082)
𝑆𝐷−𝑖 0.050 0.050 0.069
(0.070) (0.072) (0.115)
Initial class male share -0.193 -0.218* -0.213* -0.111 -0.123 -0.121 -0.384* -0.465** -0.433**
(0.118) (0.122) (0.120) (0.124) (0.128) (0.126) (0.213) (0.217) (0.221)
Initial class size 0.004* 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.009**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Personal characteristics:
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝐻𝑆 -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.049***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Starting age 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
General high school=1 -0.034** -0.034** -0.034** -0.037** -0.037** -0.037** -0.027 -0.027 -0.026
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Woman=1 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.053***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Jutland=1 -0.030* -0.031* -0.031* -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.035 -0.038 -0.038
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
Fyn and Bornholm=1 -0.051* -0.051* -0.050* -0.049 -0.049 -0.049 -0.057 -0.061 -0.056
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.059) (0.057) (0.060)
Copenhagen=1 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.012 -0.009 -0.010
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Greater Copenhagen=1 -0.029* -0.030* -0.029* -0.027 -0.028 -0.028 -0.036 -0.037 -0.035
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Frederiksborg=1 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.015 -0.015 -0.018
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Observations 4340 4340 4340 2998 2998 2998 1342 1342 1342
Note: Probit estimation. The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the student dropped out during the first year. Average marginal
effects (AMEs) are reported. When computing AMEs for dummy variables, I report the effect from the discrete change from 0 to 1. I include
dummies in all regressions to control for educational length of the parents, cohort-fixed effects, and the average age and average age squared of the
peer group, leave-out-mean. Zealand is the excluded location group. Standard errors are clustered by peer group and reported in parentheses. ***p
< 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes Danes who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS between 1996 and
2004.
146
The magnitude of the peer effect for women is in fact sizable. With a standard deviation of 𝐴−𝑖
equal to 0.17 and an estimated average marginal effect from 𝐴−𝑖 of 0.222, a one-standard-deviation
increase in 𝐴−𝑖 corresponds to an increase of approximately 4 percentage points in women’s probability
of dropping out. A 5-percent increase in Share of high-ability peers corresponds to an increase of
approximately 2.5 percentage points in women’s probability of dropping out. By comparison, a one-
standard-deviation increase in high school GPA decreases women’s probability of dropping out by
approximately 4 percentage points. Thus, for women, the impact of peer quality is comparable to
the impact of the student’s own abilities (as measured by high school GPA). An estimated peer effect
of 4 percentage points is comparable in size to the peer effects found in other studies of peer effects
on discrete outcomes (e.g., Lyle, 2007; Ost, 2010).13 Figure 4 shows the predicted probabilities with
confidence intervals as dependent on the average level of peer quality separately for men and women.
Figure 4: Average Predicted Probabilities for Different Values of 𝐴−𝑖
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Table 2 also shows that high school GPA has a significant and negative effect on the probability
of dropping out. This holds for both men and women and agrees with findings in the literature that
academic aptitude is an importing determinant of the propensity to drop out of university (e.g., Smith
and Naylor, 2001; Johnes and McNabb, 2004; Arulampalam et al., 2005). It is likely that individuals
who do well in high school are more mature and can better handle the academic demands of university,
13Ost (2010) models the impact of peers and grades on major persistence in the life and physical sciences. He predicts
peers’ propensity for persisting through the major and includes this in his regression. He finds that a 10 percentage
point increase in the propensity of one’s peers to persist leads to a 2.08 percentage point increase in one’s probability of
persisting through a major in the physical sciences. Lyle (2007) models individual choices to enroll in different majors or
continue in the army as dependent on peers and role models. He finds that a 10 percentage point increase in the fraction
of role models who intend to study engineering corresponds to a 1.5 percentage point increase in the probability that a
plebe will choose to major in engineering.
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which could make them less prone to dropping out. I also observe that women are more likely to drop
out than men, a result contrasting that of Johnes and McNabb (2004), who find that men are more
likely to drop out.
The estimated positive peer effect on women’s dropout probability seems puzzling, as one might
expect women to benefit from high-level peers and be less likely to drop out. One potential explanation
in the literature is the finding that women are less willing to enter competitions, and likely to perform
worse in competitive environments, than men of equal abilities (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle
and Vesterlund, 2007, 2010). If we assume that the level of competitiveness in a group corresponds
to the group’s ability level, then high-ability groups will have high levels of competitiveness, and this
increased competition could be a reason for the positive relationship between peer quality and dropout
rates among women.
Another potential explanation is offered by the psychology literature, the so-called big-fish-little-
pond effect (BFLPE) introduced by Marsh and Parker (1984). This is the hypothesis that students
compare their own academic abilities with those of their peers and use this comparison to form their
academic self-concepts (see also Marsh and Hau, 2003); the name refers to the idea that one feels
smarter as the brightest member of a small group (a big fish in a small pond) than as a member of
a large group with many brighter peers. Individuals of average ability in the general population thus
might view themselves as low-ability when they are put in high-ability peer groups. Applied to the
results in Table 2, this could mean that women with high-ability peers tend to perceive themselves as
having lower academic abilities than they actually do, which could lead them to exit the program more
often than students with peers of lower quality. These suggested interpretations of the estimated peer
effect are obviously only few out of many potential explanations.
6.2 Peer Effects Across the Ability Distribution
In order to learn which students respond the most to peer impacts, I estimate alternative specifications
of the model described in the previous section. Specifically, I estimate peer effects across the ability
distribution. Table 3 presents the results of estimations across two ability-dependent sub-samples.
Columns (1) to (3) show the results of estimating on the sample of individuals in the upper part of the
high school ability distribution, and columns (4) to (6) show the results for those in the lower part of
the distribution. By estimating in this way, I allow low- and high-ability students to react differently
to their peers.
My results show that low-ability students’ probability of dropping out is significantly increasing in
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peer quality. In particular, 𝐴−𝑖 and the Share of high ability peers enter the regression significantly.
Table 3 shows that this effect is driven by women. My results also show that high-ability women
are affected by the average ability levels of their peer groups. Both high- and low-ability men are
unaffected. That low-ability students are the most responsive to their peers is consistent with previous
findings (e.g., Carrell et al., 2009; Ost, 2010).
Table 3: Probability of Dropping Out - Probit Estimation
High ability students Low ability students
Al Men Women All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of high ability peers 0.060 -0.036 0.332 0.375*** 0.238 0.765***
(0.139) (0.149) (0.233) (0.132) (0.148) (0.234)
Share of low ability peers 0.094 0.088 0.122 0.107 0.140 0.031
(0.125) (0.140) (0.215) (0.126) (0.150) (0.187)
Initial class male share -0.378** -0.319* -0.496* -0.042 0.076 -0.373
(0.181) (0.186) (0.295) (0.164) (0.172) (0.365)
Woman=1 0.064*** 0.043**
(0.018) (0.020)
𝐴−𝑖 0.003 -0.068 0.185* 0.150** 0.098 0.286**
(0.062) (0.067) (0.106) (0.068) (0.071) (0.113)
Initial class male share -0.392** -0.324* -0.560* -0.076 0.062 -0.472
(0.186) (0.187) (0.303) (0.163) (0.174) (0.366)
Woman=1 0.064*** 0.045**
(0.018) (0.020)
Observations 2061 1389 672 2279 1609 670
Note: Probit estimation. The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the student dropped out during the first year. Average marginal
effects (AMEs) are reported. When computing AMEs for dummy variables, I report the effect from the discrete change from 0 to 1. In all estimations
I have included the same controls as in Table 2. High-ability students are defined as students with high school GPAs above the cohort median,
and low-ability students as students with high school GPAs below or equal to the cohort median. Standard errors are clustered by peer group
and reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes Danes who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business
economics at CBS between 1996 and 2004.
6.3 Heterogeneous Gender Effects
In this section, I examine gender-specific measures of peer quality to see which peers are the most
influential. Table 4 shows the results of estimations made with gender-specific peer measures, where
𝐴𝐹−𝑖 is the average ability level of 𝑖’s female peers and 𝐴
𝑀
−𝑖 is the average ability level of 𝑖’s male peers.
Interestingly, my results show that women are adversely affected primarily by their female peers.
Women’s probability of dropping out is significantly increasing in the Share of high ability female/male
peers and 𝐴𝐹−𝑖, but there is no significant effect from 𝐴
𝑀
−𝑖. As I mentioned, the literature has shown
that women are less likely on average to enter competitions. However, it also shows that women are
more willing to enter competitions facing other women as their main competitors (Gneezy et al., 2003;
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, 2010). Thus one could imagine that women are more likely to compete
with and compare themselves with other women than with men. This may be why the adverse impact
on women comes from their female peers. These results are also consistent with my previous finding
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that the dropout probability for women is decreasing in the share of males in the peer group.
Table 4: Probability of Dropping Out - Probit Estimation
All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Share of high ability male peers 0.123 0.126* 0.077 0.078 0.263* 0.268*
(0.075) (0.075) (0.080) (0.080) (0.152) (0.151)
Share of low ability male peers 0.096 0.115 0.110 0.112 0.066 0.109
(0.072) (0.072) (0.078) (0.079) (0.126) (0.116)
Share of high ability female peers 0.076* 0.088** 0.002 0.016 0.242*** 0.249***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.051) (0.050) (0.072) (0.072)
Share of low ability female peers -0.035 -0.031 -0.047 -0.042 -0.020 -0.021
(0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.054) (0.100) (0.099)
𝐴𝑀−𝑖 0.014 0.016 -0.017 -0.016 0.090 0.102
(0.039) (0.038) (0.041) (0.041) (0.066) (0.064)
𝐴𝐹−𝑖 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.041 0.041 0.156*** 0.160***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.044) (0.043)
Observations 4340 4340 4340 2998 2998 2998 1342 1342 1342
Note: Probit estimation. The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the student dropped out during the first year. Average marginal
effects (AMEs) are reported. When computing AMEs for dummy variables, I report the effect from the discrete change from 0 to 1. In all estimations
I have included the same controls as in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered by peer group and reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1. The sample includes Danes who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS between 1996 and 2004.
6.4 Peer Group Ability Rank
Following more recent literature that shows that relative rank is important for educational performance,
job satisfaction, and the formation of a self-concept or self-image (e.g., Brown et al., 2008; Card et al.,
2012; Murphy and Weinhardt, 2014; Elsner and Isphording, 2015), I investigate whether ranking within
one’s peer group is important for the decision to drop out. Peer group rank can affect students in several
ways. Students of the same absolute ability levels (as measured by high school GPA) can be ranked
differently in their own peer groups, and this might lead them to develop more or less self-confidence.
If students form their self-concepts on the basis of their peer group ranks rather than their absolute
ability levels, they are relying on incomplete information and risk forming misleading pictures of their
own ability levels. A misleading picture of this sort could give a student the wrong expectations about
the trade-off between the costs and benefits of education, which could affect the decision to drop out.
If a student ranks low in his peer group, he might see himself as a low-ability student in absolute
terms, even if he is not, and this could lead him to drop out of university. By contrast, a student with
a high peer group rank might see himself as a high-ability student and gain a correspondingly higher
probability of finishing university. Another view is that students are motivated by competition, and
low peer group ranks encourage them to put more effort into their education and improve their ranks.
Because students are not exposed to all the members of their cohorts the way they are to their peer
groups, I would not expect them to create academic self-concepts based on their cohort ranks, but in
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this way peer group rank can have an impact on dropout probability.
To determine how important peer group rank is, I create a measure of it, 𝑅𝑃𝑖 , based on high school
GPA (see Equation (5)) and include this measure in the estimation equation. Because 𝑅𝑃𝑖 is based on
high school GPA, its inclusion in the estimation equations does not introduce a problem of reflection,
or two-way causality. 𝑅𝑃𝑖 is created as a comparable rank measure across peer groups. Specifically, I
transform the rank position of each individual, as given by Equations (5). Doing it this way ensures
that 𝑅𝑃𝑖 is a measure of relative rank among one’s closest peers but is also comparable across cohorts
and peer groups.
𝑅𝑃𝑖 =
𝑛𝑖ℎ,𝑡 − 1
𝑁ℎ,𝑡 − 1 (5)
𝑅𝑃𝑖 ∈ [0, 1]
𝑛𝑖ℎ,𝑡 is the high school GPA-rank of individual 𝑖 in peer group ℎ and enrollment year 𝑡 and 𝑁ℎ,𝑡 is
the numbers of students in the peer group. The reason this approach works is that peer group rank
varies among students with the same high school GPA because of the variations in ability level among
peer groups. Students of the same absolute ability levels can be ranked differently in their peer groups.
This is shown graphically in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Variation in Peer Group Rank Across High School GPA*
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* Note: Information is pooled across all years. All points in the figures are calculated averages based on at least 5 observations. This is done in order
to comply with the guidelines of Statistic Denmark.
To compare the influence of peer group rank with that of absolute ability level on dropping out, I
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estimate two models, excluding high school GPA from the first and including it in the second. Table
5 presents the results of the estimations in which 𝑅𝑃𝑖 is included. When high school GPA is excluded
from the regression, 𝑅𝑃𝑖 significantly decreases the probability of dropping out across all sub-samples.
This is unsurprising because 𝑅𝑃𝑖 is correlated with individuals’ abilities, which are not controlled for
when high school GPA is excluded. The inclusion of high school GPA yields interesting results; see
Columns (2), (4), and (6) of Table 5. Column (6) shows that women’s probability of dropping out
is also decreasing in 𝑅𝑃𝑖 when high school GPA is controlled for. When both 𝑅
𝑃
𝑖 and high school
GPA are included, GPA becomes insignificant for women, but the opposite is true for men. Moreover,
Column (4) shows that when GPA is controlled for, men are unaffected by 𝑅𝑃𝑖 . These findings suggest
that women are affected by peer group rank and that comparison to peers matters more than personal
ability level. Again, the opposite seems to be the case for men. This is an important finding. One
consequence of it is that women might under-invest in their human capital relative to the optimal
situation given their absolute abilities. Given the results in the previous sections, this finding is not
too surprising and supports my suggested interpretations.
Table 5: Probability of Dropping Out - Probit Estimation
All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ordinal rank in peer group -0.186*** -0.049 -0.195*** 0.052 -0.153*** -0.315**
(0.021) (0.071) (0.025) (0.078) (0.037) (0.124)
Initial class male share -0.223* -0.216* -0.113 -0.124 -0.459** -0.463**
(0.125) (0.121) (0.135) (0.127) (0.223) (0.218)
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝐻𝑆 -0.054** -0.097*** 0.066
(0.026) (0.029) (0.046)
Woman=1 0.053*** 0.054***
(0.013) (0.013)
Observations 4340 4340 2998 2998 1342 1342
Note: Probit estimation. The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the student dropped out during the first
year. Average marginal effects (AMEs) are reported. When computing AMEs for dummy variables, I report the effect from the
discrete change from 0 to 1. In all estimations I have included the same controls as in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered
by peer group and reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes Danes who enrolled in the
bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS between 1996 and 2004.
My results correspond to those of Elsner and Isphording (2015), who find that when two students
with the same ability level but different ranks in their high school cohorts are compared, the one
who ranks higher is significantly more likely to finish high school, attend college, and complete a
4-year degree. In addition, Arulampalam et al. (2005) find a significant effect of students’ in-class
ranks. They divided students into three ranking groups (high, middle, low) and included dummies
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corresponding to these in their regressions. They find that for male students, being ranked higher (or
lower) is associated with an approximately one-percentage-point lower (higher) probability of dropping
out. Among women, they also observe a significant and positive effect of about one percentage point
from being ranked low in the class.
Unlike the measures of peer quality, the measure of peer group rank, 𝑅𝑃𝑖 , is not completely exoge-
nous in the model. Because 𝑅𝑃𝑖 is computed from pre-university educational performance, its inclusion
does not introduce the reflection problem. On the other hand, students’ unobserved abilities are likely
to affect the decision to drop out and are also likely to be correlated with peer group rank. The inclu-
sion of high school GPA should account for a large part of these unobserved abilities. Nonetheless, the
positive correlation between 𝑅𝑃𝑖 and unobserved ability levels, and the expected negative influence of
unobserved ability levels on 𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑡, might cause the estimated effect from 𝑅𝑃𝑖 to be down-biased.
7 Results: Educational Performance
7.1 Baseline Results
Table 6 presents the baseline results of estimations of a peer effect on educational performance. Inter-
estingly, I find no significant peer effect in any of the regressions. This is in contrast to other studies
that have found a significant peer effect on educational performance (e.g., Sacerdote, 2001; Carrell
et al., 2009; Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009; Vardardottir, 2013). However, many of these studies
looked at different educational levels, estimated the impact of smaller units, such as roommates, or
found a peer effect only in certain sub-samples. Furthermore, Carrell et al. (2013) show that their
expected peer effect disappeared after they designed what they thought would be optimal peer groups.
Thus, the existence of a peer effect on educational performance remains uncertain.
The share of males in a peer group does not have an impact on academic performance. This
result contrasts with that of Lavy and Schlosser (2011), who show that the proportion of girls in
the classroom has a significant and positive impact. They find that a higher share of girls improves
academic performance by way of, among other things, lower levels of classroom disruption. However,
they use data on Israeli primary, middle, and high schools students to estimate on a sample of younger
students than those looked at in this paper. Moreover, the students in our sample have completed
high school and have continued by choice into tertiary education, and can be expected to make fewer
interruptions in class.
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Table 6: Educational Performance - OLS Estimation
All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Peer effects:
Share of high ability peers -0.000 -0.040 0.222
(0.302) (0.308) (0.468)
Share of low ability peers -0.436 -0.291 -0.801
(0.318) (0.355) (0.499)
𝐴−𝑖 0.159 0.085 0.377
(0.146) (0.149) (0.249)
Std in peer ability -0.116 -0.105 -0.069
(0.215) (0.229) (0.343)
Initial class male share -0.134 -0.099 -0.093 -0.156 -0.133 -0.134 -0.045 0.013 0.072
(0.448) (0.449) (0.448) (0.465) (0.464) (0.464) (0.624) (0.623) (0.626)
Initial class size 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.011 0.011 0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Personal characteristics:
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝐻𝑆 0.669*** 0.670*** 0.669*** 0.677*** 0.677*** 0.677*** 0.644*** 0.646*** 0.644***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Starting age 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.061***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
General high school=1 0.257*** 0.255*** 0.256*** 0.225*** 0.225*** 0.226*** 0.349*** 0.342*** 0.346***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061)
Woman=1 -0.052 -0.052 -0.053
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Jutland=1 0.198*** 0.201*** 0.198*** 0.282*** 0.284*** 0.282*** 0.043 0.044 0.042
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.095) (0.096) (0.096)
Fyn and Bornholm=1 0.242*** 0.243*** 0.243*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.257*** 0.258* 0.260* 0.254*
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.133) (0.134) (0.134)
Copenhagen=1 -0.107** -0.105** -0.107** -0.017 -0.015 -0.017 -0.309*** -0.310*** -0.316***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.080) (0.080) (0.081)
Greater Copenhagen=1 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.065 0.066 0.064 -0.079 -0.076 -0.074
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079)
Frederiksborg=1 0.090** 0.091** 0.088** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.130*** -0.011 -0.011 -0.017
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.073) (0.074) (0.074)
Adj. R-squared 0.322 0.322 0.321 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.302 0.301 0.299
Observations 3562 3562 3562 2493 2493 2493 1069 1069 1069
Note: OLS estimation. The dependent variable is first-year GPA. I have included dummies in all regressions to control for educational length of
the parents, cohort-fixed effects, and the average age and average age squared of the peer group, leave-out-mean. Zealand is the excluded location
group. Standard errors are clustered by peer group and reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes Danes
who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS between 1996 and 2004.
Table 6 also shows that high school GPA enters the model with a positive and significant coefficient.
Because high school GPA is a proxy for pre-university ability level, it is not surprising that it translates
into high performance in university. The results also show that students who lived in Frederiksborg
(part of Zealand), Jutland, Fyn, or Bornholm five years before enrolling at CBS perform, on average,
better than students who lived in the part of Zealand not controlled for. As CBS is located in Zealand,
it might be that students coming from Jutland and Fyn chose CBS for a specific reason, and maybe for
a specific master’s program afterward, which could result in their being more focused and performing
better.
7.2 Peer Effects Across the Ability Distribution
Table 7 shows the results of estimating a peer effect in educational performance for students in the
upper and lower halves of the ability distribution. My results show a positive effect of average peer
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ability level on low-ability women. The former is in accordance with the results of Carrell et al. (2009).
Thus women who do not drop out during the first year see a positive effect from their peers. However,
an increase of one standard deviation of 𝐴−𝑖 results in an improvement in first-year GPA of only
0.12 (0.16 * 0.705). The standard deviation of first-year GPA is 0.99, so this corresponds to only
around one-tenth of a standard deviation. This effect is small compared to the results of Vardardottir
(2013), who finds that a one-standard-deviation increase in academic ability of peers correspond to
approximately a 0.85 and 0.58 standard deviation increase in the spring exam results and year-end
grades of Icelandic high school students. Finally, Table 7 shows no significant peer effect from the
share of high-ability peers and a 10 percent significant negative effect from the share of low-ability
peers. Overall, I do not see very strong peer effects on educational performance.
Table 7: Educational Performance - OLS Estimation
High ability students Low ability students
Al Men Women All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of high ability peers -0.370 -0.402 -0.068 0.373 0.343 0.321
(0.371) (0.392) (0.657) (0.400) (0.397) (0.679)
Share of low ability peers -0.627* -0.649 -0.689 -0.278 0.042 -1.106*
(0.343) (0.408) (0.610) (0.456) (0.481) (0.645)
Initial class male share 0.178 -0.113 0.829 -0.397 -0.026 -1.230
(0.523) (0.551) (0.834) (0.562) (0.579) (0.846)
Woman=1 -0.101** 0.013
(0.040) (0.047)
𝐴−𝑖 0.085 0.113 0.136 0.257 0.040 0.705**
(0.142) (0.163) (0.319) (0.219) (0.225) (0.332)
Initial class male share 0.215 -0.097 0.908 -0.392 -0.055 -1.188
(0.526) (0.552) (0.835) (0.557) (0.572) (0.825)
Woman=1 -0.100** 0.012
(0.041) (0.047)
Observations 1795 1231 564 1767 1262 505
Note: OLS estimation. The dependent variable is first-year GPA. In all estimations I have included the same controls as in Table 6. High ability
students are defined by students with a high school GPA above the cohort median and low ability students are defined as students with a high
school GPA below or equal to the cohort median. Standard errors are clustered by peer group and reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p <
0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes Danes who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS between 1996 and 2004.
Taking together my results from Sections 6 and 7, I observe that the educational performance of
women in the lower half of the ability distribution is positively affected by the average ability level of
the peer groups and that women’s probability of dropping out is increasing in the ability level of the
peer group. It is interesting to note that low-ability women who do not drop out during the first year
are in fact helped by their higher-ability peers. This underlines the need to understand and address
the drop-out decisions of women.
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8 Robustness
I have done a battery of robustness checks to validate my results. To ensure that the estimated effect
is driven by peers, I create placebo measures of peer quality and estimate the models, including these
measures as explanatory variables. I also test the robustness of my results to the exclusion of potential
outliers, different model specifications, and alternative measures of peer quality. Finally, I discuss a
potential problem of sample selection.
8.1 Placebo Estimation
In order to verify that the estimated effect is in fact a peer effect, I perform (pseudo) placebo estima-
tions. When conducting these I take two approaches. First, I assign students into placebo peer groups
on the basis of random draws from the uniform distribution. Relying on these peer groups, I create a
placebo measure of peer quality, 𝐴𝑃𝑖 , computed as 𝐴𝑖 but with artificial peers. This measure is labeled
𝐴𝑃𝑖 . Table B.3 and Table B.4 present the results of 15 placebo estimations each, including the first
placebo peer quality measure.
Second, I randomly match all students and peer quality measures 𝐴𝑖 based on random draws from
the uniform distribution. Table B.5 shows the results of 15 estimations, including the second placebo
peer quality measure. However, with this approach I risk matching a student with a peer quality
measure from his or her original peer group. Because the peer quality measure from the original group
is correlated with student i’s outcome by construction (unless student 𝑖 is matched exactly with his or
her own peer quality measure), I drop all students who are matched with a peer quality measure from
their original peer groups. This is why the results in Table B.5 are based on different samples.
As expected, the placebo measure of peer quality is insignificant in almost all the regressions
and my placebo results suggest that on average the placebo peer quality measure is insignificant,
which indicates that my results are in fact capturing a true peer effect. However, few times the
placebo peer measure is significant in predicting both dropout and performance. Having the points
of Angrist (2014) in mind, such results are not ensuring of an actual peer effect in my main results.
However, both of the above methods of constructing the placebo peer quality measure have flaws and
should perhaps be considered pseudo-placebo estimations. For further work on this paper, I should
consider other methods of constructing a placebo peer quality measure. These methods could include
simulations of the distribution of the peer quality measure and subsequent random draws from this
simulated distribution. Also methods of averaging over coefficients from repeated placebo estimations
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and bootstrapping the standard errors is a potential way forward
8.2 Re-estimation and Alternative Measure of Peer Quality
In order to test whether my results are sensitive to the measure of peer quality, I re-estimate the model
using an alternative measure. This measure is the 75th percentile of the high school GPA distribution of
the individual’s peer group, given by 𝑞75−𝑖 = 𝑄75(𝐺𝑃𝐴
𝐻𝑆
−𝑖ℎ𝑡). Table B.6 shows the results of estimations
with this measure included. The overall picture is the same as in Tables 2 and 6: only women are
affected by their peers, and women’s dropout probability increases with peer quality. As in the main
estimations, I find no significant peer effects on performance.
To test the sensitivity of the results to model specifications, and to investigate whether neglected
heterogeneity is a problem in the probit estimations, I estimate the dropout equation using a Linear
Probability Model (LPM). Table B.7 shows the results. The estimated coefficients of the LPM are
almost identical to the average marginal effects obtained from the main probit estimations. This
indicates that my results do not suffer from problems of neglected heterogeneity or from sensitivity to
model specifications.
To test whether my results are driven by an inaccurate definition of “dropping out”, I re-estimate
the models on a sub-sample that excludes students who dropped out because they transferred to other
business programs. If students moved to programs that were otherwise comparable but had more
prestige or, in general, higher-ability students, it could explain why the probability of dropping out
increases with peer quality. The results of the estimations on this sub-sample are shown in Table B.8.
Once again, the results are similar to the main results.
To determine whether my results are driven by older students, who might have dropped out of
university before and thus be more likely to do so again, I exclude the peer groups with average ages
above 22.5. Estimating on just the “young” peer groups does not change the results (not reported).
Because the exclusion of non-Danes might have affected the results, I re-estimate both the dropout
and performance equations on the full sample. Tables B.9 and B.10 show the results; no significant
changes are observed.
Finally, to ensure that my results on educational performance do not depend on outliers in perfor-
mance, I re-estimate the model on a sub-sample from which students with first-year GPAs above or
below the 95 and 5 percentiles have been excluded. This too does not change the results for educational
performance (not reported).
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8.3 Sample Selection and Heckman Approach
One real concern regarding my results on peer effects in educational performance is the possibility
of sample-selection bias. If selection into the sample (the choice of not dropping out) is caused by
unobserved individual characteristics that are also correlated with educational performance, my results
will be biased. Even variables that a priori are considered exogenous, such as the peer quality measure,
might turn out to be correlated with the error term in the selected sample. Formally, if the error term in
the selection equation is correlated with the error term in the performance equation, the OLS estimates
will suffer from an omitted variable bias. Obviously the problem of sample selection is an issue only
in the performance estimations.
In order to determine whether my results change when sample selection is corrected for, I run a
Heckman sample selection (HSS) model. This works by modeling the selection into the sample by a
probit selection equation and modeling the main (performance) equation by OLS while correcting for
selection into the sample. The HSS model can be estimated either by maximum likelihood or by a two-
step procedure. The two-step procedure requires an exclusion restriction in the first stage, which makes
it difficult to apply. Because I do not have a valid exclusion restriction, I perform only a maximum
likelihood estimation of the Heckman model.14 A disadvantage of the maximum likelihood procedure
is that it demands strong assumptions of the simultaneous distribution of the errors in the selection
and performance equations. Despite this, the results may serve for the purposes of comparison. The
results of the maximum likelihood estimation are presented in Table B.11. Overall, the results are
the same as those reported in Table 6, and I observe no significant peer effects. Table B.12 shows
the results of estimations from an HSS model across the ability distribution. The results are not
qualitatively different from those in Table 7 and show in fact a larger and stronger peer effect for
low-ability women. In addition they show a stronger negative effect from the Share of low ability peers
on women’s first-year GPA.
9 Conclusion
In this paper I estimate the relationship between peer quality and the propensity to drop out during
the first year of a bachelor’s program. I also consider peer effects on educational performance. The
relationship between educational performance and peer quality has been covered extensively in the
literature, though with ambiguous results. By contrast, the relationship between peer quality and the
14I have experimented with location prior to enrollment and with different measures of performance of siblings at
CBS as potential exclusion restrictions. None of them was applicable.
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decision to drop out is less well-documented. I also investigate how the peer group rank is associated
with the probability of dropping out, which is not addressed in other papers in this area.
Using data on students who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS
between 1996 and 2004 allows me to identify the impact of peer quality on educational outcomes.
Students in this program were randomly assigned to smaller groups when they enrolled, and I use
these groups as my peer groups. Because of the random assignment, my estimates do not suffer from
self-selection bias. Moreover, by using data on pre-university performance, I can create exogenous
measures of peer group quality that are not contaminated by two-way causality.
Regarding probability of dropping out during the first year, I observe that women are adversely
impacted by the ability levels of their peers: women in peer groups with high ability levels are more
likely to drop out. One interpretation of this result is that women tend to avoid competition and thus
to leave groups with high ability levels and corresponding high levels of competition. Another is the
BFLPE hypothesis found in the psychology literature. This is the suggestion that students compare
their own academic abilities with those of their peers and use these comparisons to form their academic
self-concepts. A consequence of this would be that students are more likely to form negative pictures
of their abilities if they are in peer groups with high-ability students. This diminished self-concept
may lead them to drop out.
When I estimate the impact of peer group rank on the probability of dropping out during the first
year, I find that women’s peer group ranks have a significant effect on their probability of dropping
out. Being ranked highly in a peer group reduces women’s probability of dropping out, whereas it does
not affect men’s dropout probability. Moreover, high school GPA becomes insignificant for women
when my measure of peer group rank is included, whereas the opposite is true for men. This suggests
that women are guided by their relative ability levels and men are guided by their absolute ability
levels. These results are well in line my other findings and also support the BFLPE interpretation.
The interpretations of my results, however, are obviously only suggestions from among a number of
possible explanations.
First and foremost, this paper adds to our knowledge of the nexus between peer group quality
and the propensity to dropping out of university. Overall, my results raise the question of whether
universities, in order to improve performance and reduce dropout rates, should focus more on group
formation and social interaction among students. My results also open the way for a discussion of how
to handle the fact that women’s probability of dropping out increases with the academic quality of their
peers. In particular, my results suggest that greater awareness of women’s academic potential might
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reduce dropouts. However, more information is needed before we can fully understand the implications
and drivers of these results. The results presented in this paper should be treated as informative and as
an encouragement to further investigation of why students drop out. In particular, the interpretations
offered in this paper should be investigated in depth by means of, for instance, survey analysis and
experimental approaches.
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Appendix A Figures and Summary Statistics
Figure A.1: Histogram of High School GPA Across First Year Pass and Fail Students
- Sample Pooled over Enrollment Years
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Note: In order to comply with the discretion rules of Statistic Denmark, I have excluded observations with high school GPA above 10.5.
Table A.1: Summary Statistic Across Enrollment Years
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
First year dropout 0.24 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.19
(0.43) (0.40) (0.36) (0.32) (0.36) (0.38) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39)
𝐴−𝑖 8.20 8.27 8.32 8.30 8.33 8.30 8.34 8.26 8.40
(0.17) (0.16) (0.11) (0.10) (0.20) (0.11) (0.16) (0.20) (0.14)
Initial class size 28.10 31.72 33.99 33.66 37.53 39.14 38.42 38.53 37.92
(2.55) (2.03) (2.19) (2.74) (2.21) (3.00) (2.83) (2.52) (2.96)
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝐻𝑆 8.18 8.27 8.31 8.30 8.31 8.28 8.33 8.26 8.39
(0.79) (0.84) (0.85) (0.77) (0.80) (0.76) (0.80) (0.81) (0.77)
Woman 0.28 0.27 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.30 0.28
(0.45) (0.45) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.48) (0.48) (0.46) (0.45)
N 486 424 455 458 497 511 508 502 499
Note: The sample includes Danes that enrolled in bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS between 1996 and 2004.
Means are reported, standard deviation in parenthesis
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Appendix B Additional Estimations
Table B.1: Regressing 𝐴−𝑖 on Controls - OLS Estimation
Identifying Assumption - Random Assignment
All Men Women
(1) (2) (3)
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝐻𝑆 -0.001 0.002 -0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Starting age -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Woman=1 -0.002
(0.003)
General high school=1 0.000 -0.000 0.005
Mother’s education:
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012)
Mandatory edu. -0.012 -0.008 -0.019
(0.013) (0.015) (0.023)
General High School -0.014 -0.010 -0.024
(0.014) (0.019) (0.024)
Business High School -0.006 0.011 -0.048
(0.028) (0.037) (0.037)
Professional Qualifications -0.022* -0.022 -0.023
(0.013) (0.015) (0.023)
Short Tertiary -0.012 -0.006 -0.019
(0.017) (0.019) (0.026)
Medium tertiary -0.010 -0.012 -0.002
(0.013) (0.015) (0.022)
Bachelor -0.070** -0.062 -0.072
(0.031) (0.045) (0.046)
Master’s or above -0.019 -0.022 -0.010
(0.015) (0.020) (0.024)
Father’s education:
Mandatory edu. 0.014 0.003 0.037**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.017)
General High School 0.017 0.003 0.045*
(0.011) (0.013) (0.024)
Business High School 0.012 0.002 0.023
(0.019) (0.025) (0.024)
Professional Qualifications 0.007 0.003 0.018
(0.008) (0.010) (0.015)
Short Tertiary -0.005 0.001 -0.022
(0.014) (0.017) (0.021)
Medium tertiary 0.006 -0.003 0.023
(0.010) (0.011) (0.016)
Bachelor 0.001 -0.010 0.026
(0.016) (0.021) (0.032)
Master’s or above 0.011 0.007 0.017
(0.011) (0.012) (0.017)
Location:
Jutland=1 -0.014 -0.020 -0.005
(0.011) (0.013) (0.019)
Fyn and Bornholm=1 0.008 0.008 0.001
(0.015) (0.018) (0.025)
Copenhagen=1 -0.002 -0.001 -0.007
(0.008) (0.010) (0.015)
Greater Copenhagen=1 -0.004 -0.014* 0.015
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013)
Frederiksborg=1 -0.012 -0.011 -0.018
(0.007) (0.009) (0.014)
Adj. R-squared 0.144 0.148 0.132
𝑝1 0.809 0.990 0.103
𝑝2 0.452 0.520 0.378
No. obs. 4340 2998 1342
Note: Dependent variable is average peer ability level, 𝐴−𝑖. In all the regressions I have included cohort-fixed effects. Parental
reference groups is the ones with missing information. 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 are the 𝑝-values from the test of joint significance of the father’s
and mother’s educational characteristics, respectively. Reference group for parental education is the group with missing values.
The excluded location group is the rest of Zealand. Standard errors are clustered by peer group and reported in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes Danes who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business economics at
CBS between 1996 and 2004.
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B.1 Estimations With and Without Controls
Table B.2: Probability of Dropping Out - Probit Estimation
Estimations With and Without Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample:
Share of high ability peers 0.215** 0.217**
(0.092) (0.092)
Share of low ability peers 0.105 0.101
(0.094) (0.095)
𝐴−𝑖 0.088* 0.076
(0.048) (0.048)
𝑆𝐷−𝑖 0.062 0.050
(0.066) (0.070)
Initial class male share -0.116 -0.193 -0.138 -0.218* -0.133 -0.213*
(0.117) (0.118) (0.125) (0.122) (0.119) (0.120)
Initial class size 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Controls included: No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 4340 4340 4340 4340 4340 4340
Only men:
Share of high ability peers 0.091 0.106
(0.094) (0.097)
Share of low ability peers 0.111 0.105
(0.106) (0.106)
𝐴−𝑖 0.031 0.019
(0.054) (0.051)
𝑆𝐷−𝑖 0.055 0.050
(0.069) (0.072)
Initial class male share -0.088 -0.111 -0.099 -0.123 -0.098 -0.121
(0.130) (0.124) (0.136) (0.128) (0.132) (0.126)
Initial class size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Controls included: No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2998 2998 2998 2998 2998 2998
Only Women:
Share of high ability peers 0.507*** 0.517***
(0.164) (0.169)
Share of low ability peers 0.071 0.086
(0.150) (0.157)
𝐴−𝑖 0.226*** 0.222***
(0.078) (0.082)
𝑆𝐷−𝑖 0.092 0.069
(0.106) (0.115)
Initial class male share -0.441** -0.384* -0.517** -0.465** -0.481** -0.433**
(0.209) (0.213) (0.215) (0.217) (0.217) (0.221)
Initial class size 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010** 0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Controls included: No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1342 1342 1342 1342 1342 1342
Note: Probit estimation. The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the student dropped out during the first year. Average marginal
effects (AMEs) are reported. When computing AMEs for dummy variables, I report the effect from the discrete change from 0 to 1. In columns (2),
(4), and (6) I have included the same controls as in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered by peer group and reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes Danes who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS between 1996 and 2004.
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B.2 Robustness - Additional Estimations
Table B.3: Robustness: Placebo Estimation
Probit - Drop out equation OLS - Performance equation
All Men Women All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.086 0.037 -0.293 -0.096 -0.121 -0.013
(0.167) (0.204) (0.297) (0.101) (0.122) (0.182)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.069 0.088 -0.302 0.037 0.100 -0.077
(0.165) (0.200) (0.292) (0.099) (0.119) (0.175)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.382** -0.528*** -0.126 -0.238** -0.201 -0.308*
(0.162) (0.203) (0.274) (0.100) (0.123) (0.176)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.032 0.196 -0.225 -0.100 -0.120 -0.015
(0.158) (0.201) (0.255) (0.094) (0.115) (0.165)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.314* -0.283 -0.447 -0.030 0.057 -0.200
(0.171) (0.210) (0.305) (0.101) (0.120) (0.185)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.136 0.058 -0.530* -0.099 -0.010 -0.251
(0.170) (0.211) (0.296) (0.102) (0.122) (0.190)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.316* -0.097 -0.792** -0.031 0.097 -0.380*
(0.184) (0.224) (0.329) (0.115) (0.137) (0.216)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.131 0.208 -0.034 -0.133 -0.128 -0.115
(0.181) (0.219) (0.317) (0.112) (0.134) (0.206)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.068 0.009 -0.230 -0.041 -0.087 0.083
(0.176) (0.213) (0.315) (0.107) (0.130) (0.186)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.094 -0.176 0.098 -0.075 -0.117 0.020
(0.177) (0.214) (0.318) (0.110) (0.131) (0.210)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.042 0.253 -0.336 -0.099 -0.199 0.130
(0.171) (0.212) (0.297) (0.106) (0.127) (0.192)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.047 0.146 -0.059 -0.141 -0.045 -0.391**
(0.165) (0.201) (0.296) (0.099) (0.118) (0.185)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.275 0.392* 0.113 -0.030 -0.038 -0.034
(0.183) (0.229) (0.311) (0.110) (0.136) (0.190)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.124 -0.110 -0.148 -0.036 -0.009 -0.106
(0.153) (0.186) (0.275) (0.092) (0.110) (0.167)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.189 -0.199 -0.108 0.091 0.015 0.309*
(0.155) (0.190) (0.268) (0.094) (0.113) (0.170)
4340 2998 1342 3562 2493 1069
Note: Probit and OLS estimation. In columns (1)-(3) the dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the student dropped out during the
first year and in columns (4)-(6) the dependent variable is first-year GPA. Main coefficients and not AME are reported in columns (1)-(3). In all
estimations I have included the same controls as in Table 2. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p <
0.1. The sample includes Danes who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS between 1996 and 2004. My artificial peer
groups consist of 35 students.
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Table B.4: Robustness: Placebo Estimation
Probit - Drop out equation OLS - Performance equation
All Men Women All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.224 -0.380* 0.077 0.030 0.046 -0.039
(0.163) (0.202) (0.278) (0.099) (0.120) (0.176)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.206 0.233 0.076 -0.019 -0.030 0.016
(0.154) (0.188) (0.276) (0.090) (0.106) (0.173)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.229 -0.282 -0.039 0.017 0.044 -0.079
(0.177) (0.219) (0.301) (0.106) (0.130) (0.188)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.074 0.153 -0.095 -0.104 -0.022 -0.306*
(0.145) (0.177) (0.253) (0.085) (0.101) (0.159)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.151 -0.050 -0.337 0.047 0.041 0.057
(0.157) (0.192) (0.279) (0.093) (0.114) (0.164)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.030 -0.188 0.488* -0.030 -0.106 0.173
(0.165) (0.204) (0.288) (0.100) (0.120) (0.185)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.094 0.139 -0.077 0.126 0.104 0.227
(0.163) (0.199) (0.289) (0.099) (0.119) (0.182)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.166 0.230 0.014 -0.047 -0.082 -0.000
(0.168) (0.208) (0.290) (0.101) (0.124) (0.178)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.062 -0.056 -0.149 -0.130 -0.199* 0.018
(0.139) (0.173) (0.240) (0.084) (0.102) (0.152)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.170 -0.007 -0.523 -0.082 -0.129 -0.003
(0.175) (0.210) (0.318) (0.106) (0.125) (0.203)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.154 0.167 0.162 -0.101 -0.168 0.069
(0.175) (0.211) (0.309) (0.109) (0.134) (0.187)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.030 0.080 -0.217 0.058 0.067 -0.012
(0.175) (0.213) (0.314) (0.106) (0.127) (0.194)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.496*** 0.474** 0.554* 0.032 0.005 0.168
(0.182) (0.224) (0.323) (0.112) (0.134) (0.213)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.273* 0.423** 0.025 -0.046 0.065 -0.352**
(0.151) (0.185) (0.265) (0.088) (0.106) (0.160)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.006 -0.018 -0.003 0.179* 0.158 0.231
(0.178) (0.220) (0.306) (0.105) (0.127) (0.191)
4340 2998 1342 3562 2493 1069
Note: Probit and OLS estimation. In columns (1)-(3) the dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the student dropped out during the
first year and in columns (4)-(6) the dependent variable is first-year GPA. Main coefficients and not AME are reported in columns (1)-(3). In all
estimations I have included the same controls as in Table 2. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p <
0.1. The sample includes Danes who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS between 1996 and 2004. My artificial peer
groups consist of 35 students.
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Table B.5: Robustness: Placebo Estimation
Probit - Drop out equation OLS - Performance equation
All Men Women All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.192 -0.170 -0.281 -0.032 0.027 -0.161
(0.148) (0.184) (0.261) (0.086) (0.104) (0.154)
Observations 3703 2520 1153 3068 2136 932
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.103 -0.229 0.034 -0.026 -0.010 -0.113
(0.151) (0.187) (0.262) (0.091) (0.110) (0.163)
Observations 3701 2521 1150 3065 2136 929
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.184 0.124 0.308 -0.026 -0.109 0.138
(0.149) (0.190) (0.245) (0.088) (0.106) (0.160)
Observations 3698 2517 1150 3066 2136 930
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.013 -0.101 0.179 -0.087 -0.180 0.112
(0.152) (0.190) (0.259) (0.090) (0.110) (0.164)
Observations 3697 2513 1153 3062 2129 933
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.002 -0.147 0.276 -0.060 -0.189* 0.237
(0.153) (0.193) (0.259) (0.089) (0.107) (0.155)
Observations 3697 2518 1150 3068 2138 930
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.096 -0.047 0.448* -0.155* -0.142 -0.184
(0.146) (0.180) (0.255) (0.085) (0.103) (0.153)
Observations 3691 2512 1148 3060 2132 928
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.154 0.135 0.163 0.030 -0.053 0.218
(0.156) (0.193) (0.266) (0.090) (0.109) (0.164)
Observations 3692 2517 1144 3062 2134 928
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.183 0.374** -0.175 -0.046 -0.047 -0.021
(0.149) (0.186) (0.252) (0.086) (0.104) (0.161)
Observations 3703 2523 1149 3067 2138 929
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.273* -0.227 -0.390 0.049 -0.010 0.143
(0.150) (0.189) (0.251) (0.086) (0.105) (0.149)
Observations 3700 2519 1150 3066 2134 932
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.013 -0.153 0.344 0.072 0.034 0.170
(0.154) (0.189) (0.264) (0.086) (0.101) (0.162)
Observations 3705 2526 1148 3071 2141 930
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.186 0.240 0.165 0.074 0.067 0.118
(0.152) (0.184) (0.278) (0.087) (0.102) (0.166)
Observations 3692 2516 1145 3059 2132 927
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.103 0.131 0.005 0.034 0.001 0.111
(0.150) (0.187) (0.266) (0.087) (0.105) (0.158)
Observations 3694 2515 1148 3063 2135 928
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 0.146 0.221 -0.055 -0.020 -0.027 -0.065
(0.148) (0.182) (0.263) (0.089) (0.110) (0.156)
Observations 3698 2518 1149 3063 2134 929
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.122 -0.140 -0.119 0.050 0.056 0.049
(0.147) (0.182) (0.246) (0.088) (0.106) (0.161)
Observations 3687 2512 1144 3057 2131 926
𝐴𝑃−𝑖 -0.132 -0.030 -0.378 -0.050 -0.113 0.039
(0.150) (0.182) (0.272) (0.087) (0.103) (0.168)
Observations 3698 2523 1144 3063 2137 926
Note: Probit and OLS estimation. In columns (1)-(3) the dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the student dropped out during the
first year and in columns (4)-(6) the dependent variable is first-year GPA. Main coefficients and not AME are reported in columns (1)-(3). In all
estimations I have included the same controls as in Table 2. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p <
0.1. The sample includes Danes who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS between 1996 and 2004.
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Table B.6: Robustness: Alternative Measure of Peer Quality
Probit - Drop out probability OLS - Education performance
All Men Women All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Peer effects:
𝑞ℎ𝑇75,−𝑖 0.076** 0.036 0.182*** 0.096 0.053 0.253
(0.030) (0.032) (0.054) (0.098) (0.100) (0.158)
Initial class male share -0.197 -0.115 -0.383* -0.075 -0.123 0.100
(0.121) (0.128) (0.210) (0.435) (0.455) (0.594)
Initial class size 0.003 0.001 0.010*** 0.004 0.002 0.012
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
Personal characteristics:
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝐻𝑆 -0.071*** -0.078*** -0.047*** 0.669*** 0.677*** 0.647***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.019) (0.022) (0.032)
Starting age 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.058*** 0.054*** 0.063***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019)
General high school=1 -0.034** -0.037** -0.031 0.255*** 0.225*** 0.338***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.027) (0.030) (0.035) (0.061)
Woman=1 0.053*** -0.053*
(0.013) (0.032)
Jutland=1 -0.031* -0.027 -0.039 0.201*** 0.285*** 0.043
(0.018) (0.023) (0.032) (0.056) (0.073) (0.096)
Fyn and Bornholm=1 -0.051* -0.049* -0.062 0.244*** 0.257*** 0.264*
(0.029) (0.030) (0.057) (0.073) (0.079) (0.135)
Copenhagen=1 -0.016 -0.018 -0.011 -0.105** -0.015 -0.312***
(0.020) (0.024) (0.036) (0.051) (0.063) (0.080)
Greater Copenhagen=1 -0.030** -0.028 -0.039 0.018 0.066 -0.075
(0.015) (0.019) (0.025) (0.040) (0.043) (0.079)
Frederiksborg=1 -0.011 -0.009 -0.014 0.090** 0.132*** -0.009
(0.017) (0.019) (0.032) (0.041) (0.045) (0.073)
Observations 4340 2998 1342 3562 2493 1069
Note: Probit and OLS estimation. Through columns (1)-(3) the dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the student dropped out during
the first year. Through columns (4)-(6) the dependent variable is first-year GPA. Average marginal effects. (AMEs) are reported in columns (1)-(3).
When computing AMEs for dummy variables, I report the effect from the discrete change from 0 to 1. I include dummies in all regressions to
control for educational length of the parents, cohort-fixed effects, and the average age and average age squared of the peer group, leave-out-mean.
The excluded location group is the rest of Zealand. Standard errors are clustered by peer group and reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p <
0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes Danes who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS between 1996 and 2004.
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Table B.7: Robustness: Probability of Dropping Out - Linear Probability Model
All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6)
Peer effects:
Share of high ability peers 0.216** 0.101 0.512***
(0.091) (0.096) (0.172)
Share of low ability peers 0.099 0.104 0.074
(0.097) (0.110) (0.153)
𝐴−𝑖 0.081 0.024 0.223***
(0.049) (0.053) (0.083)
𝑆𝐷−𝑖 0.048 0.044 0.067
(0.071) (0.074) (0.113)
Initial class male share -0.181 -0.203* -0.197* -0.091 -0.102 -0.101 -0.393* -0.456** -0.418*
(0.113) (0.117) (0.115) (0.122) (0.125) (0.123) (0.206) (0.206) (0.212)
Initial class size 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.011*** 0.009** 0.009**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Personal characteristics:
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝐻𝑆 -0.071*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.048***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Starting age 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
General high school=1 -0.037** -0.037** -0.037** -0.041** -0.041** -0.041** -0.031 -0.031 -0.030
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Woman=1 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.051***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Jutland=1 -0.033 -0.034* -0.034* -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 -0.036 -0.039 -0.039
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
Fyn and Bornholm=1 -0.054* -0.054* -0.053* -0.053 -0.053 -0.053 -0.056 -0.060 -0.058
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067)
Copenhagen=1 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.010 -0.006 -0.009
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Greater Copenhagen=1 -0.030* -0.030* -0.030* -0.029 -0.030 -0.029 -0.037 -0.038 -0.037
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Frederiksborg=1 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.014 -0.018
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
Observations 4340 4340 4340 2998 2998 2998 1342 1342 1342
Note: Linear Probability Model. The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the student dropped out during the first year. I include
dummies in all regressions to control for educational length of the parents, cohort-fixed effects, and the average age and average age squared of
the peer group, leave-out-mean. The excluded location group is the rest of Zealand. Standard errors are clustered by peer group and reported in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes Danes who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS
between 1996 and 2004.
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Table B.8: Probability of Dropping Out - Probit Estimation
Outliers Excluded
All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6)
Peer effects:
Share of high ability peers 0.229*** 0.129 0.527***
(0.083) (0.094) (0.159)
Share of low ability peers 0.073 0.076 0.083
(0.087) (0.103) (0.146)
𝐴−𝑖 0.092** 0.042 0.222***
(0.046) (0.051) (0.080)
𝑆𝐷−𝑖 0.049 0.032 0.127
(0.065) (0.073) (0.100)
Initial class male share -0.209* -0.231** -0.227** -0.104 -0.113 -0.114 -0.427** -0.511** -0.474**
(0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.119) (0.120) (0.119) (0.215) (0.210) (0.218)
Initial class size 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.007* 0.006 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Personal characteristics:
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝐻𝑆 -0.070*** -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.055***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Starting age 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
General high school=1 -0.031** -0.031** -0.030** -0.033* -0.033* -0.033* -0.028 -0.028 -0.028
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Woman=1 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.046***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Jutland=1 -0.033* -0.033* -0.034* -0.026 -0.026 -0.027 -0.046 -0.047 -0.049
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Fyn and Bornholm=1 -0.044 -0.046 -0.044 -0.046 -0.047 -0.046 -0.035 -0.039 -0.034
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.058) (0.057) (0.059)
Copenhagen=1 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.016 -0.012 -0.015
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Greater Copenhagen=1 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.038 -0.039* -0.037
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Frederiksborg=1 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.028 -0.028 -0.031
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Observations 4201 4201 4201 2909 2909 2909 1292 1292 1292
Note: Probit estimation. The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the student dropped out during the first year. Average marginal
effects (AMEs) are reported. When computing AMEs for dummy variables, I report the effect from the discrete change from 0 to 1. I include
dummies in all regressions to control for educational length of the parents, cohort-fixed effects, and the average age and average age squared of
the peer group, leave-out-mean. The excluded location group is the rest of Zealand. Standard errors are clustered by peer group and reported in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes Danes who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS
between 1996 and 2004. I have excluded students who dropped out because they transferred to other business programs.
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Table B.9: Robustness: Probability of Dropping Out - Probit estimation
Full Sample
All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6)
Peer effects:
Share of high ability peers 0.193** 0.096 0.420***
(0.093) (0.098) (0.156)
Share of low ability peers 0.097 0.096 0.110
(0.090) (0.102) (0.142)
𝐴−𝑖 0.079* 0.033 0.182**
(0.047) (0.050) (0.075)
Std in peer ability 0.058 0.054 0.083
(0.069) (0.075) (0.099)
Initial class male share -0.195* -0.219* -0.214* -0.128 -0.139 -0.138 -0.341* -0.420** -0.387*
(0.117) (0.120) (0.118) (0.130) (0.133) (0.130) (0.201) (0.200) (0.207)
Initial class size 0.004* 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Personal characteristics:
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝐻𝑆 -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.052***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Starting age 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
General high school=1 -0.031** -0.030** -0.030** -0.032** -0.032** -0.032** -0.025 -0.024 -0.024
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Woman=1 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.047***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Jutland=1 -0.028 -0.029 -0.029 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.043 -0.045 -0.045
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
Fyn and Bornholm=1 -0.049 -0.050* -0.048 -0.046 -0.047 -0.046 -0.061 -0.065 -0.060
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.058) (0.057) (0.059)
Copenhagen=1 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Greater Copenhagen=1 -0.022 -0.023 -0.022 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.040 -0.041* -0.039
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Frederiksborg=1 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.023 -0.022 -0.025
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Danish=1 0.010 0.009 0.008 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 0.069* 0.065* 0.065*
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038)
Observations 4555 4555 4555 3124 3124 3124 1431 1431 1431
Note: Probit estimation. The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the student dropped out during the first year. Average marginal
effects (AMEs) are reported. When computing AMEs for dummy variables, I report the effect from the discrete change from 0 to 1. In all regressions
I include cohort-fixed effects and the average age and average age squared of the peer group, leave-out-mean. The excluded location group is the
rest of Zealand. Standard errors are clustered by peer group and reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes
Danes and non-Danes who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS between 1996 and 2004.
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Table B.10: Robustness: Educational Performance - OLS Estimation
Full Sample
All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Peer effects:
Share of high ability peers -0.095 -0.152 0.045
(0.300) (0.297) (0.471)
Share of low ability peers -0.430 -0.335 -0.618
(0.332) (0.348) (0.531)
𝐴−𝑖 0.104 0.045 0.224
(0.151) (0.149) (0.256)
Std in peer ability -0.153 -0.192 -0.035
(0.216) (0.219) (0.334)
Initial class male share -0.188 -0.149 -0.148 -0.280 -0.251 -0.253 0.042 0.100 0.134
(0.443) (0.442) (0.442) (0.455) (0.453) (0.454) (0.604) (0.601) (0.600)
Initial class size 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.009 0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Personal characteristics:
ols1 ols11 ols111 ols2 ols22 ols222 ols3 ols33 ols333
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝐻𝑆 0.655*** 0.655*** 0.655*** 0.677*** 0.676*** 0.677*** 0.599*** 0.600*** 0.599***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
Starting age 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.038* 0.038* 0.037*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
General high school=1 0.270*** 0.269*** 0.269*** 0.251*** 0.250*** 0.251*** 0.329*** 0.325*** 0.327***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Woman=1 -0.054* -0.055* -0.055*
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Jutland=1 0.223*** 0.226*** 0.223*** 0.294*** 0.297*** 0.293*** 0.090 0.092 0.091
(0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097)
Fyn and Bornholm=1 0.259*** 0.260*** 0.259*** 0.256*** 0.257*** 0.256*** 0.298** 0.301** 0.299**
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.133) (0.134) (0.133)
Copenhagen=1 -0.117** -0.116** -0.117** -0.031 -0.029 -0.031 -0.324*** -0.325*** -0.329***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.083) (0.082) (0.083)
Greater Copenhagen=1 0.015 0.017 0.015 0.062 0.063 0.060 -0.074 -0.071 -0.070
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078)
Frederiksborg=1 0.100** 0.101** 0.098** 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.139*** 0.008 0.008 0.004
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
Danish=1 0.340*** 0.343*** 0.340*** 0.290*** 0.292*** 0.289*** 0.402*** 0.408*** 0.406***
(0.080) (0.081) (0.080) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.131) (0.132) (0.131)
Adj. R-squared 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.322 0.322 0.322 0.263 0.263 0.262
Observations 3738 3738 3738 2594 2594 2594 1144 1144 1144
Note: OLS estimation. The dependent variable is first-year GPA. In all regressions I include cohort-fixed effects and the average age and average
age squared of the peer group, leave-out-mean. The excluded location group is the rest of Zealand. Standard errors are clustered by peer group
and reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes Danes and non-Danes who enrolled in the bachelor’s program
in business economics at CBS between 1996 and 2004.
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B.3 Robustness: Heckman Sample Selection
Table B.11: Robustness: Educational Performance
Maximum likelihood Heckman Sample Selection Estimation
Maximum likelihood Heckman Sample Selection Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Peer effects:
Share of high ability peers -0.159 -0.123 0.743
(0.293) (0.294) (0.525)
Share of low ability peers -0.517* -0.402 -0.753
(0.296) (0.316) (0.529)
𝐴−𝑖 0.104 0.077 0.344
(0.142) (0.144) (0.239)
Std in peer ability -0.154 -0.153 -0.086
(0.193) (0.210) (0.330)
Initial class male share -0.002 0.051 0.052 -0.071 -0.035 -0.040 -0.422 0.081 0.174
(0.455) (0.454) (0.454) (0.486) (0.487) (0.487) (0.693) (0.621) (0.684)
Initial class size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.022* 0.010 0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Personal characteristics:
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝐻𝑆 0.721*** 0.722*** 0.721*** 0.746*** 0.746*** 0.744*** 0.599*** 0.654*** 0.656***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.037) (0.034) (0.045)
Starting age 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.069*** 0.062*** 0.060***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
General high school=1 0.282*** 0.280*** 0.281*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.328*** 0.346*** 0.353***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.063) (0.060) (0.060)
Woman=1 -0.090** -0.092** -0.092**
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Jutland=1 0.224*** 0.227*** 0.225*** 0.311*** 0.313*** 0.310*** 0.006 0.050 0.052
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076) (0.098) (0.095) (0.101)
Fyn and Bornholm=1 0.283*** 0.285*** 0.284*** 0.305*** 0.306*** 0.305*** 0.199 0.269** 0.269**
(0.082) (0.081) (0.082) (0.086) (0.085) (0.085) (0.140) (0.132) (0.136)
Copenhagen=1 -0.094* -0.092* -0.094* 0.002 0.004 0.002 -0.324*** -0.308*** -0.313***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.090) (0.079) (0.080)
Greater Copenhagen=1 0.038 0.040 0.038 0.092* 0.093* 0.090* -0.115 -0.070 -0.065
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.080) (0.080) (0.085)
Frederiksborg=1 0.100** 0.100** 0.098** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.140*** -0.031 -0.008 -0.013
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.080) (0.073) (0.076)
Observations 4340 4340 4340 2998 2998 2998 1342 1342 1342
Note: Maximum likelihood estimation of a Heckman sample selection model. The dependent variable is first-year GPA. I have included dummies in
all regressions to control for educational length of the parents, cohort-fixed effects, and the average age and average age squared of the peer group,
leave-out-mean. The excluded location group is the rest of Zealand. Standard errors are clustered by peer group and reported in parentheses. ***p
< 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes Danes who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business economics at CBS between 1996 and
2004.
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Table B.12: Robustness: Educational Performance
Maximum likelihood Heckman Sample Selection Estimation
Maximum likelihood Heckman Sample Selection Estimation
High ability students Low ability students
Al Men Women All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of high ability peers -0.382 -0.396 0.385 0.493 0.045 1.121
(0.365) (0.383) (0.692) (0.414) (0.437) (0.788)
Share of low ability peers -0.647* -0.660* -0.648 -0.247 -0.182 -1.099*
(0.335) (0.396) (0.677) (0.448) (0.488) (0.655)
Initial class male share 0.254 -0.073 0.241 -0.410 -0.203 -1.637*
(0.523) (0.543) (0.885) (0.561) (0.627) (0.939)
Woman=1 -0.114*** 0.026
(0.043) (0.048)
𝐴−𝑖 0.084 0.121 0.424 0.076 -0.063 1.036***
(0.139) (0.162) (0.366) (0.241) (0.245) (0.385)
Initial class male share 0.293 -0.064 0.248 -0.322 -0.188 -1.690*
(0.530) (0.547) (0.895) (0.580) (0.621) (0.922)
Woman=1 -0.113*** -0.040
(0.044) (0.052)
Observations 2061 1389 672 2279 1609 670
Note: Maximum likelihood estimation of a Heckman sample selection model. The dependent variable is first-year GPA. In all estimations I have
included the same controls as in Table 6. High-ability students are defined as students with high school GPAs above the cohort median, and low-
ability students as students with high school GPAs below or equal to the cohort median. Standard errors are clustered by peer group and reported
in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes Danes who enrolled in the bachelor’s program in business economics at
CBS between 1996 and 2004.
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Appendix C Illustration of The Reflection Problem
Given random assignment the educational production function that depends on peers’ performance
look like this
𝑌 𝑔𝑖 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑋𝑖 + 𝜃2𝑌
𝑔
𝑗 + 𝜃3?¯?
𝑔
𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖 (1)
To simplify I consider the system for two individuals, i=1,2. Thus, each peer group is only one person.
To see the problem of reflection consider equation 2 and 3.
𝑌 𝑔1 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑋1 + 𝜃2𝑌
𝑔
2 + 𝜃3𝑋
𝑔
2 + 𝜖1 (2)
𝑌 𝑔2 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑋2 + 𝜃2𝑌
𝑔
1 + 𝜃3𝑋
𝑔
1 + 𝜖2 (3)
Reducing the system by plugging Equation 3 into Equation 2 it becomes
(1− 𝜃22)𝑌 𝑔1 = 𝜃0(1 + 𝜃2) + 𝜃1𝜃2𝑋2 + 𝜃2𝜃3𝑋1 + 𝜃2𝜖2 + 𝜃3𝑋2 + 𝜖1 (4)
⇔ (5)
𝑌 𝑔1 =
𝜃0(1 + 𝜃2)
(1− 𝜃22)
+
(𝜃1 + 𝜃2𝜃3)𝑋1
(1− 𝜃22)
+
(𝜃3 + 𝜃2𝜃1)𝑋2
(1− 𝜃22)
+
𝜃2𝜖2 + 𝜖1
(1− 𝜃22)
(6)
Even if a reduced form of this equation is estimated, the underlying peer effects is not identified because
there is only 3 reduced form parameters to be estimated and 4 underlying peer effect parameters.
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1 Introduction
The importance of school peers is widely recognized (Sacerdote, 2011; Epple and Romano, 2011), and
many avenues have been discussed by which individual behavior is influenced by peers (e.g., Sacerdote,
2001; Kremer and Levy, 2008; De Giorgi et al., 2010; Carrell et al., 2011; Ali and Dwyer, 2011;
Dahl et al., 2014). The extensive literature on peer effects in education has been most successful in
documenting the role of peers for school performance and early schooling choices; however, only few
studies are concerned with peer effects in higher education decisions (Lyle, 2007; De Giorgi et al., 2010;
Ost, 2010; Poldin et al., 2015). If peer effects are also important in postgraduate decisions, then these
decisions may have adverse consequences for educational performance and labor market outcomes if
they are not in line with students’ relative abilities. Peer effects in schooling choices may therefore be
an important explanation for why such decisions are sometimes found to be inefficient (Rochat and
Demeulemeester, 2001; Robst, 2007).
In this paper, we use a unique administrative dataset of students enrolled at the largest business
school in Denmark, Copenhagen Business School (CBS), to cast light on peer influence in postgraduate
choices and the subsequent consequences. The data track 10 cohorts of students from their time
of enrollment in the same undergraduate program until they finish their two-year master’s degree
approximately five years later. Unique to the Danish schooling system, undergraduate students are
guaranteed enrollment in one of the master’s degree programs offered at the institution in which they
hold their bachelor’s degree. More than 90 percent of the undergraduate students at CBS choose
to continue in one of the offered two-year master’s degree programs. During the bachelor’s program,
students attend mandatory lectures and smaller exercise classes in randomly assigned groups. Students
are assigned to exercise classes based on institutional features at the start of the first year. Similar to
other studies in the literature, we consider these classes as our measure of peer groups (e.g., De Giorgi
et al., 2012; Booij et al., 2015; Feld and Zölitz, 2015). Because the allocation into these groups is
random, the standard problem of endogeneity in peer-group formation is overcome by construction.
We combine these data with high quality Danish register data to obtain information on parental
characteristics and students’ subsequent performance in the labor market.
The empirical analysis is divided into two parts. First we look for evidence of positive and negative
assortative matching along multiple dimensions, including matching on peers, using dyadic regressions.
An estimating equation is said to be dyadic if each observation corresponds to a pair of students. This
is in contrast to standard methods, where each observation corresponds to a single student. Positive
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assortative matching means that two students who are more similar are more likely to enroll in the
same master’s program and vice versa for negative assortative matching. Using information about all
possible pairs of students, we investigate whether pairs of students enroll in the same master’s degree
program based on peer effects or because they resemble each other along other dimensions such as
gender and revealed abilities.1 We also test whether there are differing impacts of peers depending
on students’ observable characteristics. Essentially, we test whether peer influence is stronger between
more similar students.
Second, since we have information about students’ postgraduate performance and first job after
graduation; we investigate whether peers can divert students away from a specific master’s degree in
which they have a relative ability advantage with adverse consequences for educational performance
and labor market outcomes. In order to do that, we create different measures indicating whether
students followed their peers, their potential (measured by revealed abilities during first year), both
peers and potential, or none of the three.
We find evidence of positive assortative matching: Students randomly assigned to the same group
the first year of undergraduate studies are more likely to enroll in the same master’s program three
years later. However, the significance of the effect differ across years and is significant at the 10
percent level for our main year of interest. This result is stronger for different definitions of peers
and holds for placebo peer groups. In particular, we find that assortative matching among peers is
significantly stronger between individuals with similar revealed abilities in mandatory courses in the
first year of undergraduate studies. Contrary to studies analyzing peer influence on performance, we
find no consistent heterogeneous effects by gender or age prior to enrollment.
In the second part of the analysis, we find that 21 percent of the students on average followed their
peers into a master’s program not in line with their relative abilities and 17 percent neither followed
their peers nor their potential. However, we find only limited evidence of adverse consequences from not
following one’s potential on the probability to drop out, students’ final GPA, and subsequent starting
wage. We conclude that following peers are not necessarily inefficient, as peers are likely to help
overcome the negative effects of not following ones revealed abilities. Also, as we show that students
are more likely to follow peers with whom they share similar characteristics, this might damper the
potential adverse effect from following peers.
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we introduce an econometric method-
ology, dyadic regression, normally used to study social network formation in development economics
1We measure revealed abilities using students officially reported high school grade point average (GPA), first-year
GPA or/and bachelor’s GPA.
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(e.g., Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Aker, 2010; Beck et al., 2015). This method of dyadic regression
can be compared to the gravity model used in the international trade literature to model trade flows
between pairs of countries (dyads).2 Typically, when estimating peer effects, studies are interested
in determining the influence from the average performance (or behavior) of the peer group on the
performance of an individual. The endogeneity that occurs, also called the reflection problem, is often
handled by replacing the measure of group behavior with a predetermined measure of behavior. For
instance, Lavy et al. (2012) use prior educational performance, Kremer and Levy (2008) use students
drinking habits prior to college, while Carrell et al. (2011) apply students’ fitness score prior to en-
rollment as proxy for current behavior of the group. The standard approach is not applicable when
studying master’s degree choice due to the absence of a reliable predetermined proxy for the peer
group’s choice of master’s degree. Rather, the dyadic regression model enables us to identify whether
randomly assigned university peers assort into the same master’s degree programs.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature that examines differences in sensitivity to peer
influence across groups. This literature has mostly focused on gender and race in peer influence on
performance. Some have found that male students are more sensitive to peer ability (Goethals, 2001;
Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003; Griffith and Rask, 2014), that low-ability students are helped most
by higher-ability roommates (e.g., Griffith and Rask, 2014) and that peer effects are stronger intra-race
(Hoxby, 2000). Others disagree and find evidence that female students are more affected than male
students by both school interventions and peer effects (Arcidiacono and Nicholson, 2005; Anderson,
2008; Angrist et al., 2009; Lavy et al., 2012). We complement the existing literature by looking for
evidence of heterogeneous peer influence in postgraduate studies across a larger range of individual
characteristics and in particular across revealed abilities.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the institutional structure of the
Copenhagen Business School and the allocation of students into peer groups. In Section 3 we develop
our empirical estimation strategy and discuss identification before the data are described in Section
4, together with a test of our identification strategy. Section 5 presents the results of the analysis
on assortative matching in master’s degree choice, while Section 6 analyzes the adverse consequences
of following one’s peers on students’ drop-out probability, final master’s GPA, and subsequent labor
market outcomes. Section 7 concludes this paper.
2Other examples of the applicability of this method can be found in the broader economics literature as well as in
political science (e.g., Mayer and Puller, 2008; Lindgren et al., 2009; Comola and Mendola, 2015). The dyadic regression
approach was also applied to investigate choice of specialization in higher education in Russia (Poldin et al., 2015).
However, among other things, we use the method differently by considering positive and negative assortative matching
and by solving the endogeneity problem concerning peer selection.
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2 Institutional Details
The educational focus in this paper is on higher education (sometimes also referred to as tertiary,
post-secondary, or third-level education) offered by Copenhagen Business School (CBS), which is the
largest Danish public institution that specializes in business and economics. Higher education is taken
to include undergraduate and postgraduate education. We focus exclusively on one particular under-
graduate degree, namely the largest bachelor’s program offered by CBS called Business Economics.3
This degree takes three years to complete and is awarded with a Bachelor of Science (B.Sc.) in Business
Economics. After successful completion of the Business Economic bachelor’s program, students are
eligible for different master’s degrees (i.e. postgraduate education) offered at CBS and elsewhere. All
postgraduate degrees in Denmark take two years to complete. We follow the students through their
entire higher education study lifecycle from enrollment in Business Economics to the completion of
their master’s degree approximately five years later. The complete higher educational program offered
at CBS is illustrated in Figure 1. We follow 10 cohorts of students who were enrolled in the Business
Economics bachelor’s program in the period from 1995 to 2004. Unless otherwise stated, we distinguish
between cohorts by enrollment year in undergraduate studies.
Figure 1: Higher Education Structure at Copenhagen Business School
The bachelor’s program in Business Economics primarily consists of mandatory courses. The
3A total of 25 undergraduate programs was offered at CBS in 2015, and 25 percent of the undergraduate students
was enrolled in the Business Economics bachelor’s program.
184
program combines lectures and exercise classes. Lectures are a teaching session where an instructor,
typically a senior faculty member, presents the material of the course. Lectures normally take place in
auditoriums large enough to fit a full cohort of students.4 Exercise classes are practical sessions where
a teaching assistant solves problem sets and applied exercises with the students. The exercise classes
take place in smaller (peer) groups of the same students but the assignments to be solved and the
curriculum are the same across groups. In these exercises, the students are exposed to the curriculum
in more concrete ways and are likely to interact with other group members more intensely. Students
are assigned randomly into these smaller groups and have all their exercise classes with the same group
members throughout the three years of the bachelor’s program. Similar to other papers (e.g., De Giorgi
et al., 2012; Feld and Zölitz, 2015; Booij et al., 2015), we use these exercise groups as our preferred
measure of peer groups.
Class attendance and number of hours heavily influences with whom students spend most of their
time. In the first year of the bachelor’s program, the students have eight mandatory classes, corre-
sponding to four courses each semester. A semester is 12 weeks long. In the first semester, each course
on average consists of two lecture hours and 2 hours of exercise classes per week. Exercise classes start
one week later than the lectures as exercise classes solve assignments related to the topic addressed in
the lecture the preceding week. The number of lecture weeks as well as the number of exercise weeks
depends on the specific course. On average, each course is taught for 11 weeks and has 10 weeks of
exercise classes. Taken together, this means that students who finish the first year of the bachelor’s
in Business Economics within the prescribed period spend as much as 16 hours per week in the same
room.5 However, as for many higher educational programs, there is no attendance checking, meaning
that students are not forced to attend all classes. There is no official reporting on class attendance
at CBS, but it is the general perception that exercise classes are very popular as the students get to
interact and work with the curriculum in smaller forums.
It is custom in Denmark for undergraduate students to continue their postgraduate studies at the
same institution. Students who successfully complete the Business Economics bachelor’s program can
choose to progress and enroll in one of the offered master’s programs. In fact, students who finished
4During the first year some lectures are offered twice because of the large amount of students that does not fit into
one auditorium. While it is voluntary which of the two lectures the students attend, we expect students from the same
exercise class to be more likely to attend the same lectures as they have similar course schedules.
5These numbers are based on the course schedule for Business Economics the first semester in 2015. It was not
possible to obtain the course schedule for the cohort that enrolled in Business Economics in preceding years. However,
according to the student administration at CBS, the number of teaching hours has not changed substantially the last
20 years. If anything, the budgets for teaching have followed a downward trend and thus we consider the estimate to be
conservative. The courses taught the first semester include Managerial Economics, Microeconomics, Organization and
Statistics.
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their bachelor’s degree before 2008 were, by law, automatically guaranteed enrollment in one of the
programs.6 In the considered period between 1995 and 2004, more than 90 percent of all students who
graduated from the B.Sc. Business Economics program enrolled in one of the master’s degrees offered
by CBS. Students who did not continue into postgraduate studies at CBS either did not continue
studying or enrolled in a master’s degree program at another university in Denmark or abroad.
Over the period considered, the number of master’s degrees offered at CBS has varied. For instance,
the cohort enrolled in 1997 was free to choose between 13 different master’s programs—three years
later—whereas the 2001 cohort was offered 15 different master’s programs. Table A.1 in the appendix
lists the different master’s degree programs throughout the period 1998-2007 (matched with cohorts
enrolled in Business Economics from 1995 to 2004), the average bachelor’s GPA and the distribution
of students across these master’s programs.7
Students who continued to postgraduate education at CBS were assigned to different degree pro-
grams based on a ranking list of their top four preferred degrees. If the number of students with the
same first priority exceeded the number of available seats in that particular program, the selection was
based on a lottery approach. The number of students not assigned to their first priority is around
20-30 students per cohort. However, since the assignment into the remaining master’s degree programs
was done by lottery, there is no systematic sorting on the second best choice. This approach rules
out the possibility that students not assigned to their first priority will select another degree based on
where their peers were assigned. If the assignment to a master’s degree different from the students’
top priority is random, the results can be seen as lower bounds on the true absolute effect size.
2.1 Definition of Peer Groups
The definition of peers is based on students attending exercise classes throughout their bachelor studies.
Hence, the peer-group measure is meant to capture the network in which students interact academically
and socially. Since exercise classes take place among a smaller number of students (on average 24
students) and focus on solving assignments related to the curriculum discussed in the lectures, the
assumption that students interact with each other in class is plausible. Independently, the underlying
assumption, similar to other papers studying the importance of peer groups (for a list of studies see
6After 2007, students no longer had this legal right to be accepted into a master’s degree at CBS following their
bachelor’s in Business Economics. Student who enrolled in postgraduate studies after 2007 are excluded from the analysis.
7Some of the master’s degrees offered at CBS specifically target students that finish the Business Economic bachelor’s
program whereas other master’s degrees are intended for other bachelor’s programs offered at CBS. Less than 1.25 percent
of the students in our sample are registered with a master’s degree program not ment for students with a B.Sc. in Business
Economic. We exclude these students from our sample. As a robustness test, we investigate the sensitivity of our results
by using the entire sample.
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Epple and Romano, 2011), is that these interactions are fostered by class attendance.
The assignment criteria underlying the allocation of students into groups is based on gender, na-
tionality, and age. The objective of CBS is to make homogeneous groups by gender and nationality,
but heterogeneous groups in terms of students’ starting age. Older students are assigned to the same
group(s). These “older” groups have a higher average enrollment age and most likely contain students
who have spent time working or studying other subjects. Given that older students have more experi-
ence, the impact from peers in these groups might be either more or less important. In the empirical
analysis we therefore account for average age of the peer group by including peer-group fixed effects.
Though the assignment of students into peer groups is based on the aforementioned criteria, it does
not pose a problem in terms of self-selection.8 Rather, the assignment rule helps safeguard that peer
groups are homogeneous, which in turn ensures that we are not capturing a group-composition effect
in the subsequent empirical analysis.9
In order to investigate whether student’s choice of a master’s degree is driven by peer effects,
we assume that the institutionally constructed peer groups at enrollment contain the relevant set of
peers. Fortunately, the majority of students stay in the same group throughout their bachelor studies.
Under certain circumstances, however, individuals can be assigned to a new group. One reason for
reassignment is that the core group becomes too small as students drop out. In this case, the smaller
group is merged with an existing core group. This would result in an expansion of the existing peer
group, but would not force individuals to change their existing peers. Another reason for a change in
the peer group is that individual 𝑖 chooses to change core group during the bachelor studies. Only
under very limited circumstances are students allowed to change core group. They can do that only
if they (i) apply for an exemption to change peer group, and (ii) identify a member of the preferred
peer group willing to swap group with them. Changes in group composition can take place only in the
second and third year of the bachelor’s program.10
8The problem of self-selection emerges when students self-select into groups with peers that match their own ability
level (Manski, 1993).
9The supplementary material (Appendix B) to this paper provide descriptive statistics for individual groups across
a number of characteristics including individual and academic outcomes for students enrolled in undergraduate studies
for each study cohort. As expected, the peer groups are only systematically different when it comes to age.
10Some students might attend exercise classes in groups to which they are not officially assigned. Unfortunately, we
do not observe such unofficial changes in peer groups. However, we expect that these unofficial changes only happen in
the second or third year of the bachelor’s program, why it does not influence our measure of peer groups. We discuss
this further in Section 5.3.
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3 Choice of Master Program: Estimation Strategy
The empirical analysis of master’s degree choice is divided into two steps. We first investigate char-
acteristics associated with a higher probability of enrollment in a specific master’s degree (enrollment
regression) before turning to collocation analysis identifying presence of assortative matching (dyadic
regression). We begin with a standard but naive OLS estimation in order to build a bridge to our
preferred dyadic approach. If the naive results point toward some sort of peer effect, it adds additional
reasons to investigate this effect in more depth with a dyadic regression approach.
3.1 Enrollment Regressions
In this part of the analysis, the main variable of interest is the share of peer group members— i.e. stu-
dents assigned to the same first-year exercise classes—who enroll in the same master’s degree program.
Let 𝑚𝑖,𝑘 = 1 if student 𝑖 is enrolled in master’s degree 𝑘, and 0 otherwise. We model the probability
of degree choice, by Equation (1) and estimate it with a Linear Probability Model:
𝑚𝑖,𝑘 = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝜂𝑔−𝑖,ℎ𝑘 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜃𝑐 + 𝜖𝑖 (1)
Here, 𝑔−𝑖,ℎ𝑘 is the share of 𝑖’s peers from exercise class ℎ who enrolled in the same degree 𝑘,
excluding individual 𝑖. 𝑋𝑖 contains individual and parental characteristics that are likely to influence
the choice of a master’s degree and 𝜃𝑐 is a cohort fixed effect. Estimation of Equation (1) tells us
whether student characteristics differ systematically between students enrolled in degree 𝑘 compared
to students enrolled in other master’s programs, and whether assigned first-year classmates are more
likely to enroll in the same master’s program.
The main drawback of estimating Equation (1) is that the peer-effect measure (𝑔−𝑖,ℎ𝑘) suffers from
the classical problem of reflection (or two-way causality) where individual choice is determined together
with the master’s degree choice of the larger peer group (Manski, 1993).11 Since there exists no reliable
predetermined measure of degree choice, it is not possible to solve this problem using the standard
estimation approach. To overcome the problem and come closer to determining and identifying a
potential peer effect in choice of specialization, we allow for interdependency between students using
a dyadic regression approach in the next section. This method also introduces the opportunity to
investigate presence of assortative matching in a master’s degree choice.12
11The reflection problem refers to the general problem of simultaneity of individual performance/behavior and group
performance/behavior. This problem is well know in the peer effect literature and is normally addressed by using a
predetermined measure of peer group behavior (e.g., Manski, 1993; Carrell et al., 2011; Lavy et al., 2012).
12In Equation (1), the choice of degree 𝑘 is modeled as a binary choice variable between degree 𝑘 or no degree, despite
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3.2 Dyadic Regressions
With the dyadic regression approach we examine the data for evidence that students enrolled in the
same master’s degree program share similar characteristics or belonged to the same exercise (i.e. peer)
group. Recently, Poldin et al. (2015) has also used the dyadic regression approach to investigate choice
of specialization in higher education in Russia. Both their idea and approach are very similar to
ours, however, among other things, we use the method differently by considering positive and negative
assortative matching and particularly we solve the endogeneity problem concerning peer selection. The
basic idea is that students may have preferences regarding with whom to collocate. In that case, the
choice of degree depends not only on the students’ own characteristics, but also on the characteristics of
other students. For instance, students may choose their degree of specialization based on the choice of
their peers or with students with similar observable characteristics—e.g., students of the same gender
or with similar abilities. In the literature, this is commonly referred to as homophily (the tendency to
love similar others) (McPherson et al., 2001). Given the lack of information about student preferences,
it is not possible to investigate presence of homophily; however, in equilibrium, the formation process
of master’s degree programs may result in assortative matching: Students with similar (dissimilar)
characteristics are more (less) likely to choose to specialize in the same degree. Positive assortative
matching means that two students who are more similar are more likely to choose the same degree.
Contrarily, negative assortative matching means that students belonging to the same degree program
are less similar to each other compared to the rest of the population.
Empirical work on assortative matching has generally been hindered by the fact that assortative
criteria are often correlated, which makes inference difficult (Arcand and Fafchamps, 2012). For in-
stance, suppose that in Equation (1) we find that students in the same master’s degree program have
the same gender and are more likely to belong to the same peer group. If gender and group member-
ship are correlated, we cannot distinguish whether students in the same degree share the same gender
because they follow their peers, or whether they come from the same peer group because they sort on
gender. To conduct a multivariate analysis on assortative matching we therefore use dyadic regressions
following Arcand and Fafchamps (2012). Using information about all possible pairs of students, we
investigate whether pairs of students enroll in the same master’s degree based on peer effects or because
they resemble each other along different dimensions such as revealed abilities or gender.
Let 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑘 = 1 if both student 𝑖 and 𝑗 enroll in the same degree 𝑘, and 0 otherwise. We estimate
that this does not reflect the reality where students are free to select between several master’s degrees. One possibility
is to model this by a Multinomial Logit. However, the estimations would still suffer from the reflection problem.
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the following dyadic regression model with a Linear Probability Model:
𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑔𝑖𝑗,ℎ + 𝜙𝑤𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾ℎ + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 (2)
where 𝑔𝑖𝑗,ℎ is a link-specific characteristic equal to one if students 𝑖 and 𝑗 were randomly assigned to the
same exercise class (i.e. peer group) ℎ. We also refer to this variable as the peer effect variable. Because
students are randomly assigned to these groups at enrollment, this peer measure is predetermined in
terms of students’ master’s degree choice. Thus, in Equation (2) we do not have to be concerned with
the reflection problem as in Equation (1). A positive and significant coefficient (i.e. 𝛽 > 0) means
that students belonging to the same peer group are more likely to enroll in the same master’s degree
program. 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is a vector of regressors and 𝛾ℎ is a peer-group fixed effect.
Since the dependent variable 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑘 in our study is symmetric by construction (i.e. 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑘 = 𝑚𝑗𝑖,𝑘),
regressors 𝑤𝑖𝑗 must be constructed in such a way that 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 𝑤𝑗𝑖. Especially, because the outcome 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑘
is equal to the outcome 𝑚𝑗𝑖,𝑘, the impact from 𝑤𝑖𝑗 needs to be the same as the impact from 𝑤𝑗𝑖 and
thus 𝑤𝑖𝑗 needs to equal 𝑤𝑗𝑖. To achieve this, we follow Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) and construct
regressors of the form |𝑤𝑖−𝑤𝑗 | and (𝑤𝑖+𝑤𝑗), where 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑤𝑗 are characteristics of 𝑖 and 𝑗. Combining
these types of regressors enables a distinction between the cases where students who belong to the same
master’s degree program have a higher (lower) 𝑤 than students belonging to different degrees from
cases where same-degree students have similar (dissimilar) 𝑤 than students not belonging to the same
degree. The coefficient on |𝑤𝑖 − 𝑤𝑗 |, identifies negative and positive assortative matching. A negative
coefficient on |𝑤𝑖 − 𝑤𝑗 | indicates positive assortative matching, while a positive |𝑤𝑖 − 𝑤𝑗 | indicates
negative assortative matching. The coefficient on (𝑤𝑖 + 𝑤𝑗), captures the propensity for two students
to select the same master’s degree program conditional on 𝑤. This means that the interpretation is
similar to that of standard linear regression estimates: A positive coefficient on (𝑤𝑖 + 𝑤𝑗) indicates
that this characteristic is associated with same degree choice in the larger group. However, as pointed
out by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), the identification of coefficients on (𝑤𝑖+𝑤𝑗) is difficult and one
should mostly include regressors of this type as controls and results should be interpreted with caution.
The method of dyadic regression shares similarities with the gravity model, which is commonly
used in the international trade literature to model bilateral aggregate trade flows between pairs of
countries (dyads) (for a review and explanations, see Bergstrand and Egger, 2011; Mayer, 2014). The
starting point for an analysis using the gravity model is to model trade flows between countries 𝑖 and
𝑗 by the following equation: 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑋𝑖𝑗) = 𝑙𝑛(𝛽0) + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖) + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗) + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 ,
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where 𝑃𝑋𝑖𝑗 is the merchandise trade flow from exporter 𝑖 to importer 𝑗 and 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 is the distance
between countries 𝑖 and 𝑗. The later literature has added additional country-specific and country
pair-specific variables to the model, such as dummies for common languages, common land boarders,
or the absence of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It is normally expected that 𝛽1 > 0, 𝛽2 > 0, and
𝛽3 < 0, which corresponds to saying that the distance between countries 𝑖 and 𝑗 has a negative impact
on the trade flows between the two countries and that GDP in general is positively associated with
trade flows. Relating this to our study, we also expect the “distance” in characteristics, measured by
𝑤𝑖𝑗 = |𝑤𝑖 −𝑤𝑗 |, to have a significant impact on the probability that students 𝑖 and 𝑗 choose the same
degree. The gravity model also has been used to model the probability that countries 𝑖 and 𝑗 form
a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (e.g., Baier and Bergstrand, 2004). Similar to our study, modeling a
FTA between countries 𝑖 and country 𝑗, the dependent variable is an undirectional dummy equal to
one if countries 𝑖 and 𝑗 have a FTA, and zero otherwise.
In order to investigate assortative matching along more dimensions than the peer-group effect, we
include a number of regressors (𝑤𝑖𝑗) such as high school GPA, first-year GPA, gender, and age. A
substantial literature documents the importance of family background, why we also account for parents’
occupational type prior to first-year enrollment, place of residence while in primary school, and parents’
educational level. In this study, however, we expect background effects to be smaller as everyone in
the postgraduate sample was enrolled in the same bachelor’s program at the same institution.
Since the networks of students are non-overlapping between cohorts, the dyadic approach uses the
cross-sectional dimension of the data.13 This means that Equation (2) is estimated for each cohort of
students resulting in 10 different estimations. Results for the main variables of interest (𝛽 in Equation
(2)) are reported for all cohorts, while more detailed estimation output is shown for a randomly selected
cohort of students. Given that the dependent and independent variables are defined for every pair of
students (𝑖𝑗), estimations are based on 𝑛 × (𝑛 − 1)/2 observations, where 𝑛 denotes the number of
students.14 Descriptive statistics at the dyad level by cohort has been relegated to the appendix, Table
A.2.
Dyadic observations are generally not independent, as residuals containing the same student are
correlated (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Cameron et al., 2011; Cameron and Miller, 2014). To ensure
that standard errors are robust to correlation in the error terms across students, we compute dyadic
13The network of students are non-overlapping between cohorts as assignment into first-year peer groups are based
exclusively on students enrolled in the same academic year. Only if courses were not mandatory and students progres-
siveness was unimportant for the choice of courses would we end up in a situation where the network of students would
cut across cohorts.
14For example, the empirical analysis for the 2001 cohort is performed on 57,630 unique student pairs (340 students).
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standard errors as suggested by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) throughout the empirical analysis.
Heterogeneous Effects
Understanding heterogeneous effects in peer influence is important for at least two reasons. First, if
peer effects are homogeneous, changing peer groups to improve the outcomes of some students will
necessarily harm other students. Thus, if peer effects are homogeneous, policy implications are limited.
Second, as illustrated by Carrell et al. (2013), failure to understand the underlying peer mechanisms
can result in educational policies that end up hurting students instead of helping them.15
To assess the underlying mechanisms driving peer-group influence on degree choice, we examine the
heterogeneous impact from observable student characteristics. Specifically, we interact the peer-effect
variable (𝑔𝑖𝑗,ℎ) with differences in individual characteristics (𝑤𝑖𝑗 = |𝑤𝑖 − 𝑤𝑗 |). A regression of the
following form is estimated by a Linear Probability Model
𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑔𝑖𝑗,ℎ + 𝜙𝑤𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿𝑤𝑖𝑗 · 𝑔𝑖𝑗,ℎ + 𝛾ℎ + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 (3)
This specification allows the effect from being in the same peer group to depend on the differences
in individual characteristics such as GPA, age, and gender. The partial effect from being in the same
peer group simplifies to 𝜕𝑚𝜕𝑔 = 𝛽 + 𝛿|𝑤𝑖 − 𝑤𝑗 | and can thus be separated into a main effect, 𝛽, and an
additional effect, 𝛿|𝑤𝑖 − 𝑤𝑗 |. If 𝛽 and 𝛿 are jointly significant, it implies that being in the same peer
group has a significant effect on the probability of 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑘 = 1. If 𝛿 is statistically significant, it implies
that the effect from being in the same peer group is significantly different across the distribution of
|𝑤𝑖 − 𝑤𝑗 |. Finally, 𝛽 can be interpreted as the effect from being in the same peer group given no
difference in |𝑤𝑖 − 𝑤𝑗 |.
Identification
The identification of the peer effect (i.e. 𝛽 in Equations (2) and (3)) has been the topic of several
papers (e.g., Manski, 1993; De Giorgi et al., 2010; Angrist, 2014) due to issues related to self-selection
and contamination of the peer effect.16
15Carrell et al. (2013) implement what they expect to be an optimal allocation of peers in a controlled setting.
However, in contrast to their expectations, this does not lead to improved outcomes. In fact, because students of similar
ability cluster in smaller subgroups within the assigned peer groups, some students (mostly low-ability students) are
harmed by this intervention.
16In terms of identification, the literature also has been concerned with what is known as the reflection problem
(Manski, 1993). Since our preferred peer group measure in the dyadic regression is predetermined to the choice of a
master’s degree we are not concerned with feedback effects from the choice of degree on peers. As discussed previously,
this however does not apply in the case of Equation (1).
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The self-selection problem arises when individuals choose their peers endogenously (see for instance
Poldin et al., 2015). To account for self-selection into peer groups we use the randomly assigned first-
year groups (for more details see Section 2). Since the individual students have no influence on the
composition of the groups, we overcome the problem of self-selection. We test the validity of the
assumption of randomly assigned peer groups in Section 4.
Second, in order to identify a peer effect it is important to separate out the correlation effect.
The correlation effect is a group-specific effect that arises when the group is subject to influences that
have an impact on the entire group performance and at the same time influence individual behavior.
One such factor is teacher quality, which is intrinsically indivisible: Different teachers are assigned
to different classes (i.e. groups of students). Classes may be homogeneous in mean student ability,
but student achievement may be non-monotone in teacher quality across all classes. To address the
correlation problem we exploit the social network dimension of the data and include peer-group fixed
effects (𝛾ℎ).
Another potential threat to our identification strategy can arise if students at CBS are assigned to
groups based on their own abilities or if teachers are assigned to groups based on the ability composition
of the group and the teacher’s experience or knowledge. In short, if CBS practices some kind of tracking
or non-random teacher assignment, we have an endogeneity problem. According to the administration
at CBS, teachers are randomly assigned to exercise classes and students are not assigned based on
observed high school GPA. For this reason, we are less concerned that our peer-group measure (𝑔𝑖𝑗) is
correlated with the fixed effects (𝛾ℎ) or students unobserved individual-specific ability level contained
in the error term.
Finally, apart from controlling for students’ innate ability measured by their high school GPA, we
use students’ first-year GPA to investigate how differences in students’ revealed educational abilities
affect their choice of a master’s degree. Since first-year GPA is based exclusively on mandatory courses
common to the entire cohort, it is comparable between students. As a robustness check, we also use
students’ bachelor’s GPA to measure students’ revealed abilities. Bachelor’s GPA is a more noisy
measure of revealed abilities because it is calculated based on both mandatory and elective courses.
It might be that some students choose electives that are known to be “easy”, leading to higher grades,
whereas other students choose more difficult electives that are likely to result in lower grades. In this
case, the commitment and time spent on the electives are not reflected in the bachelor’s GPA and we
thus believe that first-year GPA is a more reliable measure of students revealed abilities.
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4 Data
In order to implement the empirical strategy outlined in the previous section, we rely on a unique
dataset from Copenhagen Business School (CBS) and combine it with high quality Danish register panel
data compiled by Statistics Denmark. The educational administrative dataset contains information
about 10 cohorts of students from the time they enroll in the Business Economics bachelor’s program
until they finish their postgraduate degree. The cohorts considered enrolled in Business Economics in
the years from 1995 to 2004.
For each student, the educational part of the data includes information on names of both mandatory
and elective courses, grades obtained in individual courses followed, type of master’s degree, starting
year of the undergraduate and master’s degree programs, and time spent at university. In addition,
information about student’s ECTS-weighted grade point average (GPA) from the first year, from
the entire bachelor’s, and from their postgraduate studies is contained in the data. Importantly, the
educational part of the data also includes information about students’ assigned first-year exercise group
and high school GPA. The Danish register data cover the entire population and thus the full sample
of students enrolled at CBS. We use this data to obtain information about students’ labor market
outcomes in their first job after graduation, as well as parental background, which has been found
to heavily influence educational decisions, at least in the early educational trajectory (Ermisch and
Francesconi, 2001; Dustmann, 2004).
We exclude students who did not complete the bachelor’s program and students who did not
continue into a master’s degree program at CBS.17 We also drop non-Danish students in order to
control for a larger number of background variables. For the same reason, we restrict the sample
to students for whom we have parental information.18 The sample we use for the empirical analysis
consists of 3,132 students. Out of these, 2,633 students graduated from the master’s degree program
in which they were enrolled after finishing their undergraduate studies in Business Economics.
17Around 10 percent of the undergraduate students who graduated from the bachelor’s program did not continue
into a master’s degree program at CBS. In the robustness section, we expand the sample to include these individuals.
Moreover, more than 19 percent of the original sample dropped out of the bachelor’s program. This means that our
measure of peer groups contains fewer peers than the original number of peers.
18In total we drop 158 non-Danish students from the sample. Results including non-Danish students are discussed in
the robustness section and estimation output is provided in the supplementary material (Appendix B) to this paper.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
All cohorts 2001 cohort
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Individual student characteristics:
Starting age (years) 21.29 1.61 21.46 1.76
Gender (female=1) 0.30 0.46 0.33 0.47
Business high school (=1) 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.41
General (mat) high school (=1) 0.60 0.49 0.66 0.47
High school GPA 6.92 1.95 6.77 1.84
First-year GPA 5.29 2.24 5.20 2.05
Bachelor’s GPA 6.42 2.10 6.37 1.82
Dropped out of master’s program (=1) 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.30
Master’s GPA𝐴 7.03 1.96 6.95 1.79
Hourly wage, first job (DKK)𝐵 184.66 37.93 189.56 37.48
Parents characteristics:
Father self-employed (=1) 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.32
Mother self-employed (=1) 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22
Father’s education:
High school or less 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.40
Professional qualifications 0.29 0.45 0.31 0.46
Short or Medium tertiary 0.24 0.43 0.21 0.41
Long tertiary 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.41
Mother’s education:
High school or less 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41
Professional qualifications 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.46
Short or Medium tertiary 0.35 0.48 0.34 0.48
Long tertiary 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29
Place of residence 10 years prior to enrollment:
Region of Copenhagen 0.44 0.50 0.45 0.50
Zealand without Copenhagen 0.41 0.49 0.39 0.49
Jytland 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30
Fynen 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18
Other 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16
Sector occupation in first job:𝐵
Agriculture, fishing and quarrying * -
Industries and utilities 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26
Construction * *
Trade, transport, info. and communication 0.22 0.41 0.25 0.43
Finance and business services 0.64 0.48 0.63 0.48
Public and personal services 0.05 0.22 *
Observations 3,132 343
Note: “*” means that we are not able to disclose the information due to discretion roles set
by Statistics Denmark. For the same reasons minimum and maximum are not reported.
“-” indicates that there are no observations in that group.
𝐴Means reported for 2,633 students on final master’s degree GPA (288 observations for
the 2001 cohort).
𝐵Means reported for 1,854 observations on sector and hourly wages (253 observations for
the 2001 cohort). Wages are inflation adjusted with 2000 as the basis year.
For the full sample we have that father’s education is missing in 10 percent of the cases
and that mother’s education is missing in 3 percent of the cases. We consider the missing
information as a category by itself.
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Descriptive statistics across all 10 cohorts and separately for the cohort enrolled in 2001 are pre-
sented in Table 1. In the subsequent empirical analysis, we first report detailed estimation results for
the 2001 cohort as an illustrative example before considering the entire sample of cohorts. The average
student is 21 years old upon enrollment in Business Economics at CBS. The majority of enrolled stu-
dents are male (70 percent). Some 60 percent of the students went to a regular high school with focus
on mathematics while 25 percent went to a business high school. The remaining 15 percent of the
students completed other types of university-preparation corresponding to Danish high school level.
We measure a student’s revealed abilities by first-year GPA, which is based exclusively on mandatory
courses. The GPA is reported using the Danish “7”-step grading scale where the lowest passing grade
is 2 and the maximum grade is 12.19 A comparison of the Danish grading scale to the ECTS and
the American grading scale are shown in the supplementary material (Appendix B) to this paper.
Across all cohorts, the average high school GPA is 6.92, the average first-year GPA is 5.29, while
the average bachelor’s GPA is 6.42. The average master’s GPA is slightly higher with an average of
7.03. The higher master’s GPA suggests that we have some level of self-selection out of the master’s
degree programs—concerning students who decided not to take a postgraduate degree and students
who dropped out of the program in which they were enrolled.
Information about parental background includes place of residence, occupational type prior to first-
year enrollment, and parents’ educational level measured by different categories. Parental educational
information is reported at the aggregated level. In the actual estimations we include it at a more
detailed level.20 Eleven percent of fathers and 5 percent of mothers are self-employed. Place of
residence is measured 10 years prior to enrollment at CBS in order to capture the region in which
the student grew up and went to primary school. With this variable we account for different social
contextual effects and traditions across the country, which is likely to impact how students make
educational decisions (Akerlof, 1997). Place of residence in Table 1 is reported at the aggregated level.
In the actual estimations, place of residence 10 years prior to enrollment is based on the 12 counties
in Denmark. The vast majority of students grew up on Zealand (85 percent), which is the island on
which the capital city Copenhagen is located.
19The Danish grading system changed in 2007. Thus, GPA observed for students who graduated before 2007 is
based on the old grading scale. In order to ensure comparability between academic outcomes across cohorts we convert
students’ GPAs reported before 2007 to the new “7”-step grading scale using the official converting table provided
by the Danish Ministry for Children, Education, and Gender Equality (see http://eng.uvm.dk/Education/General/
7-point-grading-scale?allowCookies=on).
20An obvious thing to include is the income level of the parents. This should be done in future versions of this paper.
The reason for not including it here is that it need more investigation of the reason for some students’ mission information
on parents’ income. In fact, the inclusion of parental income and the exclusion of students’ with this information missing
reveals stronger results.
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Information about labor market outcomes is used to analyze the subsequent effect of following one’s
peers in students’ choice of master’s degree (see Section 6). For this analysis, the sample of students
is restricted to students who graduated from a master’s degree program at CBS, have non-missing
information about final master’s GPA and about their first job after graduation. To avoid measurement
errors, we also exclude students with wage observations that are measured with low precision according
to Statistics Denmark. We have complete information about sector occupation and hourly wages for
1,854 graduates—all observed to be employed in Denmark between the day of graduation and three
years after.21 Students’ average wage in their first job is 184.66 DKK per hour, corresponding to
approximately 25 USD.22 More than 60 percent of the students were hired in the financial and business
sector upon graduation, while 22 percent were hired in the sectors of transportation, trade, information,
and communication. Given the nature of the postgraduate educational programs offered as CBS, the
occupational division across sectors is hardly surprising.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics by Peer Groups
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the average number of groups and class size across all cohorts
and separately for the cohort enrolled in 2001. Students were, on average, assigned to 15 exercise
classes with an average number of 21 students in each class. Through the second and third year of the
bachelor’s program, the number of groups decreased to 14 in the second year and further to 13 in the
third year (on average).23 The drop in the number of exercise classes increased the average number of
students to 23 and 24 in the second and third years, respectively.
Considering the cohort enrolled in 2001, the increase in class size is substantially higher. However,
the rise in the number of students per exercise class was primarily driven by administrative decisions
to combine small exercise classes. In fact, only 12 and 13 students changed exercise class prior to the
second and third years, respectively.24 The small number of students who choose to change exercise
class suggests that the problem with self-selection is limited.
The marginal change in peer groups during undergraduate studies in our case may, however, cast
doubt on the possibility of capturing the relevant peer interactions by looking at assigned first-year
classmates. To address this, we also investigate the importance of peer groups based on group com-
21The hourly wage is measured in November each year. If students finish their master’s degree after November, the
hourly wage in their first job is not measured before November the following year.
22The average exchange rate for July 2015 was used. Wages are inflation adjusted with 2000 as the basis year.
23Additional information on group changes across years is provided in the supplementary material (Appendix B) to
this paper.
24Unfortunately, we are not allowed to report the actual transition matrix due to the low number of switchers which
introduces the risk of disclosing confidential information.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistic Across Peer Groups
All cohorts 2001 cohort
Mean Std.dev.
No. of
groups
Average
no. of
groups
Mean Std.dev.
No. of
groups
Group size (no. of students):
First-year peer group 21.31 4.87 147 14.7 24.5 2.71 14
Second-year peer group 22.86 7.29 137 13.7 28.58 3.12 12
Third-year peer group 23.91 10.68 132 13.1 31.18 10.70 11
First-year peer group characteristics:
Share of males 0.70 0.07 147 14.7 0.67 0.06 14
Age 21.31 0.73 147 14.7 21.46 0.41 14
High school GPA 8.39 0.20 147 14.7 8.33 0.20 14
First-year GPA 7.67 0.33 147 14.7 7.67 0.22 14
Bachelor’s GPA 8.16 0.32 147 14.7 8.17 0.11 14
position in the second and third years. Considering these alternative peer groups, however, comes
with the disadvantage of introducing self-selection as some of the individuals change groups based on a
personal choice/request and not due to an administrative decision. Due to the self-selection problem,
we expect the peer effect to be larger compared to the effect when the first-year peer-group measure
is used.
4.2 Test of Random Assignment into Peer Groups
The assumption that allows us to estimate and identify a peer effect is random assignment into first-
year groups. Even though this is formally the case, we check the validity of our preferred definition to
ensure that there are no systematic differences across peer groups. To do this, we investigate whether
peer-group assignment is correlated with individual socio-economic and pre-educational characteristics.
To be exact, we estimate a Linear Probability Model (LPM) of the form ℎ𝑖,𝑔𝑡 = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖, where
ℎ𝑖,𝑔𝑡 = 1 if individual 𝑖 was assigned to peer group 𝑔 in enrollment year 𝑡 and 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of
background variables. We undertake this exercise for each group in each cohort (i.e. 147 estimations)
and test for joint significance of all the explanatory variables except from enrollment age which is used
as class assignment criteria by CBS.
The estimation output is summarized here and detailed further in Tables 6 and 7 in the supple-
mentary material (Appendix B) to this paper. As expected, given the randomization, the variables
are not jointly significant in the vast majority of cases. For the cohort enrolled in 2001 we find that
the variables are not jointly significant predictors of peer groups in all cases. Besides starting age,
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we find that it is mostly the characteristics of the parents that enter the regressions significantly. To
mitigate the potential problem with correlation between background characteristics and peer-group
assignment, we control for the difference in enrollment age and parents’ characteristics, and include
peer-group fixed effects in all estimations. That starting age enters the regression significantly is not
overly surprising given the allocation criteria used by CBS.
The test of random assignment is based on the sample of students that completed the bachelor’s
program in Business Economics. More than 19 percent on average drop out of the Business Economics
program either in the first, second or third year. While we have information about the students that
dropped out, we have not included them in the analysis. We recognize that this may lead to out-
of-sample bias due to the self-selection nature of the decision to drop out or stay in the sample. If
the students that dropped out during the first three years are also the ones with less strong peer
attachments, our estimates would thus lead to a higher peer effect.
However, Skibsted (2016), Chapter 3 of this thesis, shows how women’s probability of dropping
out is increasing in the peers’ ability level. This result is interpreted as women being more prone
to compare themselves with their peers and to create wrong self-images based on these comparisons,
which make them drop out. If this is true, it could just as well be that the students that drop out of
the sample (the bachelor’s program) are the ones that in fact react most to their peers. This would
mean that our sample of students that finished their bachelor’s program consists of students that react
the least to peers’ impact and thus our estimates of a peer effect would be lower. This explanation
corresponds well with the finding that controlling for sample selection, Skibsted (2016) finds stronger
and larger peer effects on educational performance compared with standard OLS peer effect estimates.
In fact, even if our estimated peer effect is higher because the students that stay in the sample are also
the ones with strongest peer attachments, our estimates can still be thought of as a true peer effect.
This is so because the effect is simply just generated by a two-step decision process where students
decide to stay in the sample and then decide on their master’s degree program, where both decisions
were impacted by the same randomly assigned peers.
Given the arguments above, we feel confident that our estimates will reflect a peer effect and that our
results can contribute with important knowledge about how students decide on their master’s degree
program. Nevertheless, the issue of sample selection is worth considerations and for further research
a sample selection model of Equation (2) should be considered. To ensure that our assumption of
random assignment into peer groups is still plausible despite the issue with self-selection out of the
sample, we perform the test of random assignment on the smaller group of students that did not drop
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out in order to ensure that the remaining students are randomly assigned to groups.
5 Results
5.1 Enrollment Regressions
We begin by estimating Equation (1), focusing exclusively on the effect from the share of peer-group
members enrolled in the same master’s degree program. We wish to investigate whether assigned first-
year classmates are more likely to enroll in the same degree three years later. Estimation results for
the 15 most popular degrees available to the cohorts enrolled in the period 1995-2004 are presented in
Table 3. Each column corresponds to a separate estimation for a specific master’s degree 𝑘.
Results show a positive association between enrollment in master’s degree 𝑘 and the share of peers
enrolled in degree 𝑘: Students are more likely to enroll in a master’s degree program the larger the
share of peers enrolled in the same degree. For about half of the cases, the association is statistically
significant at least at the 5-percent level. A possible explanation for the insignificant peer effect is
the large share of foreign students enrolled in these master’s programs.25 This is consistent with the
findings that social interaction and peer impacts are less important in an environment or class with
more foreign students (Hoxby, 2000).
Table 3: Enrollment Regressions: Share of Peers in Same Master’s Degree (all cohorts)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Degree 𝑘: M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8
𝑔−𝑖,ℎ𝑘 0.299*** 0.079 0.225** 0.182** 0.157* 0.311*** 0.078 0.019
(0.075) (0.075) (0.089) (0.073) (0.091) (0.066) (0.126) (0.096)
Years 1995-2004 1995-2004 1995-2001 1995-2004 1995-2002 1995-2004 1999-2004 1995-2004
Observations 3132 3132 2194 3132 2534 3132 1990 3132
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Degree 𝑘: M9 M10 M11 M12 M13 M14 M15
𝑔−𝑖,ℎ𝑘 0.153 0.246*** 0.186 0.005 0.205** 0.222*** 0.168
(0.110) (0.083) (0.117) (0.105) (0.097) (0.077) (0.110)
Years 1995-2004 1995-2004 2000-2004 1999-2004 1995-1999 1995-2004 1995-2001
Observations 3,132 3,132 1,637 1,990 1,495 3,132 2,194
Note: Linear Probability Model. Dependent variable is equal to 1 if students are enrolled in master’s degree 𝑘,
and zero otherwise. Standard errors reported in parenthesis. Each column correspond to a master’s degree. The
𝑘=(M1,...,M15) master’s degree programs corresponds to a degree with the same number in Table A.1 shown in the
appendix. All estimations include cohort fixed effects and control variables (student’s bachelor’s GPA, a high school
dummy, age at enrollment, gender and family characteristics). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
25Between 5-20 percent of the students enrolled in the master’s degree programs named M2, M7, M9, M11, M15 are
identified as non-Danish students. This compares with an average of 4 percent in the master’s programs where the share
of peers are found to have a positive and significant effect.
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The results support presence of peer effects in choice of master’s degree among a homogeneous
group of bachelor’s students at the largest Danish business school in Denmark. While this result is
encouraging, it may suffer from two-way causality (reflection). Furthermore, Equation (1) models
only the choice of degree as a function of own characteristics. For this reason it is not possible to
identify positive and negative assortative matching, which may lead us to conclude that some master’s
degrees are only for higher achieving students when in fact the data are better explained by assortative
matching.
5.2 Dyadic Regressions
Results: 2001 Cohort
We first estimate the dyadic regression for the cohort of students enrolled in Business Economics in the
year 2001. Estimation results are shown in Table 4. We find that the measure of first-year peer group is
significant at the 10 percent level for students’ choice of specialization (column 1): students randomly
assigned to the same exercise class upon enrollment at the bachelor’s level are 1.3 percentage points
more likely to study for the same master’s degree. This effect size does not change when student and
parental characteristics are included in columns 2-4. This supports the previous evidence that students
are randomly assigned into peer groups.
The negative sign on the estimated coefficient to the difference in first-year GPA indicates that
students with similar revealed abilities in mandatory courses are more likely to choose the same master’s
degree program (i.e. positive assortative matching). To investigate whether the estimated peer effect
depends on the measure of revealed abilities used in the model, column 4 replaces first-year GPA with
students’ final bachelor’s GPA. The absolute difference in students’ bachelor’s GPA is statistically
significant at the 5-percent level, but the size of the coefficient estimate falls slightly compared to the
estimate using first-year GPA.
We observe no significant effect from differences in high school GPA, age, or being of different
gender. A negative and significant effect from the sum of high school GPA is observed. This indicates
that a pair of students who together have a high sum of high school GPA are less likely to choose the
same degree compared to a pair of students with a low sum of high school GPA. Thus, our results
show that students of similar and higher abilities are less likely to choose the same master’s degree
compared to pairs of students with similar and lower abilities.
Columns 5 and 6 replicate the result reported in column 3 by substituting only the first-year-peer
group measure with the second- and third-year peer-group measure, respectively. The peer effect is
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statistically significant at the 5 percent level and the magnitude of the effect increases slightly in
size: Students from the same peer group are 1.3-1.4 percentage points more likely to choose the same
master’s degree.
Table 4: Dyadic regressions: Peer effects in the choice of master’s degree
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First-year peer group 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 0.013*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Second-year peer group 0.013**
(0.006)
Third-year peer group 0.014**
(0.006)
Same gender (=0) -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Same location (=0) 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Fathers both self-employed (=0) -0.029** -0.027** -0.027** -0.027** -0.027**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Mothers both self-employed (=0) -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Fathers with same education (=1) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Mothers with same education (=1) -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Absolute difference in:
First-year GPA -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Bachelor’s GPA -0.006**
(0.003)
High school GPA -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Sum of:
First-year GPA 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Bachelor’s GPA 0.001
(0.003)
High school GPA -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 58,653 58,653 58,653 58,653 58,653 58,653
Note: Linear Probability Model. Dependent variable is equal to 1 if 𝑖 and 𝑗 are enrolled in the same master’s
degree. Standard errors reported in parenthesis. Estimation sample includes Danish students who enrolled
in undergraduate studies at CBS in 2001. All estimations include cohort and peer-group fixed effects. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Even though our estimated peer effect is modest in magnitude and only significant at the 10
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percent level, the size of the effect is similar to previous findings in the literature (Arcidiacono and
Nicholson, 2005; Lyle, 2007; Ost, 2010; De Giorgi et al., 2010; Poldin et al., 2015). Using a somewhat
similar approach to our enrollment Equation (1), Lyle (2007) finds a significant role-model effect
and an insignificant peer effect in major choice using data on plebes from a U.S. military academy.
Particularly, he finds that a 10-percent increase in the fraction of role models that intended to study
engineering results in a 1.5-percentage-point increase in the probability that a cadet will choose to
major in engineering. Using overlapping peer groups and IV estimations to identify a peer effect in
major choice, De Giorgi et al. (2010) finds that adding one average peer with a major in economics
to an average student’s peer group increases the probability that the average student will choose to
major in economics by 7.4 percentage points. Compared to these studies investigating peer effects in
major choice, our estimated effect of 1.3 percentage points is in the lower end, yet comparable to Lyle
(2007).
Heterogeneous Effects: 2001 Cohort
We proceed to investigate the underlying mechanisms driving assortative matching by peer groups.
Estimation results of Equation (3) for the cohort enrolled in 2001 are reported in Table 5.
We include interactions between the peer-effect variable and the absolute difference in first-year
GPA, bachelor’s GPA, high school GPA, age, and gender to examine whether matching on peer groups is
homogeneous across observable student characteristics. Considering students’ first-year GPA (column
2), the total peer effect now depends on the difference in GPA between pairs of students. We find
that students belonging to the same peer group are more likely to choose the same master’s degree if
they are similar in terms of revealed abilities measured as first-year GPA. The effect is even stronger
in column 3 when we account for the effect from students’ bachelor’s GPA. In comparison to the result
without interactions, the likelihood of choosing the same program increases from 1.3 percentage points
to 3.4-4.0 percentage points (columns 2 and 3 in Table 5) from being in the same peer group given
no difference in first-year GPA or bachelor’s GPA, respectively. Moreover, the peer effect is significant
at the 1 percent level. Furthermore, the interaction term in columns 2 and 3 (𝑔𝑖𝑗,ℎ interacted with
first-year GPA and bachelor’s GPA, respectively) is statistically significant at the 5 and 1 percent level,
respectively. This suggests that the peer effect is different across students’ ability distribution.
The estimated peer effect disappears when we include the interaction with the absolute difference in
high school GPA (column 4). This is in line with the finding presented in Table 4: If a pair of students
with a high sum of high school GPA are less likely to choose the same master’s degree compared with
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a pair of students with a low sum of high school GPA, then this effect cancels out the effect from the
difference in high school GPA. This is the case because two students with a high sum of high school
GPA will also have a small absolute difference in high school GPA.
Table 5: Heterogeneous effects: Peer effects in the choice of master’s degree
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First-year peer group 0.013* 0.034*** 0.040*** 0.004 0.015 0.024***
(0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Abs. diff. in first-year GPA * First-year peer group -0.009**
(0.004)
Abs. diff. in bachelor’s GPA * First-year peer group -0.013***
(0.004)
Abs. diff. in high school GPA * First-year peer group 0.004
(0.003)
Same gender (=0) * First-year peer group -0.004
(0.012)
Abs. diff. in age * First-year peer group -0.006*
(0.003)
Absolute difference in:
Difference in first year GPA -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Difference in GPA -0.005*
(0.003)
Difference in high school GPA -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Same gender (=0) -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Difference in age 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Mothers with same education (=1) -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Fathers with same education (=1) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
𝑝1-value from joint test 0.025 0.006 0.065 0.167 0.021
𝑝2-value from joint test 0.001 0.003 0.092 0.212 0.040
Observations: 58,653 58,653 58,653 58,653 58,653 58,653
Note: Linear Probability Model. Dependent variable is equal to 1 if 𝑖 and 𝑗 are enrolled in the same master’s degree.
Standard errors reported in parenthesis. 𝐻1 : 𝛽𝑔𝑖𝑗,ℎ = 0, 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 0 and 𝐻2 : 𝛽𝑔𝑖𝑗,ℎ = 0, 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 0,
𝜙𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 = 0. The estimation sample includes Danish students who enrolled in undergraduate studies at CBS in
2001. All estimations include control variables similar to Table 4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We also find that the effect from peers increases and stays significant when we include the interaction
with the absolute difference in starting age (column 5). This result suggests that students from the
same peer group with no age difference are more likely to choose the same degree compared to students
in the same peer group, but with a larger age difference. The partial effect from being in the same peer
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group increases to 2.4 percentages points when peer-group members assort based on no age difference.
The interaction between peer group and absolute age difference (𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) is not significant in itself,
but the main peer-group effect and the interaction effect are jointly significant. In addition, all three
effects—the main peer-group effect, the interaction effect, and the absolute age difference effect—are
jointly significant. Finally, we find only weak presence of heterogeneous peer effects based on students’
gender (column 6).
In summary, students follow the peers with whom they share similar characteristics in terms of
revealed abilities and age. This result is in line with Carrell et al. (2013) who show that within ran-
domly assigned peer groups individuals form endogenous subgroups of peers with similar ability levels.
Consistent with their findings, our findings indicate that students tend to form more homogeneous
sub-peer groups in terms of revealed abilities and age. Accounting for heterogeneous peer effects,
the magnitude of the effect increases to 3.4-4.0 percentage points, which is in line with the broader
peer-effect literature.
Dyadic Results and Heterogeneous Effects: All Cohorts
Figure 2 summarizes the key results of the dyadic regressions with respect to peer effects across all
cohorts. The graph shows the estimated 𝛽 from Equation (2) across the cohorts enrolled between
1995-2004, as well as the 5 and 10 percent confidence bounds. The dependent variable is equal to one
if students 𝑖 and 𝑗 enroll in the same master’s degree program, and zero otherwise. All estimations
include peer-group fixed effects and control variables similar to the ones included in Table 4.
For the majority of years considered, we find evidence to support that students randomly assigned
to the same first-year group during undergraduate studies are more likely to enroll in the same master’s
degree three years later. Our results are stronger for cohorts enrolled in the early years of the period.
This is most likely explained by the fact that exercise groups used to be smaller, leading to stronger
peer influence and/or access to the master’s programs easier. Looking at the partial effects, it is also
evident that the effect size found in 2001 is one of the smallest significant effects (10 percent level). Not
accounting for heterogeneous peer effects, students from the same peer group are on average 1.3-3.0
percentage points more likely to specialize in the same degree.
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Figure 2: Dyadic Regressions: Peer Effects in the Choice of Master’s Degree (all cohorts)
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Note: Linear Probability Model. Coefficient estimates for first-year peer group reported. All estimations include
control variables similar to the ones included in Table 4. The estimation samples include Danish students who
enrolled in undergraduate studies at CBS in the period 1995-2004.
Estimation results of Equation (3) for all 10 cohorts are represented in Tables 6-8. For the years
where we find a strong peer effect (Figure 2), we also find a strong positive main effect from belonging
to the same peer group when interactions with difference in first-year GPA or difference in bachelor’s
GPA are included. Generally, across all cohorts the results including interactions are very similar to
the results found for the cohort enrolled in 2001, with even stronger results for some cohorts. For
instance, we observe a positive and strongly significant gender effect for the cohort enrolled in the
period between 1995-2000. This is likely to be explained by the more unequal gender distribution at
CBS in the 1990s, leading to more positive assortative matching along gender dimensions.
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Table 6: Heterogeneous effects: Peer effects in the choice of master’s degree (all cohorts)
1995
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First-year peer group 0.039*** 0.032** 0.043** 0.025** 0.025**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012)
Abs. diff. in first-year GPA * First-year peer group -0.007**
(0.003)
Abs. diff. in bachelor’s GPA * First-year peer group -0.005
(0.005)
Abs. diff. in high school GPA * First-year peer group -0.009*
(0.005)
Same gender (=0) * First-year peer group -0.008
(0.017)
Abs. diff. in age * First-year peer group -0.002
(0.003)
𝑝-value from joint test 0.009 0.052 0.037 0.075 0.079
No. of nodes 38226 38226 38226 38226 38226
1996
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First-year peer group 0.030** 0.038*** 0.010 0.030*** 0.019
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
Abs. diff. in first-year GPA * First-year peer group -0.007
(0.004)
Abs. diff. in bachelor’s GPA * First-year peer group -0.011**
(0.005)
Abs. diff. in high school GPA * First-year peer group 0.002
(0.004)
Same gender (=0) * First-year peer group -0.037**
(0.017)
Abs. diff. in age * First-year peer group -0.003
(0.006)
𝑝-value from joint test 0.032 0.015 0.115 0.017 0.122
No. of nodes 40186 40186 40186 40186 40186
1997
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First-year peer group 0.042** 0.046*** 0.031** 0.041*** 0.027**
(0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Abs. diff. in first-year GPA * First-year peer group -0.009*
(0.005)
Abs. diff. in bachelor’s GPA * First-year peer group -0.012**
(0.005)
Abs. diff. in high school GPA * First-year peer group -0.004
(0.005)
Same gender (=0) * First-year peer group -0.046**
(0.018)
Abs. diff. in age * First-year peer group -0.004
(0.004)
𝑝-value from joint test 0.069 0.017 0.075 0.007 0.134
No. of nodes 33411 33411 33411 33411 33411
1998
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First-year peer group 0.029** 0.038*** 0.026* 0.036*** 0.036**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015)
Abs. diff. in first-year GPA * First-year peer group 0.001
(0.004)
Abs. diff. in bachelor’s GPA * First-year peer group -0.003
(0.004)
Abs. diff. in high school GPA * First-year peer group 0.002
(0.004)
Same gender (=0) * First-year peer group -0.013
(0.014)
Abs. diff. in age * First-year peer group -0.003
(0.005)
𝑝-value from joint test 0.018 0.013 0.017 0.005 0.019
No. of nodes 52326 52326 52326 52326 52326
Note: Linear Probability Model. All estimations include control variables similar to the ones included in Table
4. The estimation samples include Danish students who enrolled in undergraduate studies at CBS in the period
1995-2004. The reported p-value is from the test of joint significance of the peer effect and the interaction effect,
𝐻1 where 𝐻1 : 𝛽𝑔𝑖𝑗,ℎ = 0, 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Heterogeneous effects: Peer effects in the choice of master’s degree (all cohorts)
1999
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First-year peer group 0.015* 0.023** 0.018* 0.026*** 0.019**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
Abs. diff. in first-year GPA * First-year peer group -0.000
(0.002)
Abs. diff. in bachelor’s GPA * First-year peer group -0.004
(0.003)
Abs. diff. in high school GPA * First-year peer group -0.002
(0.003)
Same gender (=0) * First-year peer group -0.026*
(0.015)
Abs. diff. in age * First-year peer group -0.002
(0.004)
𝑝-value from joint test 0.035 0.032 0.042 0.022 0.025
No. of nodes 62128 62128 62128 62128 62128
2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First-year peer group 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.013* 0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Abs. diff. in first-year GPA * First-year peer group -0.003
(0.003)
Abs. diff. in bachelor’s GPA * First-year peer group -0.004
(0.003)
Abs. diff. in high school GPA * First-year peer group -0.003
(0.003)
Same gender (=0) * First-year peer group -0.021*
(0.012)
Abs. diff. in age * First-year peer group -0.000
(0.005)
𝑝-value from joint test 0.459 0.394 0.565 0.174 0.758
No. of nodes 63190 63190 63190 63190 63190
2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First-year peer group 0.034*** 0.040*** 0.004 0.015 0.024***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Abs. diff. in first-year GPA * First-year peer group -0.009**
(0.004)
Abs. diff. in bachelor’s GPA * First-year peer group -0.013***
(0.004)
Abs. diff. in high school GPA * First-year peer group 0.004
(0.003)
Same gender (=0) * First-year peer group -0.004
(0.012)
Abs. diff. in age * First-year peer group -0.006*
(0.003)
𝑝-value from joint test 0.025 0.006 0.065 0.167 0.021
No. of nodes 58653 58653 58653 58653 58653
2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First-year peer group 0.005 0.005 -0.003 0.001 0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011)
Abs. diff. in first-year GPA * First-year peer group -0.000
(0.003)
Abs. diff. in bachelor’s GPA * First-year peer group -0.000
(0.003)
Abs. diff. in high school GPA * First-year peer group 0.003
(0.003)
Same gender (=0) * First-year peer group 0.005
(0.010)
Abs. diff. in age * First-year peer group 0.000
(0.005)
𝑝-value from joint test 0.765 0.742 0.456 0.619 0.746
No. of nodes 57630 57630 57630 57630 57630
Note: Linear Probability Model. All estimations include control variables similar to the ones included in Table
4. The estimation samples include Danish students who enrolled in undergraduate studies at CBS in the period
1995-2004. The reported p-value is from the test of joint significance of the peer effect and the interaction effect,
𝐻1 where 𝐻1 : 𝛽𝑔𝑖𝑗,ℎ = 0, 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Heterogeneous effects: Peer effects in the choice of master’s degree (all cohorts)
2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First-year peer group 0.017 0.026 0.030* 0.009 0.031*
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.017)
Abs. diff. in first-year GPA * First-year peer group -0.001
(0.004)
Abs. diff. in bachelor’s GPA * First-year peer group -0.005
(0.005)
Abs. diff. in high school GPA * First-year peer group -0.007
(0.006)
Same gender (=0) * First-year peer group 0.013
(0.011)
Abs. diff. in age * First-year peer group -0.011*
(0.006)
𝑝-value from joint test 0.346 0.249 0.178 0.144 0.182
No. of nodes 45150 45150 45150 45150 45150
2004
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First-year peer group 0.036*** 0.049*** 0.018 0.018 0.009
(0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Abs. diff. in first-year GPA * First-year peer group -0.006*
(0.003)
Abs. diff. in bachelor’s GPA * First-year peer group -0.013***
(0.004)
Abs. diff. in high school GPA * First-year peer group 0.001
(0.004)
Same gender (=0) * First-year peer group 0.006
(0.013)
Abs. diff. in age * First-year peer group 0.009
(0.007)
𝑝-value from joint test 0.020 0.003 0.075 0.059 0.049
No. of nodes 43956 43956 43956 43956 43956
Note: Linear Probability Model. All estimations include control variables similar to the ones included in
Table 4. The estimation samples include Danish students who enrolled in undergraduate studies at CBS in
the period 1995-2004. The reported p-value is from the test of joint significance of the peer effect and the
interaction effect, 𝐻1 where 𝐻1 : 𝛽𝑔𝑖𝑗,ℎ = 0, 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5.3 Robustness
In this section, we present a series of robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our results as well as
to give a sense of the assumptions on which the results rely.
We purposefully excluded non-Danish students in the analysis due to a lack of background infor-
mation such as parents’ educational level and place of residence 10 years prior to enrollment. In the
supplementary material (Appendix B) to this paper we re-estimate Equation (2) using the full sample
of students. We find that students randomly assigned to the same exercise class upon enrollment at the
bachelor’s level are more likely to study for the same degree, however the estimates are slightly weaker
in significance and smaller in magnitude. A possible explanation is that foreign students studying in
Denmark are likely to have chosen CBS for a specific reason or master’s degree, and thus are less likely
to be prone to peer influence.
Second, to ensure that our results are not driven by a selective sample of students who took their
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undergraduate and postgraduate degrees at CBS, we expand the sample to include (i) students who
did not continue into a master’s program at CBS, and (ii) students who enrolled in one of the “non-
traditional” master’s degrees listed in Table A.1. Results are shown for all cohorts in Figure A.1.
Across all cohorts, our baseline results remain and we find indications of that students belonging to
the same first-year peer group are more likely to enroll in the same master’s degree three years later.
Third, to validate our results we construct placebo peer groups by randomly assigning students to
hypothetical classes and re-estimate Equation (2) with the placebo peer groups as our main explanatory
variable. We expect to find no significant effect from the placebo group variable in the presence of a
true peer effect from our original first-year peer effect variable. The estimated peer effects across all
cohorts from 6 different placebo estimations are shown in Figure A.2. Across almost all estimations
there is no significant effect from being assigned to artificial peer groups. The results indicate that, on
average across estimations, we would see no significant placebo peer effect. In fact, the magnitude of
the results is much closer to zero than the baseline results reported in Figure 2. The significance of the
control variables does not change as expected. This suggests that our finding is an actual peer-group
effect. However, with this way of constructing artificial peer groups, we risk combining students in
placebo peer groups that are in fact from the same original peer group, which could drive a significant
result. Thus, for further research, alternative ways of creating placebo groups should be considered.
While the randomly assigned first-year classes are meant to capture the network in which students
interact academically and socially, studies have shown that the peer effects are working through smaller
sub-units such as study partnerships (Carrell et al., 2009) and roommates (Sacerdote, 2001). Common
to these findings is that students interact more regularly with their study partners and their roommates
as compared to the larger social group in which they are placed. To investigate the hypothesis that
peer effects are stronger among students who interact more we experiment with additional measures of
peer groups. We construct two alternative, and possibly stronger, peer group measures for the cohort
enrolled in 2001. These measures are based on the elective courses taken throughout the second and
third year of the bachelor’s studies.
The first and least restrictive measure requires that classmates have attended at least one common
elective course. More formally, individual 𝑖’s peer group (𝑔𝑖𝑗,ℎ) includes all individuals 𝑗 who were
randomly assigned to the same class ℎ as individual 𝑖 in the first year, and have attended at least one
common elective course during the second or third year. The second measure is more restrictive and
requires that classmates in the first year attend at least two elective courses together.26 If students
26The maximim number of elective courses in the Business Economics program is five, and thus in order to ensure
at least one sub-group within each first-year peer group we do not allow for a measure based on three common elective
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interact more intensively with students they spend more time with and/or share similar interest with,
then we expect the peer effect to be stronger. However, given the voluntary nature of the elective
courses on which we base the sub-peer group measures, we face the problem of self-selection causing
the estimates to be upward biased. It is important to note that the selection is limited to within
first-year assigned peer groups.
Estimation results including our preferred first-year peer-group measure and additional control
variables for the 2001 cohort are reported in Table A.3. We find that both the smaller peer-group
measures are positive and statistically significant. In other words, we find an additional effect from
taking at least one elective course together beyond the observed effect from belonging to the same
first-year peer group. Particularly, we find that students who had at least one elective course together
at some point during their undergraduate studies are 6.4 percentages point more likely to enroll in the
same master’s degree program. Compared to the partial effects estimated from Equations (2) and (3),
this is a large yet comparable peer effect to the effect found by De Giorgi et al. (2010).
The last central threat to the definition of our peer-group measure is measurement error. Sojourner
(2013) and Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) discuss identification of peer effects in the presence of
measurement error generated by misresponses and/or missing values leading to incomplete peer groups.
The first type of measurement error is less of a concern in this paper as we exclusively use data from
the Danish register and the university administration database. The second type of measurement error
is more relevant as our measure of peer groups may not include the relevant set of peers. For instance,
if the relevant peer group includes friends outside the assigned first-year group.
Another possibility is that students unofficially change group or follow different exercise classes in
some of the subjects. This might occur if some teaching assistants are better or due to incompatibility
between the course schedule for exercise classes in the students’ first-year group and their part-time
job. We expect this problem to be less pronounced in the first year or at least the first semester when
the institutional framework is still new to the students, which we expect makes students less likely
to unofficially shop between exercise classes. If the measurement error is random in any of the two
cases, which is not unlikely, then the OLS underestimate the true effect (i.e. attenuation bias). Thus,
presence of a random measurement error in our peer-group measure means that the true coefficient is
larger in absolute value. The estimated effect of 1.3-3.0 percentages points should therefore be regarded
as a lower bound estimate of the peer effect in degree choice.
courses.
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6 Does Schooling Choice Lead to Inefficiencies?
We now proceed to analyze students’ educational achievements in their master’s studies and their
subsequent labor market outcome based on how they chose their degree. We distinguish between two
decision modes, namely whether they choose a specific master’s degree based on their own revealed
abilities or based on their peers’ behavior.
We follow a similar approach to De Giorgi et al. (2010) and create indicators of whether students
follow their peers, their potential, both, or neither in the choice of degree. In contrast to De Giorgi
et al. (2010), we consider a larger number of groups based on a larger number of master’s degrees and
measure abilities relative to the peer group rather than the entire cohort. The number of groups is
determined by the number of master’s degree programs offered each year. Concretely, we first construct
a measure of “peer impact”, 𝑓𝑖, and then a measure of “relative ability,” 𝑞𝑖. Combining these measures
we divide students into four different decision modes.
The measure of peer impact, 𝑓𝑖, measures the relative fraction of peers who choose the same degree
program. If student 𝑖 chose the master’s degree 𝑘, then 𝑓𝑖 captures the fraction of 𝑖’s peers who also
choose degree 𝑘 relative to the entire cohort. Formally, 𝑓𝑖 is defined as follows:
𝑓𝑖 =
𝑁−1ℎ
∑︀
1[𝑚𝑗,ℎ=𝑘]
𝑁−1
∑︀
1[𝑚𝑗=𝑘]
if 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑘 (4)
where 𝑘 is an indicator of the master’s degree, 𝑚𝑖 is the indicator of individual 𝑖’s degree choice, while
ℎ captures the first-year peer group. Thus, if 𝑓𝑖 > 1, it means that in 𝑖’s peer group the share of
individuals who choose degree 𝑘 is higher than the average share in the cohort. Hence, 𝑓𝑖 > 1 is taken
as suggested evidence that individual 𝑖 followed his/her peers in choice of specialization.
The measure of relative ability, 𝑞𝑖, measures individual 𝑖’s relative educational achievement in
mandatory courses relevant for individual 𝑖’s chosen master’s degree. If student 𝑖 chose the master’s
degree 𝑘, then 𝑞𝑖 is computed as the ratio between 𝑖’s average grade in the mandatory courses relevant
for degree 𝑘 and 𝑖’s average grade in the other mandatory courses. We normalize this measure by the
relative performance of 𝑖’s peer group. We choose the reference group as 𝑖’s classmates the first year of
the undergraduate studies, i.e. our preferred peer-group measure, as these individuals are more likely
to be the group of students with whom 𝑖 compares him/herself.27 Formally, 𝑞𝑖 is defined as follows:
𝑞𝑖 =
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑘𝑖
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑂𝑘𝑖
×
∑︀
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑂𝑘𝑗∑︀
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑘𝑗
if 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑘, ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 𝑖 ̸= 𝑗 & 𝑔𝑖𝑗,ℎ = 1 (5)
27The subsequent results are not sentitive to the choice of reference group.
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where 𝑅𝑘 is the set of relevant mandatory undergraduate courses for master’s 𝑘, 𝑂𝑘 is the set of other
mandatory undergraduate courses, and 𝑔𝑖𝑗,ℎ = 1 indicate that 𝑖 and 𝑗 belong to the same peer group
ℎ. If 𝑞𝑖 > 1, it means that individual 𝑖 performed better in courses relevant for the chosen degree
compared to 𝑖’s peers.28 Thus, if 𝑞𝑖 < 1, we interpret it as evidence that individual 𝑖 did not follow
his/her potential.
We constructed the sets 𝑅𝑘 and 𝑂𝑘 based on answers about the most important mandatory courses
from the responsible professor of each of the master’s programs offered at CBS. For four master’s
programs, it was either not possible to obtain the list of the most important mandatory courses or
the degree were no longer offered, in which case the responsible person could not be identified. In
these cases, we used the online available enrollment requirements to create the set of relevant courses.
Moreover, we consider only students who chose one of the 15 most commonly chosen degrees (see
Table A.1). More details about the mandatory courses in Business Economics and the master’s degree
programs offered can be found in the supplementary material.
Based on the indicators 𝑞𝑖 and 𝑓𝑖 we create four groups similar to De Giorgi et al. (2010). For each
of the groups we create a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the student belongs to the decision
mode, and zero otherwise. The different decision modes are as follows:
∙ Following one’s peers and potential: 𝐷𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ = 1 if 𝑓𝑖 > 1 ∧ 𝑞𝑖 > 1
∙ Following one’s potential but not peers: 𝐷𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 = 1 if 𝑓𝑖 < 1 ∧ 𝑞𝑖 > 1
∙ Following one’s peers but not potential: 𝐷𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠 = 1 if 𝑓𝑖 > 1 ∧ 𝑞𝑖 < 1
∙ Following neither one’s potential nor peers: 𝐷𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒 = 1 if 𝑓𝑖 < 1 ∧ 𝑞𝑖 < 1
The distribution of students into the different decision modes are reported in Table 9. Most students
belonging to 𝐷𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 (32 percent) and fewest students neither follow their peers nor their potential
𝐷𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒 (17 percent). Some 21 percent follow their peers and 30 percent follow both their abilities and
their peers.
28Student 𝑖 performed better in courses relevant for the chosen degree relative to 𝑖’s peers whenever
𝐺𝑃𝐴
𝑅𝑘
𝑖
𝐺𝑃𝐴
𝑂𝑘
𝑖
>
∑︀
𝐺𝑃𝐴
𝑅𝑘
𝑗∑︀
𝐺𝑃𝐴
𝑂𝑘
𝑗
⇒ 𝑞𝑖 > 1
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Table 9: Grouping by decision mode
Followed peers: Did not follow peers: Total
𝑓𝑖 > 1 𝑓𝑖 < 1
Followed potential: 𝑔𝑖 > 1 943 1003 1,946
(30.1) (32.02)
Did not follow potential: 𝑔𝑖 < 1 644 542 1,186
(20.56) (17.31)
Total 1,587 1,545 3,132
Note: Frequency. Percentages reported in parenthesis. 𝑔𝑖 < 1 indicate that 𝑖
did not follow its potential and 𝑔𝑖 > 1 indicate that 𝑖 followed its potential.
The sample includes cohorts of Danish students enrolled between 1995-2004.
We use these groups to estimate the association between these decision modes and different out-
comes 𝑦𝑖. Formally, we estimate the following equation using standard OLS estimation procedures:
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷
𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒
𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐷
𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷
𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ
𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿𝑚 + 𝜂𝑙 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 (6)
where the reference group is the students who follow their potential, i.e. 𝐷𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙. The vector
𝑋𝑖 contains individual specific characteristics including a gender dummy, students’ enrollment age,
bachelor’s GPA, high school GPA, and a dummy for whether they went to a business high school.29
We also include master’s degree fixed effects (𝛿𝑚), as well as location fixed effects defined as the
place of residence 10 years prior to enrollment (𝜂𝑙) and enrollment year fixed effects (𝜃𝑡). The different
outcomes (𝑦𝑖) considered include educational achievement measured in terms of students’ final master’s
GPA, dropout rates, and labor market performance measured as the hourly wage in the first job after
graduation. When we consider the relationship between starting wages and decision mode about a
degree, we also include sector occupation dummies.
6.1 Results
Estimation results are presented in Table 10. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include only the dummies for the
different decision modes, while columns 2, 4, and 6 extend the specification with control variables.
The coefficient estimate on 𝐷𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠 is negative across all estimations. In contrast to the findings
by De Giorgi et al. (2010), the effect is not statistically significant for educational performance and
dropout. This result is likely to be explained by our previous findings. Here, we find that peer effects
are stronger among students who share similar abilities. If the students who follow their peers benefit
from efficient study partnerships with their peers, then the consequences from following peers might
29When included in Equation (6), bachelor’s and high school GPA are not transformed to the “7”-step scale.
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not be an adverse impact on performance. This could potentially cause students to perform even
better despite the fact that they did not choose a master’s degree in which they had a relative ability
advantage.
Table 10: Academic and labor market outcomes on decision modes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Master’s degree GPA Drop out Starting wage (log)
𝐷𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒 -0.198* -0.115 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006
(0.105) (0.084) (0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014)
𝐷𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 -0.153 -0.106 -0.009 -0.009 -0.029* -0.027*
(0.098) (0.082) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
𝐷𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ -0.036 0.011 -0.003 -0.000 -0.012 -0.009
(0.089) (0.072) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012)
Starting age -0.043** 0.011** 0.006*
(0.020) (0.004) (0.003)
GPA from master’s degree 0.010***
(0.003)
GPA from bachelor’s degree 1.146*** -0.077***
(0.043) (0.010)
GPA from high school 0.353*** 0.004 0.013*
(0.046) (0.010) (0.007)
Business high school dummy -0.196*** 0.028* -0.005
(0.073) (0.016) (0.012)
Gender, female=1 -0.038 -0.038*** -0.056***
(0.063) (0.013) (0.011)
Mother self-employed 0.151 0.023 0.024
(0.135) (0.030) (0.021)
Father self-employed 0.142 -0.003 -0.014
(0.088) (0.019) (0.017)
Master’s degree fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Starting year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parental education fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Sector fixed effect No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2633 2633 3132 3132 1854 1854
Note: OLS. Standard errors reported in parenthesis. Estimation sample includes cohorts of Dan-
ish students enrolled in the period 1995-2004. The reference group is ability-driven individuals
(𝐷𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙). In the wage regression wage observations below and above the 1 % and 99 % per-
centile, respectively, are dropped. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The coefficient estimate on 𝐷𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠 is negative and significant at the 10 percent level when starting
wages are model. Thus, even though following peers is not negatively associated with educational
performance, it is negatively reflected in starting wages. If students follow peers into less profitable
master’s programs, this might explain this results.
Finally, we do observe a borderline significant and negative effect from neither following peers nor
potential (𝐷𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒) on master’s GPA, indicating an adverse impact relative to following one’s potential.
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However, this effect does not stay significant when individual specific controls are included.
We test the sensitivity of the results in two ways. First, the measure of relative abilities (𝑞𝑖) might
be measured with error for the master’s programs for which we have used the enrollment criteria
specified online. To test the sensitivity of the results, we exclude students enrolled in programs where
the relevant set of courses is not based on answers from the responsible professor. The estimation
results are found to be slightly stronger, but does not change qualitatively as shown in Table A.4.
Second, the consequences from following one’s peers might differ for non-Danish students. Estimation
results on the full sample including non-Danish students are shown in the supplementary material to
this paper. Again, we find that our main results hold.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined whether students’ choices of a master’s degree are influenced by the
behavior of peers. It is widely recognized that peers influence individual outcomes such as student
performance (e.g., Sacerdote, 2011; Lavy et al., 2012; Carrell et al., 2013) while the role of peers in
students’ educational decision about specialization is less well-documented. Previous studies have
shown that roommate peer effects are not important in determining choice of major (Sacerdote, 2001),
while classroom peers are important among undergraduates when choosing their major (De Giorgi
et al., 2010). While the later study documents the importance of peers in major choice, it does not
consider heterogeneous effects within peer-group influence.
To our knowledge, this paper constitutes the first attempt to use a novel testing strategy—while
accounting for endogeneity of peers—to distinguish assortative criteria in order to analyze whether
peer influence or individual characteristics determine students’ choice of master’s degree. We subse-
quently examine whether peer influence is heterogeneous and the consequences for future educational
achievement and labor market outcomes. The data requirements for testing the importance of peers in
degree choice and impact on labor market outcomes are quite daunting; however, we solve this by using
administrative university data that follow 10 cohorts of students through their entire study lifecycle
(approximately five years) combined with Danish register data.
At the start of the first year of undergraduate studies, students are randomly assigned to exercise
classes in which the vast majority of students stay throughout their entire bachelor’s studies. Using
first-year exercise classes as our preferred peer-group measure, we find that peers are important for
students’ postgraduate choice. However, the effect is particularly strong among students who share
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similar abilities. We find that students revealed abilities measured as first-year GPA and bachelor’s
GPA as well as age are most important. Contrary to expectations, we do not find that similarities in
other individual or parental characteristics explain degree choice. In the second part of the analysis,
we find that the decision to follow peers has only limited impact on academic achievement and no
impact on dropout rates and students’ starting wage.
Overall, the result demonstrates that even within a group of highly selected university students,
peer effects are important to understand not only regarding students’ outcomes, but also regarding
central educational decisions such as the choice of a master’s degree. We conclude that peer influence
in degree choice is not a likely explanation for why such decisions are sometimes found to be inefficient
(e.g., Rochat and Demeulemeester, 2001; Robst, 2007). One explanation supported by the evidence in
this paper is that students are more likely to follow peers with similar revealed abilities, limiting the
adverse consequences from their master’s degree choice on educational performance and starting wage
after graduation. Another potential explanation is that following peers into postgraduate studies make
it easier to form study partnerships, which might have a positive impact on students’ outcome.
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Appendix A Additional Estimations and Descriptive Statistics
Table A.1: List of Master’s Programs Offered by Students Characteristics
Degree Name of master’s degree program All cohorts 2001 cohort
(𝑘) Frequency Percent Bachelor’s
GPA
Frequency Percent Bachelor’s
GPA
M1 M.Sc. in Business Administration and
Auditing (CMA)
405 12.93 6.15 45 13.12 5.97
M2 M.Sc. in Applied Economics &
Finance (CMAEF)
189 6.03 7.91 24 7.00 7.15
M3 M.Sc. in Design and Communication
Management (CMDCM)
170 5.43 5.43 *
M4 M.Sc. in Economic Marketing
(CMEMF)
644 20.56 5.81 69 20.12 5.93
M5 M.Sc. in Management Accounting &
Control (CMEST)
156 4.98 6.42 15 4.37 6.09
M6 M.Sc. in Finance and Accounting
(CMFR)
574 18.33 7.40 72 20.99 6.69
M7 M.Sc. in Finance & Strategic
Management (CMFSM)
113 3.61 7.63 19 5.54 8.17
M8 M.Sc. in Human Resource
Management (CMHRM)
118 3.77 5.84 *
M9 M.Sc. in International Business
(CMIBS)
68 2.17 5.92 8 2.33 6.55
M10 M.Sc. in International Marketing and
Management (CMIMM)
196 6.44 8.19 13 3.79 6.45
M11 M.Sc. in Marketing Communications
Management (CMMCM)
36 1.15 6.28 10 2.92 6.04
M12 M.Sc. in Management of Innovation
& Business Development (CMMIB)
57 1.82 6.03 15 4.37 5.88
M13 M.Sc. in Management of Technology
(CMMOT)
43 1.37 6.41 *
M14 M.Sc. in Supply Chain Management
(CMSCM)
229 7.31 5.87 36 10.50 6.2
M15 M.Sc. in Business Administration and
Organization (CMSOL)
134 6.04 8.03 5 1.46 7.82
3,132 343
Note: The name of master’s degree program in parenthesis refer to the Danish abbreviation of the degree. “*” means that
we are not able to disclose the information due to discretion roles set by Statistics Denmark. // Less than 1.25-percent
of the students are registered with one of the following master’s programs: M.Sc. in Strategic Market Creation, M.Sc.
in International/Industrial Marketing and Purchasing, M.Sc. in Strategy, Organization and Leadership, M.Sc. in Business
Economics and Computer Science, M.Sc. in Economics of International Strategy and Governance, M.Sc. in Business Economics
and Philosophy, M.Sc. in Business Administration and Modern Languages, M.Sc. in Business Economics and Business Law,
and M.Sc. in Creative Business Processes. For this reason they are excluded from the main analyses. As a robustness check
we include these master’s programs - see Figure A.1.
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Figure A.1: Robustness: Peer Effects in the Choice of Master’s Degree
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Note: Linear Probability Model. Coefficient estimates for first-year peer group reported. All estimations include
control variables similar to the ones included in Table 4. The estimation samples include students that did not
continue with a master’s degree at CBS or graduated from one of the master’s degree program reported in footnote
to Table A.1.
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Figure A.2: Robustness: Placebo peer effects in the choice of master’s degree
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Note: Linear Probability Model. Coefficient estimates for first-year peer group reported. All estimations include
control variables similar to the ones included in Table 4. The estimation samples include Danish students who
enrolled in undergraduate studies at CBS in the period 1995-2004.
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Table A.3: Robustness: Alternative peer-group measures in choice of master’s degree
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
At least one common elective 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.063***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
At least two common electives 0.132*** 0.131*** 0.126***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
First-year peer group 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 58,653 58,653 58,653 58,653 58,653 58,653
Note: Linear Probability Model. Dependent variable is equal to 1 if 𝑖 and 𝑗 are enrolled in the
same master’s program. Standard errors reported in parenthesis. Estimation sample includes Danish
students enrolled in undergraduate studies at CBS in 2001. All estimations include control variables
similar to Table 4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
225
Table A.4: Robustness: Academic and labor market outcomes on decision modes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Master’s degree GPA Drop out Starting wage (log)
𝐷𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒 -0.249** -0.152* -0.017 -0.018 -0.007 -0.004
(0.112) (0.089) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014)
𝐷𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 -0.179* -0.120 -0.014 -0.014 -0.033* -0.031*
(0.106) (0.088) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
𝐷𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ -0.061 0.013 0.006 0.007 -0.011 -0.008
(0.096) (0.077) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012)
Starting age -0.053** 0.011** 0.006*
(0.022) (0.005) (0.003)
GPA from master’s 0.009**
(0.004)
GPA from bachelor’s 1.182*** -0.077***
(0.046) (0.010)
GPA from high school 0.357*** 0.009 0.016**
(0.049) (0.010) (0.008)
Business high school dummy -0.182** 0.021 -0.003
(0.079) (0.017) (0.012)
Gender, female=1 -0.080 -0.038*** -0.050***
(0.068) (0.014) (0.011)
Mother as self-employed 0.211 0.038 0.023
(0.150) (0.033) (0.021)
Father as self-employed 0.200** -0.016 -0.015
(0.091) (0.020) (0.018)
Master’s degree fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Starting year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parental education fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Sector fixed effect No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2292 2292 2717 2717 1641 1641
Note: OLS. Standard errors reported in parenthesis. Sample includes cohorts of Danish students
enrolled in undergraduate studies at CBS in the period 1995-2004. The reference group is ability
driven individuals (𝐷𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙). In the wage regression wage observations below and above the 1 %
and 99 % percentile, respectively, are dropped. We exclude students enrolled in programs where the
relevant set of courses is not based on answers from the responsible professor. We exclude students
that enrolled in the master’s programs M3, M9, M13, and M15 due to the low share that graduated
- for details of the programs see Table A.1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix B Supplementary Material
B.1 Institutional Details and Master’s Programs Offered
Copenhagen Business School (CBS) is the largest business school in Denmark. The largest under-
graduate program at CBS is Business Economics, and the focus of this paper. It takes three years to
complete the undergraduate program, after which students can enroll in one of the master’s degrees
offered at CBS, at a different institution, or apply for a job. Contrary to higher-education traditions in
many parts of the world, the vast majority of bachelor’s students also enroll in a two-year master’s pro-
gram. Part of the explanation is that it is not commonly accepted that a bachelor’s degree is sufficient
in order to find a relevant job with a Danish employer. More than 90 percent of the undergraduate
students who enrolled in and subsequently graduated from the Business Economics bachelor’s program
at CBS in the period 1995-2004 choose to continue in one of the two-year master’s programs offered
by CBS.
During the bachelor’s program (i.e. first three years), students primarily have mandatory courses.
Table B.1 provides a list of mandatory courses and specifies the cohorts for which the course was
mandatory. For instance, Financing was a mandatory course for all cohorts enrolled in Business
Economics in the academic years between 1995-2004, while Information Technology was mandatory
only for cohorts enrolled after 1996.
In the second part of the analysis in the paper, we investigate whether choice of master’s program
leads to inefficiencies in terms of educational achievements and subsequent labor market outcomes.
We construct a measure of revealed ability (𝑞𝑖) measured as peers’ relative educational achievement
in relevant mandatory courses. To identify the relevant mandatory courses we first drop the master’s
programs that are not specifically targeted on students at the Business Economics bachelor’s program.
Students in these master’s programs constitute less than 1.29 percent of the sample. For the remaining
master’s programs we ask the responsible professor for each master’s program to select up to four
courses from a roster list of mandatory courses (listed in Table B.1). In four cases we were not able to
obtain information from the responsible professor. For these master’s programs we identify the set of
relevant mandatory courses based on the enrollment requirements for each of the programs specified
online. Table B.2 lists the relevant courses by master’s program and specify whether the information
is obtained from descriptions of enrollment requirements. Also, it specifies the years for which the
master’s program was offered at CBS. We test the sensitivity of the results by excluding students
enrolled in master’s programs where the relevant set of courses was not based on answers from the
228
responsible professor.
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Table B.2: List of Master’s Programs Matched with Relevant Mandatory Courses
Degree
(𝑘)
Name of master’s degree program Relevant mandatory courses Enrollment
requirements
Offered
M1 M.Sc. in Business Administration and
Auditing (CMA)
Financial accounting, Business Law,
Management accounting
1995-2004
M2 M.Sc. in Applied Economics &
Finance (CMAEF)
Financing, Macroeconomics,
Microeconomics, Statistics
1995-2004
M3 M.Sc. in Design and Communication
Management (CMDCM)
- Yes 1995-2001
M4 M.Sc. in Economic Marketing
(CMEMF)
Marketing, Organizational methods
(operational part)
1995-2004
M5 M.Sc. in Management Accounting &
Control (CMEST)
Contextual theory about firms,
Organizational methods (operational part),
Company’s decision analysis, Management
accounting
1995-2002
M6 M.Sc. in Finance and Accounting
(CMFR)
Financial accounting, Business law,
Financing, Statistics
1995-2004
M7 M.Sc. in Finance & Strategic
Management (CMFSM)
Empirical economics and methodology,
Financing, Contextual theory about firms,
Statistics
1999-2004
M8 M.Sc. in Human Resource
Management (CMHRM)
Contextual theory about firms,
Organizational methods (methodological
part), Organizational methords(operational
part), Company’s decision analysis
1995-2004
M9 M.Sc. in International Business
(CMIBS)
- Yes 1995-2004
M10 M.Sc. in International Marketing and
Management (CMIMM)
Contextual theory about firms, Marketing,
Organizational methods (methodological
part), Company’s decision analysis
1995-2004
M11 M.Sc. in Marketing Communications
Management (CMMCM)
Marketing, Empirical economics and
methodology, Company’s decision analysis
2000-2004
M12 M.Sc. in Management of Innovation
& Business Development (CMMIB)
Information technology, Contextual theory
about firms, Organizational methods
(operational part), Company’s decision
analysis
1999-2004
M13 M.Sc. in Management of Technology
(CMMOT)
- Yes 1995-1999
M14 M.Sc. in Supply Chain Management
(CMSCM)
Empirical economics and methodology,
Microeconomics, Company’s decision
analysis
1995-2004
M15 M.Sc. in Business Administration and
Organization (CMSOL)
- Yes 1995-2001
Note: The name of master’s degree program in parenthesis refer to the Danish abbreviation of the degree. Relevant
mandatory courses reported by the responsible professor of each of the master’s degrees offered. For master’s degrees where
the responsible professor was not located, we use online reported enrollment requirements. “Offered” refer to the period in
which the different degrees were offered to graduate students at CBS. Less than 1.29-percent of the students are registered with
one of the following master’s programs: M.Sc. in Strategic Market Creation, M.Sc. in International/Industrial Marketing
and Purchasing, M.Sc. in Strategy, Organization and Leadership, M.Sc. in Business Economics and Computer Science, M.Sc.
in Economics of International Strategy and Governance, M.Sc. in Business Economics and Philosophy, M.Sc. in Business
Administration and Modern Languages, M.Sc. in Business Economics and Business Law, M.SC. in Business Economics and
Language, and M.Sc. in Creative Business Processes. For this reason they are excluded from the main analyses. As a
robustness check we include these master’s programs - see Figure A.1 in the Appendix to the paper.
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B.2 Descriptive Statistics: Peer Groups
Table B.3 reports descriptive statistics for the individual group across a number of characteristics
including individual and academic outcomes for students enrolled in 2001. Overall, the groups are
not systematically different from each other in terms of number of students, gender, or academic
performance.30 Table B.4 shows similar descriptive statistics across all cohorts. The picture that
emerges is similar to the one for the cohort enrolled in 2001.
30Despite that the share of males looks slightly larger in group number 9 compared to the other groups, this difference
is not statistically significant.
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Table B.5 reports changes in exercise groups across the three years in Business Economics (under-
graduate studies). Columns 2-4 show average changes across all 10 cohorts, while columns 5-7 show
changes separately for the cohort enrolled in 2001. For the 2001 cohort, groups number 7 and 10 were
merged with other exercise classes in the second year. The number of groups fell further to 11 groups
in the third year as group number 3 was closed down and merged with other exercise classes. The
abolishment of some exercise classes increased the average number of students per exercise class in the
second and third year.
Table B.5: Group Changes Across Years
Group
All cohorts 2001 cohort
Number of individuals in each group
First year Second year Third year First year Second year Third year
1 20.90 22.30 21.70 25.00 32.00 33.00
2 23.10 27.22 28.25 23.00 31.00 36.00
3 21.50 23.20 23.78 22.00 22.00 *
4 22.40 25.90 27.00 25.00 29.00 33.00
5 21.20 25.56 25.13 22.00 27.00 39.00
6 20.80 22.88 23.20 23.00 29.00 35.00
7 21.30 23.38 25.43 25.00 𝑁𝐴 𝑁𝐴
8 22.40 22.70 27.00 26.00 29.00 *
9 21.40 21.67 20.38 24.00 24.00 *
10 19.20 20.67 22.13 19.00 𝑁𝐴 𝑁𝐴
11 21.80 21.80 23.22 26.00 27.00 26.00
12 20.70 22.88 21.33 25.00 30.00 28.00
13 22.40 23.11 26.22 30.00 32.00 32.00
14 23.50 24.30 28.5 28.00 31.00 37.00
15 11.0 11.00 11.00
16 13.00 12.00 12.50
17 15.50 14.00 14.00
18 17.00 16.00 14.00
Note: Means by peer group (i.e. exercise class). Groups number 15-18 only exist
for 1995 and 1996. “*” means that we are not able to disclose the information due
to discretion rules set by Statistics Denmark. “𝑁𝐴” implies that the groups (i.e.
exercise classes) no longer exist because the class was merged with other classes.
235
Test of Random Assignment into Peer Groups
The assumption that allows us to estimate and identify a peer effect is random assignment into first-year
groups. To do this we investigate whether peer-group assignment is correlated with individual socio-
economic and pre-educational characteristics. Tables B.6 and B.7 examine this by reporting estimation
results and F-statistics of the joint significance of all the explanatory variables (except enrollment age)
from a linear probability regression of the probability of being assigned into each group on individual
characteristics and pre-educational characteristics. Results are further discussed in the main text of
the paper.
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B.3 Full Sample Including Non-Danes
Summary Statistics
Tables B.8 and B.9 show summary statistics based on the full sample including non-Danes. We have
missing information for non-Danish students if they did not go to high school where the GPA could be
translated into the Danish scale by CBS. Furthermore, we have missing information on their wages if
they did not take a job with a Danish employer after graduation. Moreover, we are not able to account
for parental education or labor market background for non-Danes.
Table B.8: Descriptive Statistics: All Students
All cohorts 2001 cohort
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Individual student characteristics:
Starting age (years) 21.32 1.66 21.47 1.80
Gender (female=1) 0.31 0.46 0.34 0.47
Business high school (=1) 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40
General (mat) high school (=1) 0.59 0.49 0.64 0.48
High school GPA 6.93 1.96 6.83 1.85
First-year GPA 5.26 2.24 5.20 2.04
Bachelor’s GPA 6.40 2.10 6.39 1.82
Dropped out of master’s program (=1) 0.14 0.34 0.10 0.30
Master’s GPA 𝐴 7.05 1.96 6.97 1.79
Hourly wage (DKK)𝐵 184.49 37.81 188.65 38.07
Pleace of residence teen year prior to enrollment:
Region of Copenhagen 0.42 0.49 0.43 0.50
Zealand without Copenhagen 0.39 0.49 0.36 0.48
Jytland 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29
Fyn 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17
Other 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15
Outside Denmark (non-Danish) 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.25
Sector occupation in first job𝐵:
Agriculture, fishing and quarrying * * 𝑁𝐴 𝑁𝐴
Industries and utilities 0.092 0.29 * *
Construction * * * *
Trade, transport, info. and communication 0.216 0.41 0.24 0.43
Finance and business services 0.638 0.48 0.63 0.48
Public and personal services 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.19
Observations 3,290 367
Note: “*” means that we are not able to disclose the information due to discretion roles set
by Statistics Denmark. For the same reasons minimum and maximum are not reported.
“𝑁𝐴” indicates that there are no observations in that group. 𝐴Means reported for 2,601
students on final master’s degree GPA (286 observations for the 2001 cohort). 𝐵Means
reported for 1,810 observations on sector and hourly wages (250 observations for the 2001
cohort).
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Table B.9: Descriptive Statistic Across Peer Groups
All cohorts 2001 cohort
Mean Std.dev.
No. of
groups
Average
no. of
groups
Mean Std.dev.
No. of
groups
Group size (no. of students):
First-year peer group 22.37 5.16 147 14.7 26.21 2.78 14
Second-year peer group 24.00 7.81 137 13.7 30.58 3.58 12
Third-year peer group 25.09 11.59 131 13.1 33.36 11.53 11
First-year peer group characteristics:
Share of males 0.69 0.07 147 14.7 0.66 0.07 14
Age 21.34 0.78 147 14.7 21.46 0.42 14
High school GPA 8.39 0.19 147 14.7 8.36 0.18 14
First-year GPA 7.65 0.32 147 14.7 7.67 0.20 14
Bachelor’s GPA 8.15 0.32 147 14.7 8.18 0.11 14
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Choice of Master’s Program
Table B.10: Robustness: Peer Effects in the Choice of Master’s Degree (all students)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First-year peer group 0.010 0.010 0.010* 0.011*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Second-year peer group 0.011*
(0.006)
Third-year peer group 0.011**
(0.005)
Same gender (=0) -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Same location prior to enrollment (=0) -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Absolute difference in:
First-year GPA -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Bachelor’s GPA -0.007**
(0.003)
High school GPA -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 0.004* 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Sum of:
First-year GPA 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Bachelor’s GPA 0.000
(0.003)
High school GPA -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 67,161 67,161 67,161 67,161 67,161 67,161
Note: Linear Probability Model. Dependent variable is equal to 1 if 𝑖 and 𝑗 are enrolled in the same
master’s degree. Standard errors reported in parenthesis. Estimation sample includes all students (i.e.
Danish and non-Danish) who enrolled in undergraduate studies at CBS in 2001. All estimations include
cohort and peer-group fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.10 shows estimation results using the full sample of postgraduate students including non-
Danish students. Again, we find that students randomly assigned to the same exercise class upon
enrollment at the bachelor’s level are more likely to study for the same degree; however, the estimate
is at best statistically significant at the 10-percent level when the full sample is used. Since foreign
students studying in Denmark are likely to have chosen Copenhagen Business School for a specific
reason and maybe for a specific master’s program, we would also expect them to be less prone to peer
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influence, explaining the insignificant and lower coefficient estimate reported in column 2. Figure B.1
presents the estimation results on our main variable of interest, first-year peer group, across all cohorts.
In line with the results for 2001 detailed above, we find that peer influence is less strong in terms of
significance in master’s choice when the entire sample of students is considered.
Figure B.1: Robustness: Peer Effects in the Choice of Master’s Degree (all students)
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Note: Linear Probability Model. Coefficient estimates for first-year peer group reported. All estimations include
control variables similar to the ones included in Table B.10. The estimation samples include all students (i.e. Danish
and non-Danish) who enrolled in undergraduate studies at CBS in the period 1995-2004.
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Does Schooling Choice Lead to Inefficiencies?
The distribution of students into the different decision modes based on the full sample (i.e. Danish and
non-Danish students) is reported in Table B.11.31 Twenty-nine percent of the students followed both
peer and potential, meaning that 𝐷𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ = 1. Seventeen percent followed neither peer nor potential, 21
percent followed their peer without following their potential at the same time, and, 32 percent of the
students followed only their potential. The distribution is almost identical to the distribution observed
in the sample including only Danish students.
Table B.11: Grouping by Decision Mode (all students)
Followed peers: Did not follow peers: Total
𝑓𝑖 > 1 𝑓𝑖 < 1
Followed abilities: 𝑔𝑖 > 1 985 1,043 2,028
(29.94) (31.70)
Did not follow abilities: 𝑔𝑖 < 1 679 583 1,262
(20.64) (17.72)
Total 1,664 1,626 3,290
Note: Frequency. Percentages reported in parenthesis. 𝑔𝑖 < 1 indicates “did
not follow potential” and 𝑔𝑖 > 1 indicates followed potential. The sample
includes all students (Danish and non-Danish) enrolled in undergraduate
studies at CBS in the period 1995-2004.
Estimation results using the full sample are presented in Table B.12. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include
only the dummies for the different decision modes, while columns 2, 4, and 6 extend the specification
with control variables.
Our main interest is the comparison between the students who follow their abilities (𝐷𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 -
reference group) and students who follow their peers (𝐷𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠). The coefficient estimate on 𝐷𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠 is
negative across all estimations but not statistically significant when control variables are included.
These results are almost identical to the results reported in the main text. We therefore conclude that
the result obtained in the main text is not driven by exclusion of non-Danish students.
31The different decision modes are as follows: (i) Following one’s peers and potential: 𝐷𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ = 1 if 𝑓𝑖 > 1 ∧ 𝑞𝑖 > 1,
(ii) following one’s potential but not peers: 𝐷𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 = 1 if 𝑓𝑖 < 1∧ 𝑞𝑖 > 1, (iii) following one’s peers but not potential:
𝐷𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠 = 1 if 𝑓𝑖 > 1 ∧ 𝑞𝑖 < 1, and (iv) following neither one’s potential nor peers: 𝐷𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒 = 1 if 𝑓𝑖 < 1 ∧ 𝑞𝑖 < 1. Here
𝑓𝑖 measures the relative fraction of peers who choose the same degree program, while 𝑞𝑖 measures individual 𝑖’s relative
educational achievement in mandatory courses relevant for individual 𝑖’s chosen master’s degree.
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Table B.12: Academic and Labor Market Outcomes on Decision Modes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Master GPA Drop out Starting wage (log)
𝐷𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒 -0.189* -0.133 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004
(0.101) (0.081) (0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014)
𝐷𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 -0.177* -0.118 -0.004 -0.008 -0.028* -0.027*
(0.095) (0.080) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
𝐷𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ -0.077 -0.019 -0.007 -0.007 -0.015 -0.012
(0.087) (0.070) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012)
Starting age -0.042** 0.012*** 0.005
(0.018) (0.004) (0.003)
GPA from master’s degree 0.010***
(0.003)
GPA from bachelor’s degree 1.133*** -0.078***
(0.043) (0.009)
GPA from high school 0.343*** 0.002 0.010
(0.043) (0.010) (0.007)
Business high school dummy -0.255*** 0.030** -0.004
(0.070) (0.015) (0.012)
Gender (female=1) -0.071 -0.036*** -0.053***
(0.061) (0.013) (0.011)
Master fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Starting year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effect Yes Yes
Observations 2,757 2,757 3,290 3,290 1,918 1,918
Note: OLS. Standard errors reported in parenthesis. Estimation sample includes all students
(Danish and non-Danish) enrolled between 1995 and 2004. The reference group is ability-
driven individuals (𝐷𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙). In the wage regression wage observations below and above
the 1% and 99% percentile, respectively, are dropped. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B.4 Comparison of Grading Systems
Table B.13 compares the Danish grading scale (both the “13” and the “7” scales) to the ECTS and the
American grading scale, respectively. Thus, an average degree of 7 on the Danish “7” scale corresponds
to a C on the ECTS scale and a B+ on the American scale (4.5).
Table B.13: Academic Grading Scale Comparison
Definition Excellent Very good Good Satisfactory Passed Failed
Danish “13” scale (old scale) 13 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 03 00
Danish “7” scale (new scale) 12 12 10 7 7 4 02 00 00 -3
ECTS scale A A B C C D E Fx Fx F
American scale (4.0) A A- B+ B B- C+ C D F F
American scale (4.3) A+ A A- B+ B B- C D F F
American scale (4.5) A+ A+ A B+ B+ B C+ D F F
Note: At higher education institutions, the Danish “13” scale was replaced by a new “7” scale in 2007.
Source: World Education Services.
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Conclusion
This thesis is concerned with the influence of educational decisions on labor market outcomes and
the mechanisms explaining these different educational decisions. The research questions asked all fall
under the heading of economics of education and labor and are addressed empirically by means of
Danish micro data. The topics in this thesis are motivated by existing research that debates how
different educational decisions of individuals can explain variation in welfare, both at the individual
and at the country level. However, there is still a need for better knowledge of these topics. Chapter
1 and Chapter 2 complement the literature by providing new empirical evidence on the returns to
educational decision. Chapter 1 investigates the returns to a master’s degree in business economics
and management and Chapter 2 looks at how the choice of elective courses within a specific master’s
program is reflected in both the probability of obtaining a leadership position and wage outcomes.
Inspired by the findings in the first two chapters, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 cast light on determinants
of educational choices and in particular on peer effects on tertiary education decisions. Chapter 3
investigates peer effects on the decision of dropping out of university and Chapter 4 examines peer
effects in master’s degree choice.
Chapter 1 compares labor market outcomes from graduates with master’s degrees in business
economics and management to labor market outcomes from graduates with master’s degrees from
other fields in the social sciences. Using an Instrumental Variables (IV) approach to address selection
into educational field, the results from Chapter 1 show that a master’s degree in business economics
and management results in significantly higher wage outcomes and a higher probability of obtaining
employment in the private sector. By contrast to the literature that finds that the gender wage gap can
be explained by differences in type of educational field, we find that controlling for a master’s degree
in business economics and management does not affect the gender wage gap prevalent in our sample.
Chapter 2 examines how self-selected differences in the curriculum within the same master’s pro-
gram correspond to differences in labor market outcomes. We show in this chapter how elective courses
in management are associated with an increased probability of obtaining leadership. Moreover, and in
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line with previous research, we show how math-related courses such as courses in finance and account-
ing are positively associated with wage outcomes. Finally, our results show how being educationally
diversified among classical business courses is reflected positively in the probability of obtaining a
leadership position whereas being educationally diversified outside the classical business school type
courses has no significant effect.
Chapters 3 and 4 estimate peer effects and exploit data on students who were randomly assigned into
groups at enrollment in the largest bachelor’s program at CBS to overcome the problem of endogenous
selection of peers. Similar to other papers in the literature, these randomly assigned groups work as
our definition of peer groups.
Chapter 3 shows how women are more likely to drop out of the first year of university if they have
high ability peers. Chapter 3 also show that women’s probabilities of dropping out are decreasing
with their peer group ranks. Moreover, when including peer group rank in my model, high school
GPA becomes insignificant in predicting the drop out probability for women. By contrast, men are
unaffected by both the ability level of their peers and their peer group rank. However, absolute ability,
measured by high school GPA, is still a significant predictor of men’s probability of dropping out even
after controlling for peer group rank. These results underline how men and women react differently to
their peers and suggests that the comparison to peers is more important for women’s decision to drop
out than their absolute ability level. The opposite seems to be true for men.
Chapter 4 shows how the choice of a master’s degree is impacted by peers. We find that pairs of
students assigned to the same exercise group when enrolled in a bachelor’s program are more likely to
choose the same master’s degree program. Particularly, we also find that students’ with similar first-
year GPA from the bachelor’s program experience a stronger peer effect indicating that peer effects
are heterogeneous across individuals with different ability levels. Finally, we see no adverse impact
of following your peers into a master’s degree program on master’s degree GPA or the probability of
dropping out of the master’s program.
This thesis studies individual educational decisions, their determinants, and their consequences.
Overall, I find that educational decisions are significantly related to differences in labor market out-
comes. Moreover, I find peer effects on both the decision to drop out of university and on the choice of
master’s program. From a policy perspective, my findings can help inform politicians about how differ-
ent study fields and curriculum characteristics are reflected in labor market outcomes and I can provide
information about how prospective and current students decide on their educational investments.
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Appendix A The Danish Education System
Figure A.1: Pathways of the Danish Education System
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The thesis is concerned mostly with the returns to study fields at the tertiary level and with the
mechanisms underlying tertiary educational investment decisions and address these topics using Danish
micro data. Thus, before reading this thesis, it might be beneficial to have an introduction to the Danish
education system. Danish students must fulfill certain requirements to proceed to tertiary education
and the Danish education system also has a somewhat different structure from those of other countries.
For example, in Denmark almost everyone who graduates with a bachelor’s degree continues into a
master’s program, because a bachelor’s degree is not valued highly in the Danish labor market. But,
in contrast with other countries such as the U.S., very few students with master’s degrees continue
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into doctoral programs. The majority of students with master’s degrees is ready for and demanded by
the labor market. A sketch of the different pathways through the Danish education system is shown
in Figure A.1.
Before 2007, Danish students were graded on the the Danish “13” scale. This scale is named for
its highest grade, 13, which can only be achieved with an exceptionally independent and excellent
performance. The lowest passing grade is 6. This scale does not use the value 12, skipping directly
from 11 to 13, and 13 is almost never awarded. A 7-step grading scale replaced the “13” system in
2007, with the objective that grading should be absolute in order to measure students’ achievements
relative to a pre-defined fixed standard. This scheme uses 7 values. The lowest passing grade is 2, the
maximum grade is 12, and the remaining passing grades are 4, 7, 10, and 12. To clarify this, Table A.1
compares both Danish grading scales (the “13” and the “7” scales) with the ECTS and the American
grading scale. This table is similar to that in Appendix B of Chapter 4. As can be seen, a grade of 7
on the Danish “7” scale corresponds to a C on the ECTS scale and a B+ on the American scale (4.5).
Table A.1: Academic Grading Scale Comparison
Definition Excellent Very good Good Satisfactory Passed Failed
Danish “13” scale (old scale) 13 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 03 00
Danish “7” scale (new scale) 12 12 10 7 7 4 02 00 00 -3
ECTS scale A A B C C D E Fx Fx F
American scale (4.0) A A- B+ B B- C+ C D F F
American scale (4.3) A+ A A- B+ B B- C D F F
American scale (4.5) A+ A+ A B+ B+ B C+ D F F
Note: At higher education institutions, the Danish “13” scale was replaced by a new “7” scale in 2007.
Source: World Education Services.
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